Description

Book Synopsis

The Ottoman and Habsburg Empires both faced the "general crisis" of the 17th century. Yet they responded to the crisis very differently. The Habsburgs centralized fiscal structures, which would facilitate economic development in the 19th century. The Ottomans, which initially had more centralized tax collection, opted for decentralization, paving the way for economic peripheralization. To account for this puzzle, this book offers a political-economic theory of institutional change that focuses on the structure and intensity of elite conflict over the distribution of resources. Using the comparative-historical method, the book demonstrates that high levels of conflict generated political incentives for centralization, and where such incentives were lacking, decentralization followed.

Economic Crisis, Elite Conflict and Institutional

    Product form

    £37.80

    Includes FREE delivery

    RRP £42.00 – you save £4.20 (10%)

    Order before 4pm today for delivery by Fri 7 Aug 2026.

    A Hardback by Tolga Demiryol

    Out of stock

      Trusted by thousands of customers. See 2,385+ Customer Reviews

      View other formats and editions of Economic Crisis, Elite Conflict and Institutional by Tolga Demiryol

      Publisher: Peter Lang AG
      Publication Date: Publication Date: 27/03/2023
      ISBN13: 9783631896181, 978-3631896181
      ISBN10: 3631896182

      Description

      Book Synopsis

      The Ottoman and Habsburg Empires both faced the "general crisis" of the 17th century. Yet they responded to the crisis very differently. The Habsburgs centralized fiscal structures, which would facilitate economic development in the 19th century. The Ottomans, which initially had more centralized tax collection, opted for decentralization, paving the way for economic peripheralization. To account for this puzzle, this book offers a political-economic theory of institutional change that focuses on the structure and intensity of elite conflict over the distribution of resources. Using the comparative-historical method, the book demonstrates that high levels of conflict generated political incentives for centralization, and where such incentives were lacking, decentralization followed.

      Recently viewed products

      © 2026 Book Curl

        • American Express
        • Apple Pay
        • Diners Club
        • Discover
        • Google Pay
        • Maestro
        • Mastercard
        • PayPal
        • Shop Pay
        • Union Pay
        • Visa

        Login

        Forgot your password?

        Don't have an account yet?
        Create account