Description
Book SynopsisThis major volume presents a collection of classic articles on economic regulation and its reform. The topics covered include the political economy of regulation, efficient pricing for regulated firms, incentive regulation, the empirical effects of economic regulation in practice and network access pricing for competitive entrants.
Economic Regulation will be an essential source of reference for scholars and students of industrial organization, including natural monopoly regulation, regulatory reform and deregulation.
Trade Review'This is a very good collection of important papers, that represent a judicious mix of those that will appeal to theoretical economists and those that are relevant in the real world. Paul Joskow's introduction is a fascinating, balanced and informative survey of work and thinking in this area. The book can be strongly recommended to students and to all those involved in the practice of regulation, whether as regulated or regulator.' -- Stephen Littlechild, University of Cambridge, UK
Table of ContentsContents: Acknowledgements • Introduction Part I: Theories of Economic Regulation 1. George J. Stigler (1971), ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ 2. Richard A. Posner (1971), ‘Taxation by Regulation’ 3. Paul L. Joskow (1974), ‘Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation’ 4. Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast (1987), ‘Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control’ 5. Sam Peltzman (1989), ‘The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation’ and ‘Comments and Discussion’ Part II: Efficient Pricing for Natural Monopolies when Regulators are Well Informed 6. William J. Baumol (1977), ‘On the Proper Cost Tests for Natural Monopoly in a Multiproduct Industry’ 7. M. Boiteux (1960), ‘Peak-Load Pricing’ 8. Dennis W. Carlton (1977), ‘Peak Load Pricing with Stochastic Demand’ 9. William J. Baumol and David F. Bradford (1970), ‘Optimal Departures From Marginal Cost Pricing’ 10. Leonard J. Mirman and David Sibley (1980), ‘Optimal Nonlinear Prices for Multiproduct Monopolies’ Part III: Regulation when Regulators are Imperfectly Informed 11. William J. Baumol and Alvin K. Klevorick (1970), ‘Input Choices and Rate-of-Return Regulation: An Overview of the Discussion’ 12. David P. Baron and Roger B. Myerson (1982), ‘Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs’ 13. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1986), ‘Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms’ 14. Paul L. Joskow and Richard Schmalensee (1986), ‘Incentive Regulation For Electric Utilities’ 15. Tracy R. Lewis and David E.M. Sappington (1988), ‘Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand’ 16. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1990), ‘The Regulation of Multiproduct Firms Part I: Theory’ 17. Richard Schmalensee (1989), ‘Good Regulatory Regimes’ Part IV: Effects of Economic Regulation in Practice 18. Sam Peltzman (1993), ‘George Stigler’s Contribution to the Economic Analysis of Regulation’ 19. Paul L. Joskow (1989), ‘Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform, and Structural Change in the Electrical Power Industry’ 20. Nancy L. Rose (1987), ‘Labor Rent Sharing and Regulation: Evidence from the Trucking Industry’ 21. Nancy L. Rose (1985), ‘The Incidence of Regulatory Rents in the Motor Carrier Industry’ 22. Donald J. Kridel, David E.M. Sappington and Dennis L. Weisman (1996), ‘The Effects of Incentive Regulation in the Telecommunications Industry: A Survey’ Part V: Network Access Pricing for Competitive Entrants 23. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1996), ‘Creating Competition Through Interconnection: Theory and Practice’ 24. Mark Armstrong, Chris Doyle and John Vickers (1996), ‘The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis’ 25. John Vickers (1997), ‘Regulation, Competition, and the Structure of Prices’ Name Index
