Description
Book SynopsisThis book illustrates how analytical sociology is progressively refining its theoretical framework and how powerful this framework is in explaining a large array of social phenomena.
Table of ContentsPreface and Acknowledgments xiii
About the Editor xv
List of Contributors xvii
Introduction 1
Editor's Introduction to Chapter 1 2
1 Data, Generative Models, and Mechanisms: More on the Principles of Analytical Sociology 4
Gianluca Manzo
1.1 Introduction 4
1.2 The Principles of Analytical Sociology 7
1.3 Clarity (P1) 10
1.4 Description (P2) 12
1.5 Generative Models (P3) 14
1.6 Structural Methodological Individualism (P4a) 17
1.7 Logics of Action (P4b) 21
1.8 Structural Interdependency (P4c) 27
1.9 Agent-Based Modeling (P5) 29
1.10 Back to Data (P6 and P7) 35
1.11 Concluding Remarks 37
1.12 How to Read this Book 40
Part I ACTIONS 53
Foundational Issues 54
Editor's Introduction to Chapter 2 55
2 Analytical Sociology and Rational-Choice Theory 57
Peter Hedström and Petri Ylikoski
2.1 Rational-Choice Theory 58
2.2 Sociological Rational-Choice Theory 59
2.3 Analytical Sociology as a Meta-Theory 60
2.4 The Key Ideas of Analytical Sociology 61
2.4.1 Mechanism-Based Explanation 61
2.4.2 Realism 62
2.4.3 Theories of Middle Range 63
2.4.4 Theory of Action 64
2.5 The Puzzle 64
2.6 The Assumed Special Role of RCT 65
2.7 Conclusion 67
3 Why Crime Happens: A Situational Action Theory 74
Per-Olof H. Wikström
3.1 Situational Action Theory 75
3.2 Explaining Crime 76
3.3 The Situational Model 77
3.4 The Situational Process 78
3.4.1 Motivation 79
3.4.2 Perception of Action Alternatives: The Moral Filter 80
3.4.3 The Process of Choice: Habits and Deliberation 80
3.4.4 Controls: Self-Control and Deterrence 82
3.5 The Social Model 82
3.6 Integrating the Social and Situational Models 84
3.7 Testing SAT 85
3.7.1 The Peterborough Adolescent and Young Adult Development Study 85
3.7.2 Measuring Crime, Crime Propensity and Criminogenic Exposure 86
3.7.3 Crime Involvement by Crime Propensity and Criminogenic Exposure 87
3.7.4 The Impact of Criminogenic Exposure on Crime for Groups with Different Levels of Crime Propensity 88
3.8 Explaining Crime Concentrations (Hot Spots) 90
3.9 Coda 92
4 Frames, Scripts, and Variable Rationality: An Integrative Theory of Action 97
Clemens Kroneberg
4.1 Introduction 97
4.2 The Model of Frame Selection (MFS) 99
4.2.1 Frames, Scripts, and Actions 99
4.2.2 Dual-processes: Spontaneous vs. Reflected Modes of Selection 100
4.2.3 The Determinants of Variable Rationality 104
4.3 Hypotheses and Previous Applications 106
4.4 An Exemplary Application Using Survey Data: Explaining Voter Participation 108
4.4.1 Theory 108
4.4.2 Data and Measures 112
4.4.3 Results 113
4.5 Applying the MFS to Study Social Dynamics 115
4.5.1 The MFS and the Study of Social Movements and Collective Action 116
4.5.2 Strategic Interaction with Variable Rationality and Framing 117
4.6 Conclusion 118
5 Analytical Sociology and Quantitative Narrative Analysis: Explaining Lynchings in Georgia (1875–1930) 127
Roberto Franzosi
5.1 Strange Fruits on Southern Trees 127
5.2 Analytical Sociology 128
5.3 Quantitative Narrative Analysis (QNA) 129
5.3.1 Step 1: Story Grammars 130
5.3.2 Step 2: PC-ACE (Program for Computer-Assisted Coding of Events) 132
5.3.3 Step 3: Data Analysis: Actor-Centered vs. Variable-Centered Tools of Analysis 134
5.4 Of Sequences 139
5.5 Of Time and Space 142
5.6 Conclusions 144
6 Identity and Opportunity in Early Modern Politics: How Job Vacancies Induced Witch Persecutions in Scotland, 1563–1736 151
Anna Mitschele
6.1 Introduction 151
6.2 Theories about Witches and Research on State Making 153
6.3 Towards a Theory of Persecution 155
6.3.1 Communities 156
6.3.2 Elite Social Structure and Government 157
6.4 Witch-Hunting in Scotland 157
6.5 Findings 159
6.5.1 Prosecution as Career Device I: Waves of Witch-Hunting and their Historical Correlates 159
6.5.2 Prosecution as Career Device II: Witch-Hunters Become Justices of the Peace 161
6.5.3 Competing Explanations I: The Godly State Ideology 162
6.5.4 Competing Explanations II: Witches as Scapegoats for Disaster 163
6.6 Discussion 164
7 Mechanisms of Cooperation 172
Davide Barrera
7.1 Introduction 172
7.2 Cooperation Problems in Dyadic Settings 174
7.2.1 Models of Trust Problem 175
7.2.2 Cooperation Mechanisms in Embedded Settings 178
7.2.3 Empirical Research on Trust in Embedded Settings 179
7.2.4 Dyadic Embeddedness 180
7.2.5 Network Embeddedness 180
7.3 Cooperation Problems Involving More than Two Actors 181
7.3.1 Reciprocity and Non-Standard Utility Models 183
7.3.2 Empirical Evidence on Heterogeneous Preferences 184
7.4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks 187
8 The Impact of Elections on Cooperation: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Uganda 201
Guy Grossman and Delia Baldassarri
8.1 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 203
8.2 Research Site, Sampling, and Experimental Design 206
8.3 Research Site 207
8.4 Sampling and Data Collection 208
8.5 Experimental Design 208
8.6 Experimental Findings 210
8.7 Monitors’ Sanctioning Behavior 214
8.8 Discussion of the Experimental Part 216
8.9 Observational Data 217
8.10 Comparing Behavior in the Experiment and Real Life 219
8.11 Conclusion 221
Part II NETWORKS 233
Collective Action 234
Editor's Introduction to Chapter 9 235
9 Social Networks and Agent-Based Modelling 237
Meredith Rolfe
9.1 Social Network Properties 238
9.1.1 Surveys of Personal Networks 239
9.2 Network Construction Techniques 243
9.2.1 Global Reference or Full Information 243
9.2.2 Random Graph Local Networks 243
9.2.3 Two-Dimensional Lattices or Grid-Based Networks 244
9.2.4 One-Dimensional Lattice or Small-World Method 245
9.2.5 Biased or Structured Random Networks 245
9.3 Networks as Pipes: A Basic Demonstration 246
9.3.1 Global Networks and Group Size 248
9.3.2 Results with Network Construction Methods 251
9.4 Discussion 256
10 Online Networks and the Diffusion of Protest 263
Sandra Gonzalez-Bailón, Javier Borge-Holthoefer, and Yamir Moreno
10.1 Diffusion Dynamics 264
10.1.1 Models of Diffusion 264
10.1.2 Case Study 266
10.2 Thresholds and Critical Mass 268
10.3 Networks and Social Influence 271
10.4 Conclusion: Digital Data and Analytical Sociology 275
11 Liability to Rupture: Multiple Mechanisms and Subgroup Formation. An Exploratory Theoretical Study 282
Peter Abell
11.1 Introduction 282
11.2 A Formal Framework 283
11.3 Balance Theory 284
11.4 Homophily (H-theory) 287
11.5 Baseline Structures 288
11.6 Developing a Dynamic Mechanism for Balance Theory 289
11.7 Developing a Dynamic Mechanism for H-theory 291
11.8 The Dynamic Interaction of Balance and H-theories 293
11.9 Conclusions 294
12 Network Size and Network Homophily: Same-Sex Friendships in 595 Scandinavian Schools 299
Thomas Grund
12.1 Introduction 299
12.2 Theoretical Considerations 301
12.2.1 Biased Urn Model Without Replacement for Network Formation 301
12.2.2 Role of Group Size for Homophily 305
12.3 Empirical Application: Same-Sex Ties in School Classes 308
12.3.1 Hypotheses 308
12.3.2 Data and Method 309
12.4 Results 310
12.5 Conclusion 312
13 Status and Participation in Online Task Groups: An Agent-Based Model 317
Simone Gabbriellini
13.1 Introduction 317
13.2 Previous Models 319
13.3 E-state Structuralism: A Very Brief Review with an Add-On 321
13.4 Case Study: Strategies and Discussions in Massively Multi-Player Online Games 324
13.5 Analysis of the Model 326
13.6 Empirical Test/Validation of the Model 331
13.7 Conclusions 336
14 Turbulent Careers: Social Networks, Employer Hiring Preferences, and Job Instability 342
Christine Fountain and Katherine Stovel
14.1 Introduction 342
14.2 Background 343
14.2.1 The Rise of Turbulence in Individual Employment Trajectories 343
14.2.2 Inequality in Insecurity 344
14.3 Networks 346
14.3.1 Network Structure and Inequality in Information 346
14.3.2 Our Approach 348
14.4 Methods 349
14.4.1 The Simulation Environment 349
14.4.2 Implementation 350
14.4.3 Experimental Structure 353
14.5 Results 355
14.6 Summary and Conclusions 362
15 Employer Networks, Priming, and Discrimination in Hiring: An Experiment 373
Karoly Takacs, Flaminio Squazzoni, Giangiacomo Bravo, and Marco Castellani
15.1 Introduction 373
15.2 Method 376
15.2.1 Experimental Design 376
15.2.2 Manipulations 378
15.2.3 Subjects 378
15.3 Results 379
15.3.1 Index Values 379
15.3.2 Hierarchical Models 382
15.3.3 From Traditional Testing Toward Finding Indicators for Mechanisms 385
15.4 Discussion 391
16 The Duality of Organizations and Audiences 400
Balazs Kovacs
16.1 Introduction 400
16.2 Similarity and the Duality of Organizations and their Audiences 401
16.3 Organizational Similarity, Audiences, and Arguments for Extending Structural Equivalence 403
16.4 A Representation for Dual Similarity of Organizations and their Audiences 406
16.5 Empirical Illustration: The Duality of Restaurants and their Reviewers 407
16.6 Similarity as a Basis for Prediction: Validating the Model 408
16.7 Discussion, Implications, and Limitations 412
16.8 Connections to Analytical Sociology 415
References 415
Further Reading 418
Coda 419
Problem Shift in Sociology: Mechanisms, Generic Instruments, and Fractals 420
Gianluca Manzo
Index 427
