Description

Book Synopsis
Peace does not offer such an obvious rationale for arming oneself as does war. In fact, war expresses an intention to attack which fuels preparation for it via arming oneself. Yet, there are reasons to arm for peace especially when war is modeled only as a potential outcome. Potential wars could be stylized into a winner-takes-all (-that-is-left) contest. The contest design formalizes strategic behavior of, for simplicity, two players such as nations or states. These players set out to make two decisions: First, they decide the degree of arming and then, observe the armaments. Second, they decide on whether or not to use force. Two different mutual deterrence-concepts lead to armed, peaceful equilibria with certainty. Yet another better established concept considers arming to serve a different purpose, namely, to reinforce bargaining power.

Table of Contents
​Winner-Takes-All-Contest.- Mutual Deterrence.- Bargaining Theory.

Arm For Peace: A Rationalist Explanation

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    A Paperback / softback by Sharon Pfister

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      Publisher: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG
      Publication Date: 23/01/2014
      ISBN13: 9783658039523, 978-3658039523
      ISBN10: 3658039523
      Also in:
      Development economics

      Description

      Book Synopsis
      Peace does not offer such an obvious rationale for arming oneself as does war. In fact, war expresses an intention to attack which fuels preparation for it via arming oneself. Yet, there are reasons to arm for peace especially when war is modeled only as a potential outcome. Potential wars could be stylized into a winner-takes-all (-that-is-left) contest. The contest design formalizes strategic behavior of, for simplicity, two players such as nations or states. These players set out to make two decisions: First, they decide the degree of arming and then, observe the armaments. Second, they decide on whether or not to use force. Two different mutual deterrence-concepts lead to armed, peaceful equilibria with certainty. Yet another better established concept considers arming to serve a different purpose, namely, to reinforce bargaining power.

      Table of Contents
      ​Winner-Takes-All-Contest.- Mutual Deterrence.- Bargaining Theory.

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