Description
Book SynopsisOver the years a number of historians have argued that the CCP was a nationalist movement and that the United States missed its opportunity to establish friendly relations because US leaders were blinded by fears of an international Communist threat. This book challenges this position.
Table of ContentsAcknowledgmentsIntroduction3Ch. IThe Roots of Mao's Pro-Soviet Policy before 193715Ch. IICCP-Moscow Relations during the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-194531Ch. IIIFrom Enemies to Friends: CCP Policy toward the United States before Pearl Harbor57Ch. IVCourting the Americans: The CCP's United Front Policy toward the U.S., 1942-194574Ch. VPostwar Alignment: CCP-Moscow versus GMD-Washington in Manchuria, August-December 194598Ch. VIMao Deals with George Marshall, November 1945-December 1946119Ch. VIIThe CCP and the Cold War in Asia: Mao's "Intermediate-Zone" Theory and the Anti-American United Front, 1946-1947145Ch. VIIIMao's Revolutionary Diplomacy and the Cold War in Asia, 1948-1949161Conclusion187Notes197Select Bibliography229Index245
