Description
Book SynopsisMost philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of good or the notion of desire have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of desire and good, how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the Guise of the Good thesis - the view that desire (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good - has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good. Is it a purely formal notion, or does
Trade ReviewThe nine papers are impressive by their elaborate analysis. They are stimulating insofar as taken together they present a broad range of approaches to the topic, and the arguments are developed in a detailed way. * Robert Zaborowski, Bryn Mawr Classical Review *
Table of Contents1. Sergio Tenenbaum (University of Toronto), Introduction ; 2. Matt Evans (New York University), A Partisan Guide to Socratic Intellectualism. ; 3. Rachel Barney (University of Toronto), Plato on the Desire for the Good. ; 4. Jessica Moss (University of Oxford), Aristotle's non-trivial, non-insane view that everyone always desires things under the guise of the good. ; 5. Kieran Setiya (University of Pittsburgh), Sympathy for the Devil. ; 6. Joseph Raz (University of Oxford), The Guise of the Good ; 7. Sebastian Rodl (University of Basel), The Form of the Will ; 8. Matthew Boyle and Doug Lavin (Harvard University), Goodness and Desire. ; 9. Sergio Tenenbaum (University of Toronto), Good and Good For. ; 10. Phil Clark (University of Toronto), Aspects, Guises, Species, and Knowing Something to be Good.
