Description
Book SynopsisThe theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in 1928, is a subfield of mathematics and economics that models situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each other. This book assembles the fundamental contributions in this field. It is useful for researchers in game theory and for students.
Trade Review"This volume assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field [of game theory]..."--L'Enseignement Mathematique
Table of ContentsPermissionsForewordAn Appreciation1Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games32The Bargaining Problem53Non-Cooperative Games144An Iterative Method of Solving a Game275Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form366Extensive Games and the Problem and Information467A Value for n-Person Games698Stochastic Games809Recursive Games8710Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments11911A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy12712The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games14013Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders17014The Core of an n-Person Game19215Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model216Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points247Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game26816The Big Match28917On Market Games29618Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games317List of Contributors355Index357
