Description
Book SynopsisThis book examines why elected leaders pursue foreign policies that are remarkably distant from their proposed policies. To investigate this pattern this book develops a model of how the foreign policy preferences of the executive and the government in the legislature interact over the electoral cycle to affect democratic leaders'' foreign policy choices. The executive is cross-pressured when the foreign policy that the legislature wants is not the same policy that the executive''s constituents want. The executive must choose a policy that balances the conflicting demands of remaining in a productive government (pleasing the legislature) and obtaining votes in the next election (pleasing constituents). Getting votes is clearly more important when elections are near, so democratic leaders weigh these competing demands differently over the course of the electoral cycle. This is what can lead to trends in foreign policy: the executive first chooses policies that mollify the legislature
Trade ReviewProfessor Atkinson makes an important contribution to the literature on democracy and foreign policy orientation. The deductive theoretical work is top-notch and supported by empirical analysis. -- Charles Boehmer, University of Texas at El Paso
Chad Atkinson offers an insightful analysis of the relationship between leaders and legislators when making foreign policy decisions. Theoretically solid, methodologically sophisticated, and relevant to policy, Dangerous Democracies and Partying Prime Ministers makes a first rate contribution to existing literatures on the democratic peace and two-level games. -- Brandon C. Prins, University of Tennessee
Table of ContentsChapter 1 Domestic Sources of International Behavior Chapter 2 Concepts Chapter 3 Parties in Israel Chapter 4 From Game Theory to Statistical Testing Chapter 5 Hypotheses Chapter 6 Summary: Where to go from here
