Description
Book SynopsisThis book explores the British Army's response on the Western Front to a period of seminal change in warfare. In particular it examines the impact of the pre-war emphasis on worldwide garrison, occupation and policing duties for the Empire's defence of the mindset of the Army's leadership and its lack of preparation for a continental war involving a massive, unplanned increase in men and material.
The reasons for the poor performance in the early years of the war, notably professionalism within the British Army, including poor staff work, 'trade unionism', careerism within the high command, and the tendency of an overconfident hierarchy to ignore the need for reform to tackle the tactical stalemate prior to 1916, are analyzed. The high command rapidly learnt from the defeats of 1915â16 and performed much better in 1916â18, an especially formative period resulting in the promotion of a younger, more professional leadership and the development of the first truly modern system of
Table of Contents
List of Illustrations Acknowledgements Abbreviations Sources Introduction 1. The Army's Ethos and Culture
2. The Decline and Fall of an Army 3. The Brain of an Army 4. Developing a Professional Leadership 5. The Army's Over-ambitious Decision-making 6. Training for Victory 7. Tactical Innovation 8. A Strategy for Victory 9. Conclusion
Notes Appendices Bibliography Index
