Description
Book SynopsisIn Animal Rationality: Later Medieval Theories 1250-1350, Anselm Oelze offers the first comprehensive and systematic exploration of theories of animal rationality in the later Middle Ages. Traditionally, it was held that medieval thinkers ascribed rationality to humans while denying it to nonhuman animals. As Oelze shows, this narrative fails to capture the depth and diversity of the medieval debate. Although many thinkers, from Albert the Great to John Buridan, did indeed hold that nonhuman animals lack rational faculties, some granted them the ability to engage in certain rational processes such as judging, reasoning, or employing prudence. There is thus a whole spectrum of positions to be discovered, many of which show interesting parallels with contemporary theories of animal rationality.
Trade Review"Cette approche, à la fois historique et systématique, de la rationalité animale aboutit à une étude passionnante, dont le propos, agrémenté de nombreux exemples, allie la clarté à l’élégance. Nul doute que cette étude maîtrisée d’un corpus et d’un réseau de questions originaux constitue une contribution majeure à l’histoire de la philosophie médiévale". Véronique Decaix, Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale, 21 (3), (2020).
Table of ContentsPreface Introduction 1 What are and Why Study Later Medieval Theories of Animal Rationality? 2 How to Study Later Medieval Theories? 3 Structure and Key Questions Part 1: Animals and Rationality in the Middle Ages Introduction to Part 1 4 The Role of Animals in the Middle Ages 5 Animal Souls and Sensory Cognition 6 Human Souls and the Triad of Intellectual Operations 7 Grey Areas Part 2: Universal Cognition and Concept Formation Introduction to Part 2 8 Estimation, Conceptualisation, and Categorisation (Thomas Aquinas) 9 Intentions and Quiddities (Albertus Magnus) 10 Elevated Intentions and Common Forms (Pseudo-Peter of Spain) 11 Vague Particulars as Universals (Roger Bacon) 12 Universal Desire and Experience (John Buridan) 13 General Mental Representations (Peter of John Olivi) Part 3: Judging Introduction to Part 3 14 The Idea of Sensory Judgments 15 Natural Judgments (Thomas Aquinas) 16 Erroneous Judgments and Differences in Estimation (Albertus Magnus) 17 Reflective and Experimental Judgments (Peter of John Olivi, John Buridan) 18 The Ascription of Judgments and the Problem of Anthropomorphism (William of Ockham, Adam Wodeham, Gregory of Rimini) Part 4: Reasoning Introduction to Part 4 19 Quasi-Reasoning (Thomas Aquinas, Gregory of Rimini, John Duns Scotus) 20 Quasi-Reasoning and Cogitation (Roger Bacon) 21 Imperfect Argumentations and Practical Syllogisms (Albertus Magnus) 22 Material Souls and Degrees of Reasoning (John Buridan, Nicole Oresme) Part 5: Prudence Introduction to Part 5 23 Memory vs. Recollection (Albertus Magnus) 24 Incomplete and Complete Memory (Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon) 25 Foresight and Provision (Albertus Magnus, Bonaventure) 26 Quasi-Foresight and Quasi-Hope (Thomas Aquinas) 27 Operating for and towards the Future (Roger Bacon, Peter of John Olivi) 28 Imperfect or Particular Prudence (Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas) 29 Prudence by Analogy (Giles of Rome, John Duns Scotus) Part 6: Rationality without Reason? Introduction to Part 6 30 Medieval and Contemporary Theories: The Differences 31 Medieval and Contemporary Theories: The Commonalities 32 Towards a Classification: Differentialist and Assimilationist Explanations 33 Room for Rationality or Rationality without Reason Conclusion Bibliography Index of Names Index of Subjects
