Description
Book SynopsisThis book makes a valuable, analytical contribution to recent debates on the ongoing institutional changes occurring within the European Union. It provides a comprehensive and diverse insight into a variety of areas, including in-depth studies of fiscal, monetary and voting issues, to help elucidate the current period of transitional change.
The authors argue that a fiscal constitution is essential to help solve the deficits and debts that member countries face due to welfare state financing. Moreover, they believe that the successful implementation of a fiscal constitution is the key to a more coherent institutional setting for Europe as a whole. Although monetary institutions within the EU have already secured a degree of constitutional solution in the form of the euro, they warn that its stabilising power should not be overestimated: the European Central Bank has yet to experience financial crises like those faced by the Federal Reserve Bank. The authors move on to propose a new parliamentary design for Europe and assess the advantages for the elite of a small country to join the EU, compared to the population at large.
This volume comprehensively explores the rapidly changing institutional configuration of the EU, employing both qualitative and quantitative approaches. It will be required reading for scholars of public choice, and those with an interest in political economy and EU integration. It is also an excellent sourcebook on European institutions and would provide useful complementary reading in a variety of undergraduate and postgraduate courses.
Table of ContentsContents: Introduction Part I: The Underside of EU Fiscal Institutions: Budget, Deficit, Debt and Regulation 1. EMU Fiscal Rules: New Answers to Old Questions? 2. Indebtedness and Deficits of the Nations of the European Union 3. Tax Harmonization – Tax Competition Once Again: Who Gives the EU Orchestra the A? 4. The Political Economy of Regulation: A Prolegomenon Part II: Becoming Euro: Internal Stability and International Crises 5. EMU as an Evolutionary Process 6. The Role of International Monetary Institutions after the EMU and the Asian Crises: Some Preliminary Ideas Using Constitutional Economics 7. A Curmudgeon’s View of EMU Part III: Two Issues at Work: Voting and Contracting 8. Towards a More Consistent Design of Parliamentary Democracy and its Consequences for the European Union 9. A Small Country in Europe’s Integration – Generalizing the Political Economy of the Danish Case Index
