Description
Book SynopsisIt''s an obvious enough observation that the standards that govern whether ordinary speakers will say that someone knows something vary with context: What we are happy to call knowledge in some (low-standards) contexts we''ll deny is knowledge in other (high-standards) contexts. But do these varying standards for when ordinary speakers will attribute knowledge, and for when they are in some important sense warranted in attributing knowledge, reflect varying standards for when it is or would be true for them to attribute knowledge? Or are the standards that govern whether such claims are true always the same? And what are the implications for epistemology if these truth-conditions for knowledge claims shift with context? Contextualism is the view that the epistemic standards a subject must meet, in order for a claim attributing knowledge to her to be true, do vary with context. This has been hotly debated in epistemology and philosophy of language during the last few decades. In The Cas
Trade ReviewReview from previous edition This volume will be of particular benefit to graduate students and researchers looking to gain initial sympathetic familiarity with contextualism; it is also clear and accessible enough to be suitable for advanced undergraduates. This book will be among the first resources I turn to when students ask for an introduction to "knows" contextualism. * Jonathan Ichikawa, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *
Table of Contents1. Contextualism, Invariantism, Skepticism, and What Goes On in Ordinary Conversation ; 2. The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism ; 3. Assertion, Knowledge, and Context ; 4. Single Scoreboard Semantics ; 5. "Bamboozled by Our Own Words": Semantic Blindness and Some Objections to Contextualism ; 6. Now You Know It, Now You Don't: Intellectualism, Contextualism, and Subject-Sensitive Invariantism ; 7. Knowledge, Assertion and Action: Contextualism vs. Subject-Sensitive Invariantism ; References
