Description
Book SynopsisDo alliances curb efforts by states to develop nuclear weapons? Atomic Assurance looks at what makes alliances sufficiently credible to prevent nuclear proliferation; how alliances can break down and so encourage nuclear proliferation; and whether security guarantors like the United States can use alliance ties to end the nuclear efforts of their allies.
Alexander Lanoszka finds that military alliances are less useful in preventing allies from acquiring nuclear weapons than conventional wisdom suggests. Through intensive case studies of West Germany, Japan, and South Korea, as well as a series of smaller cases on Great Britain, France, Norway, Australia, and Taiwan, Atomic Assurance shows that it is easier to prevent an ally from initiating a nuclear program than to stop an ally that has already started one; in-theater conventional forces are crucial in making American nuclear guarantees credible; the American coercion of allies who started, or were tempted to st
Trade Review
In case studies of West Germany, Japan, and South Korea, Lanoszka compares alternative explanations for proliferation decisions, finding support for his claims.... The analysis offered is well-reasoned.
* Choice *
Political scientists and historians will each find this work to be a fitting springboard for further research into nuclear proliferation and military alliances. With Atomic Assurance, Lanoszka has made a valuable contribution to the study of arms control that deserves the attention of academics and policy-makers alike.
* Diplomacy & Statecraft *
Table of ContentsIntroduction
1. How Alliances (Mis)Manage Nuclear Proliferation
2. American Security Guarantees during the Cold War,1949–1980
3. West Germany, 1954–1970
4. Japan, 1952–1980
5. South Korea, 1968–1980
6. Nuclear Proliferation and Other American Alliances
Conclusion: Understanding and Managing Alliancesin the 21st Century
Notes
Index
