Description
Book SynopsisBuilding Better Beings presents a new theory of moral responsibility. Beginning with a discussion of ordinary convictions about responsibility and free will and their implications for a philosophical theory, Manuel Vargas argues that no theory can do justice to all the things we want from a theory of free will and moral responsibility. He goes on to show how we can nevertheless justify our responsibility practices and provide a normatively and naturalistically adequate account of of responsible agency, blame, and desert. Three ideas are central to Vargas'' account: the agency cultivation model, circumstantialism about powers, and revisionism about responsibility and free will. On Vargas'' account, responsibility norms and practices are justified by their effects. In particular, the agency cultivation model holds that responsibility practices help mold us into creatures that respond to moral considerations. Moreover, the abilities that matter for responsibility and free will are not met
Trade ReviewHe does an admirable job of showing how his agency cultivation model is largely immune to the sorts of worries thought to plague other versions of the approach ... anyone interested in the questions of whether and how praise and blame can be justified will want read this book and think seriously about its arguments. * Justin A. Capes, Journal of Moral Philosophy *
extraordinarily rich . . . Vargas has achieved something that is quite rare: he has given us an entirely new way to approach an ancient and, yes, seemingly intractable problem. * Tamler Sommers, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *
Vargas sets out and defends a subtle and powerful view, according to which holding one another morally responsible is justified by the effects of our practices on cultivating moral agency. * Neil Levy, Philosophical Quarterly *
Recommended. * J. Hoffman, CHOICE *
Table of ContentsPART I. BUILDING BLOCKS; PART II. A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY; APPENDIX: ACTIVITY AND ORIGINATION
