Description
Book SynopsisThe concept of action that requires philosophical analysis is one that concerns behavior characteristically found in humans. In Action Reconceptualized: Human Agency and Its Sources, David K. Chan examines the sources of human agency that are proposed in causal theories of actionnamely desire, intention, and tryingand distinguishes them from each other in terms of their roles in practical reasoning and motivation. He conceptualizes them in relation to each other in a way that is consistent and useful for answering a number of questions that are central to the philosophy of action. The action theory in this book addresses the need to understand human agency for its own sake, but it also serves another purpose. When the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe stressed the need to do philosophy of action before doing ethical theory, what she meant was that moral philosophers should first work out a proper account of the relationship between the inner states of a person and the actions that she pe
Trade ReviewChan's discussions and arguments are often insightful and engaging.... [I]t is very clearly written and its arguments are thought-provoking and instructive. This is enough to make Chan's book a valuable contribution to contemporary philosophy of action. * Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *
An instructive examination of basic concepts in the philosophy of action, including action, intention, decision, and trying. Chan usefully brings the philosophy of action into contact with ethical theory and the moral assessment of agents and their actions. -- Alfred R. Mele, Florida State University
Table of ContentsPreface Introduction The Need to Reconceptualize Action What Needs to be Reconceptualized Putting the Pieces Together Chapter 1: Towards a Theory of Action Philosophy of Action Causal and Non-Causal Theories Conceptualizing Action ‘Actopia’ Evaluating Action Fixing the Constants An Outline of this Book Chapter 2: Intention Skepticism about Intention The Planning Theory of Intention Intention and Reasons for Acting Comparing Concepts of Intention Chapter 3: Desire Defining Desire Extrinsic Desire Desire Ownership Motivation, Reason, and Akratic Agency Chapter 4: From Volitions to Tryings Volitions and the Regress Problem Why Do Volitionalists Say Strange Things? A Theory of Tryings The Identity-Theory of Trying as Mental and Physical Mental Tryings The Theoretical Advantage of Conceptualizing Tryings as Processes Non-Observational Knowledge of Trying Chapter 5: Problems and Issues in Action Theory Deviant Causality The Simple View Non-Intentional Actions Basic and Non-Basic Actions The Nature of Action Desiring and Intending to Try Chapter 6: Rational and Moral Agency The Doctrine of Double Effect The Moral Significance of Non-Intentional Agency The Argument Against Ethical Rationalism Conclusion The Reconceptualized Action Theory The Importance of Getting It Right Bibliography Index
