Description
Book SynopsisThis volume provides an introduction to and review of key contemporary debates concerning connectionism, and the nature of explanation and methodology in cognitive psychology.
The first debate centers on the question of whether human cognition is best modeled by classical or by connectionist architectures. The second centres on the question of the compatibility between folk, or commonsense, psychological explanation and explanations based on connectionist models of cognition. Each of the two sections includes a classic reading along with important responses, and concludes with a specially commissioned reply by the main contributor. The editorial introductions provide a comprehensive survey and map through the debates.
Table of ContentsPart I: Subdoxastic Explanation I: Connectionism and Classical Architecture:.
1. Introduction: Classicism v. Connectionism: Cynthia MacDonald.
2. On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism: Paul Smolensky.
3. Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis: Jerry A. Foder and Zenon W. Pylyshyn.
4. Connectionism, Constituency and the Language of Thought: Paul Smolensky.
5. Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work: Jerry A. Foder and Brian P. McLaughlin.
6. Reply: Constituent Structure and Explanation in an Integrated Connectionist/Symbolic Cognitive Architecture: Paul Smolensky.
Part II: Subdoxastic Explanation II: Connectionism and Eliminativism: .
7. Introduction: Connectionism and Eliminativism: Cynthia Macdonald.
8. Connectionism, Eliminativism and the Future of Folk Psychology: William Ramsey, Stephen Stich and Joseph Garon.
9. Connectionist Minds: Andy Clark.
10. On the Projectable Predicates of Connectionist Psychology: A Case for Belief: Paul Smolensky.
11. Reply to Clark and Smolensky: Do Connectionists Minds Have Beliefs?: Stephen Stich and Ted Warfield.
Index.
