Description
Book SynopsisWhen making decisions, people naturally face uncertainty about the potential consequences of their actions due in part to limits in their capacity to represent, evaluate or deliberate. Nonetheless, they aim to make the best decisions possible. In Decision Theory with a Human Face, Richard Bradley develops new theories of agency and rational decision-making, offering guidance on how 'real' agents who are aware of their bounds should represent the uncertainty they face, how they should revise their opinions as a result of experience and how they should make decisions when lacking full awareness of, or precise opinions on relevant contingencies. He engages with the strengths and flaws of Bayesian reasoning, and presents clear and comprehensive explorations of key issues in decision theory, from belief and desire to semantics and learning. His book draws on philosophy, economics, decision science and psychology, and will appeal to readers in all of these disciplines.
Trade Review'Decision Theory with a Human Face is a major work that unifies and expands on an already impressive body of work from Bradley. It is difficult to think of many major debates in philosophical decision theory to which it does not make significant contributions.' Timothy Luke Williamson, Metascience
'This book represents an important step forward in the literature, and Bradley does an impressive job in providing a rigorous treatment of decision theory that refuses to idealise away from key features of human rationality.' Timothy Luke Williamson, Metascience
Table of ContentsList of figures; List of tables; Preface; Introduction; Part I. Rationality, Uncertainty and Choice: 1. Decision problems; 2. Rationality; 3. Uncertainty; 4. Justifying Bayesianism; Part II. Prospective Rationality: 5. Rational belief and desire; 6. Conditional attitudes; 7. Conditionals and the Ramsey Test; Part III. Facing the World: 8. Multidimensional possible world semantics; 9. Taking action; 10. The learning agent; Part IV. Rationality Within Bounds: 11. Imprecise Bayesianism; 12. Changing your mind; 13. Decision making under severe uncertainty; 14. Confidence; Bibliography; Index.
