Description
Book SynopsisAlmost anywhere in the world, new constitutions are written and passed at almost any time. Over the last couple of years, an increasing number of economists have analysed constitutions based on an economic approach with an emphasis firstly on the (economic) effects of constitutions and followed by the factors determining their content.
Trade Review‘This particular work presents - in one handy and copiously footnoted hardback volume - no less than 23 of the most authoritative and ground-breaking essays and articles currently available on this relatively new avenue of economic and legal research, published by a judicious selection of the world’s top universities. . . If you’re a lawyer, economic adviser, policy maker, student or academic, you should acquire this book.’ -- Phillip Taylor MBE and Elizabeth Taylor, The Barrister Magazine
Table of ContentsContents: Acknowledgements Introduction Stefan Voigt PART I GETTING STARTED: STATE OF THE ART AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 1. Dennis C. Mueller (2005), ‘Constitutional Political Economy in the European Union’ 2. Donald L. Horowitz (2002), ‘Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes’ 3. Arend Lijphart (2002), ‘The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy’ PART II THE RELEVANCE OF PROCEDURE FOR … 4. Jon Elster (1995), ‘Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process’ 5. Stefan Voigt (2004), ‘The Consequences of Popular Participation in Constitutional Choice—Towards a Comparative Analysis’ 6. John M. Carey (2009), ‘Does It Matter How a Constitution Is Created?’ 7. Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins and Justin Blount (2009), ‘Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?’ PART III BASIC RIGHTS 8. Lorenz Blume and Stefan Voigt (2007), ‘The Economic Effects of Human Rights’ 9. Avi Ben-Bassat and Momi Dahan (2008), ‘Social Rights in the Constitution and in Practice’ PART IV STATE ORGANIZATION A ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 10. Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland and Guido Tabellini (2007), ‘Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies’ 11. Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni (2010), ‘Endogenous Constitutions’ B FORM OF GOVERNMENT 12. Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini (1997), ‘Separation of Powers and Political Accountability’ 13. Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina and Francesco Trebbi (2004), ‘Endogenous Political Institutions’ C THE STRUCTURE OF THE LEGISLATURE: BICAMERALISM 14. Roger D. Congleton (2006), ‘On the Merits of Bicameral Legislatures: Intragovernmental Bargaining and Policy Stability’ 15. Cecilia Testa (2010), ‘Bicameralism and Corruption’ D FEDERALISM 16. Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr and Barry R. Weingast (2005), ‘Self-Enforcing Federalism’ 17. Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (2005), ‘Federalism and the Democratic Transition: Lessons from South Africa’ E DIRECT DEMOCRACY 18. Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer (2006), ‘Direct Democracy: Designing a Living Constitution’ 19. Lorenz Blume, Jens Müller and Stefan Voigt (2009), ‘The Economic Effects of Direct Democracy – A First Global Assessment’ PART V BEYOND CONVENTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 20. Bruce Ackerman (2000), ‘The New Separation of Powers’ 21. Stefan Voigt and Eli M. Salzberger (2002), ‘Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers’ 22. Tom Ginsburg (2006), ‘Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law’ 23. Stefan Voigt, Michael Ebeling and Lorenz Blume (2007), ‘Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence – the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council’
