Description
Book SynopsisFear pervades dictatorial regimes. Citizens fear leaders, the regime''s agents fear superiors, and leaders fear the masses. The ubiquity of fear in such regimes gives rise to the dictator''s dilemma, where autocrats do not know the level of opposition they face and cannot effectively neutralize domestic threats to their rule. The dilemma has led scholars to believe that autocracies are likely to be short-lived.Yet, some autocracies have found ways to mitigate the dictator''s dilemma. As Martin K. Dimitrov shows in Dictatorship and Information, substantial variability exists in the survival of nondemocratic regimes, with single-party polities having the longest average duration. Offering a systematic theory of the institutional solutions to the dictator''s dilemma, Dimitrov argues that single-party autocracies have fostered channels that allow for the confidential vertical transmission of information, while also solving the problems associated with distorted information. To explain how
Trade ReviewIn this rigorous and innovative study, Dimitrov sheds new light on the inner workings of authoritarian regimes and on the difficulties faced by these governments to collect and systematize information about the workings of their societies. Deploying a wealth of novel archival evidence, Dimitrov documents tremendous variation in the institutions established by authoritarian regimes to gather such information. Dictatorship and Information is a must-read for all students of authoritarian regimes. * Isabela Mares, Arnold Wolfers Professor of Political Science, Yale University *
Can authoritarian leaders reliably gauge the level of support for their regime? If they can resolve this 'dictator's dilemma,' can they act on the information effectively? Drawing on a wealth of internal documents from the Communist party-states of China and Bulgaria, Dimitrov answers (a surprising albeit qualified) 'yes' to both questions, thereby making a major contribution to our understanding of the foundations of authoritarian resilience. * Elizabeth J. Perry, Henry Rosovsky Professor of Government, Harvard University *
Many of us have theorized and postulated about the deployment of secret police by authoritarian regimes to stay in power, but Dimitrov plumbs the depths of the archives and documents of secret police organizations in several countries and uncovers some startling new insights. This is a path-breaking work that is at once relevant to contemporary development in China and Russia, as well as a major empirical contribution to the literature that will keep scholars of authoritarian regimes busy for years to come. * Victor Shih, Associate Professor of Political Economy and Ho Miu Lam Chair in China and Pacific Relations, University of California San Diego *
No dictatorship can escape the paradox of repression: the more brutal the regime is, the less certain can it be about its own genuine popularity and forestall incipient opposition. In this masterful analysis, Martin Dimitrov documents how autocrats from Cold War-era communist Eastern Europe to present-day China have confronted this paradox. * Milan Svolik, Professor of Political Science, Yale University *
Centralized autocracies that suppress open political expression employ a range of substitute channels of information about the actual dispositions of citizens. This information can be deployed either to focus repression or respond to potential sources of popular discontent. In recent years analysts have become more attentive to the ways that these mechanisms serve to stabilize autocratic rule. In his innovative comparative analysis of surveillance and monitoring in China, Bulgaria, and a range of other autocracies, Dimitrov sharpens and clarifies our understanding of why and how these efforts succeed or fail to make autocracies more flexible and resilient. * Andrew G. Walder, author of Agents of Disorder: Inside China's Cultural Revolution *
Abundantly supported by internal documents from the communist parties and governments of Bulgaria and China,...Dictatorship and Information provides a thorough treatment of communist rule in Bulgaria. * Choice *
Table of ContentsList of Figures and Maps List of Tables Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations Part I. Theory and Method 1. Introduction: Solving the Dictator's Dilemma 2. Studying Government Perceptions of Popular Discontent in Autocracies Part II. Parallel Origins of Communist Information States 3. Monitoring and Counteracting Dissent in Bulgaria, 1944-1958 4. Monitoring and Counteracting Dissent in China, 1949-1958 Part III. Divergent Evolution of Communist Information States 5. Bread and Circuses: Consumption and Stability in Bulgaria, 1959-1988 6. Continuity and Change: Information Gathering in China, 1959-1988 Part IV. Similar Crises, Varied Contexts, Different Reforms 7. Information-Gathering Institutions in Bulgaria, 1989-1991 8. Information-Gathering Institutions in China, 1989-2019 Part V. Generalizability of the Theory 9. Scope Conditions: Authoritarian Information-Gathering Institutions 10. Conclusion: Information and Authoritarian Regime Resilience Index
