Description

Book Synopsis

This book argues that the moral quality of an act comes from the agentâs inner states. By arguing for the indispensable relevance of intention in the moral evaluation of acts, the book moves against a mainstream, objective approach in normative ethics.

It is commonly held that the intentions, knowledge, and volition of agents are irrelevant to the moral permissibility of their acts. This book stresses that the capacities of agency, rather than simply the label agent, must be engaged during an act if its moral evaluation is to be coherent. The author begins with an ontological argument that an act is a motion or a causing of change in something else. He argues that the source of an actâs moral meaning is in the agent: specifically, what the agent, if aware of relevant facts around her, aims to accomplish. He then moves to a series of critical chapters that consider arguments for mainstream approaches to act evaluation, including Thomsonâs dismissal of the agent knowledge and vo

Acts Intentions and Moral Evaluation

    Product form

    A Paperback by Craig M. White

    £39.99

    Includes FREE delivery

    Order before 4pm today for delivery by Fri 2 Oct 2026.

    1 in stock

      Trusted by thousands of customers. See 2,385+ Customer Reviews

      View other formats and editions of Acts Intentions and Moral Evaluation by Craig M. White

      Book details

      Publisher Taylor & Francis
      Published 8/26/2024
      ISBN-13 9781032298269
      978-1032298269
      ISBN-10 103229826X
      Also in:
      Medieval Western philosophy

      Description

      Book Synopsis

      This book argues that the moral quality of an act comes from the agentâs inner states. By arguing for the indispensable relevance of intention in the moral evaluation of acts, the book moves against a mainstream, objective approach in normative ethics.

      It is commonly held that the intentions, knowledge, and volition of agents are irrelevant to the moral permissibility of their acts. This book stresses that the capacities of agency, rather than simply the label agent, must be engaged during an act if its moral evaluation is to be coherent. The author begins with an ontological argument that an act is a motion or a causing of change in something else. He argues that the source of an actâs moral meaning is in the agent: specifically, what the agent, if aware of relevant facts around her, aims to accomplish. He then moves to a series of critical chapters that consider arguments for mainstream approaches to act evaluation, including Thomsonâs dismissal of the agent knowledge and vo

      Recently viewed products

      © 2026 Book Curl

        • American Express
        • Apple Pay
        • Diners Club
        • Discover
        • Google Pay
        • Maestro
        • Mastercard
        • PayPal
        • Shop Pay
        • Union Pay
        • Visa

        Login

        Forgot your password?

        Don't have an account yet?
        Create account