Description
Book SynopsisExamines the performance of the Allies' Mediterranean Expeditionary Force from the beginning of the Gallipoli Campaign to the bitter end. This book is a view of the Gallipoli Campaign unique in its detail and scope, as well as in its conclusions - a book that looks past myth and distortion to the facts of what happened.
Trade ReviewRhys Crawley takes a revisionist sledgehammer to one of the remaining myths of the Gallipoli campaign: that the Allies could have won the Suvla offensive of August 1915. In a series of carefully constructed chapters he demonstrates that the operation's failure was a function of structure rather than circumstance. Not only was the plan too ambitious, but it placed far too much faith in the possibilities of maneuver in an age of industrialized positional warfare. The result was all too typical of the Great War - an aggregation of sacrifices as futile as they were heroic."" - Dennis Showalter, author of
Hitler's Panzers: The Lightning Attacks that Revolutionized Warfare""Rhys Crawley's rigorous examination of the August offensives at Gallipoli - in particular the artillery and logistic support required for a successful attack - deepens our understanding of why the First World War was so expensive in casualties, while the front lines seemed to move hardly at all. This book is highly recommended for all those interested in the Gallipoli campaign and in the operations of the First World War as a whole."" - Robert O'Neill, author of
The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933 - 1939
