Description
Book SynopsisIn this book, Josep M. Colomer argues, against much conventional wisdom, that political polarization is embedded in the constitutional design.
The book puts forth that sustained conflict and institutional gridlock are not mainly questions of character, personalities, or determined by socioeconomic or cultural inequalities. They are, above all, the result of the formula of separation of powers between the Presidency and Congress, which, together with a system of only two parties, fosters adversarial politics and polarization. Colomer contends that in the past, bipartisan cooperation and domestic peace flourished only under a foreign existential threat, such as during the Cold War. Once such a threat vanished, unsettled issues and new social concerns have broadened the public agenda and triggered again animosity and conflict.
Constitutional Polarization offers innovative and relevant insights in political science to a broad readership without technical or academic j
Trade Review
"Many who worry about the state of American democracy adopt a narrow focus and consequently propose specific reform proposals such as ranked-choice voting or campaign finance restrictions. This book by an eminent scholar of comparative politics situates American democracy in a broader historical, comparative, and—especially--international context. Along the way, it makes a welcome shift in the focus of attention from what is going on inside the heads of voters to what is occurring in the larger social, economic, and international worlds in which they live."
Morris P. Fiorina, Stanford University and Hoover Institution
"In this brilliant book, Josep Colomer documents how the visionary framers of the US Constitution devised the doctrine of separation of powers to curb monarchical rule and the follies of immoderate majorities. Although presidentialism generally succeeded in a world long dominated by imperial powers, he shows how in recent decades the increased gridlock of divided government continues to undermine genuine democratic governance."
Arturo Valenzuela, Georgetown University and co-author (with Juan J. Linz) of The Failure of Presidential Democracy
Table of ContentsIntroduction: It’s the Institutions, stupid! Part 1: A Tamed Democracy 1. Democracy Was Only for Small Countries 2. From Empire to Federation 3. Montesquieu Did Not Speak English Part 2: An Elected King with the Name of President 4. The Archaic Presidential Election 5. Biased Filters and Checks 6. The Presidentialist Temptation Part 3: Two Parties with Narrow Agendas 7. The Framers Did Not Like Factions 8. The Unforeseen Emergence of Only Two Parties 9. Shifting Majorities and Accordion Agendas Part 4: Either Internal Anger or External Fear 10. Anarchy and Civil War 11. Cold-War Fear and Cooperation 12. The Ongoing Turmoil Epilogue: A Future in Hope Conclusion
