Description
Book SynopsisIn Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity Robert J. Howell argues that the options in the debates about consciousness and the mind-body problem are more limited than many philosophers have appreciated. Unless one takes a hard-line stance, which either denies the data provided by consciousness or makes a leap of faith about future discoveries, one must admit that no objective picture of our world can be complete. Howell argues, however, that this is consistent with physicalism, contrary to received wisdom. After developing a novel, neo-Cartesian notion of the physical, followed by a careful consideration of the three major anti-materialist arguments--Black''s ''Presentation Problem'', Jackson''s Knowledge Argument, and Chalmers'' Conceivability Argument--Howell proposes a ''subjective physicalism'' which gives the data of consciousness their due, while retaining the advantages of a monistic, physical ontology.
Trade ReviewA clear account of how consciousness could be physical even if we can't fully know it from an objective standpoint. Howell shows that there is still much to be discussed in what might look like well-worn territory, and his book is deserving of attention . . . I think this is the best version of the supervenience approach currently on the market. * Richard Brown, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *
The book is aimed at professional philosophers . . . and its breezy, informal (by academic standards) tone make the book a pleasant read. * Derek Ball, TPM *
Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity is carefully argued, clear, full of creative insights, and advances a number of debates. It should be read by anyone with an interest in physicalism, consciousness, and the limits of objective understanding. * Kevin Morris, The Philosophical Quarterly *
Short, sharply-focused, and well-written, this volume develops an improved version of supervenience-based physicalism . . . an excellent addition to the literature on the hard problem of consciousness . . . Highly recommended. * W. Seager, Choice *
Table of ContentsPART I: DEFINING PHYSICALISM; PART II: THE THREAT OF THE SUBJECTIVE; PART III: SAVING PHYSICALISM
