Description
Book SynopsisThis book provides a minimal metaphysics for scientific practice, i.e. one that refrains from postulating any structure that is explanatorily irrelevant. Hüttemann analyses central aspects of scientific practice, such as prediction, explanation and manipulation, to consider whether and (if so) what presuppositions best account for these practices.
Trade Review'A Minimal Metaphysics for Scientific Practice constitutes a highly original contribution to the burgeoning field of the metaphysics of science. Clear, well-argued and ambitious in scope, it will be required reading for those seeking cutting-edge work on such issues as laws, causation, reductionism and fundamentality.' Travis Dumsday, Concordia University of Edmonton
Table of ContentsIntroduction; 1. Laws of nature and their modal surface structure; 2. The problem of ceteris paribus clauses; 3. Causation – conceptual groundwork; 4. Causation – application and augmentation; 5. Reductive practices; 6. Reduction and physical foundationalism; 7. Reduction and ontological monism; 8. Concluding remarks: methods and epistemic sources in metaphysics.
