Description
Book SynopsisThe central claim of the book is that all members of the group in whose name collective crime is committed share responsibility for it. Discusses analytical and normative defense of arguments that purport to explain reasons for, and the character of, responsibility of decent people. Those who did not intend, support, or committed wrong, are still accountable in a non-vicarious manner. The basis of their responsibility is the crime-specific relationship between group identity and personal identity. Combines eye witness experience with the best of current scholarship on one of the most serious ethical issues of the day, namely, responding to criminal behavior of a national regime. This fact-rich review of emblematic political events in the recent past shows not only what it means to assume responsibility for the criminal actions of a corrupt regime but also frames the argument in the context of a critique of moral relativism.
Table of ContentsAcknowledgments Introduction Chapter One: Criminal Regime, its Subjects, and Collective Crime 1. Introduction 2. The Challenge of the Disturbing Past 3. Regime and its Subjects: Regime Crime and Collective Crime 3.1. Regime Crimes 3.2. Collective Crimes 3.2.1. The Preparation of Collective Crime 3.2.2. Criminal Action 3.2.3. Approving Outcomes of Crime Chapter Two: Politics of Silence and Denial 1. Introduction 2. Transitional Justice or Just the Transition? Politics of Silence 2.1. General Argument: Vulnerability of Democracy 2.2. Specific Arguments 2.2.1. Political Reconciliation in the Name of Protecting the Genuine Common Identity 2.2.2. Injustice 2.2.3. Unmasterable Burden 3. We did Nothing WrongA": Politics of Denial 4. A Summary Chapter Three: Culture, Knowledge, and Collective Crime: Reading Relativism 1. Introduction: Crime-specific Culture 2. Moral Relativism as a Philosophical Argument 3. Blaming Culture for Moral Confusion? 3.1. Collective Crime as a Normative Practice 3.2. Inability Thesis 3.2.1. Supporting Inability Thesis: Psychology of Obedience to Authority 3.2.2. Supporting Inability Thesis: on the Political Production of Culture 4. The Inability Thesis as the Authenticity Thesis: on 'Broken Thermometers', 'Genuine Beliefs', and Mass Crimes 4.1. Richard Arneson on Moral Inequality and Responsibility 4.2. Michael Zimmerman and the Debate on 'Excusing the Inexcusable' 5. Gilbert Harman on the Non-moral Character of Extreme Intentions Chapter Four: Moral Responsibility for Collective Crime 1. Introduction 2. Conceptualizing Moral Responsibility 2.1. A Preliminary Definition 2.2. Responsibility as a Relationship 3. What Social Groups are and how they Matter 3.1. The Challenge of Methodological Individualism 3.2. Group Structure 3.3. Solidarity through Time 3.4. Collective Action: Relational and Positional 4. Collective Moral Responsibility 4.1. The Question 4.2. Responsible Agency and the Autonomy Objection. Can the Idea of Extended Participation Provide an Answer? 4.3. Two Causal Reasons for Collective Moral Responsibility 4.3.1. Intention 4.3.2. Participation 4.4. An Identity-based Reason for Collective Moral Responsibility 5. Collective Moral Responsibility beyond Causality and Blame 5.1. Group-specific Identities Created by Crime 5.1.1. Victims 5.1.2. On the Side of Criminals: Agents, By-standers, Decent Persons 5.2. How Ideological Justification of Collective Crime Affects Morally Decent Persons 5.3. Solidarity, Taint, and Responses 5.3.1. Solidarity Revisited 5.3.2. Moral Taint 5.3.3. Two Forms of Collective Responsibility Bibliography
