Description
Book SynopsisThis is the first book-length treatment of knowledge closure, a central and widely endorsed principle in epistemology. The volume provides a new and sustained defense of 'closure failure' and will be relevant to anyone studying or working in epistemology and related philosophical disciplines.
Trade Review'Marc Alspector-Kelly provides the most comprehensive treatment available of the much-debated topic of epistemic closure, and his own arguments are a valuable antidote to the current consensus in favor of closure. Henceforth, epistemologists who discuss closure will have to reckon with Alspector-Kelly's original and sophisticated case against this principle.' Peter Murphy, University of Indianapolis
Table of Contents1. Motivation, strategy, and definition; 2. Counterexamples; 3. Denying premise 1: Skepticism; 4. Denying premise 2: Warrant transmission; 5. Transmission, skepticism, and conditions of warrant; 6. Front-loading; 7. Denying premise 3: warrant for P as warrant for Q; 8. Denying premise 4: warrant by background information; 9. Denying premise 5: warrant by entitlement; 10. Abominable conjunctions, contextualism, and the spreading problem; 11. Bootstrapping, epistemic circularity, and justification closure.
