Description
Book SynopsisA Defense of Ignorance develops new ideas in feminist epistemology by exploring diverse and sometimes positive roles for ignorance. Cynthia Townley argues that epistemic values cannot simply be reduced to the value of increasing knowledge and that ignorance is not merely inescapable for epistemic agents, but, rather, is valuable. Townley shows that ignorance-friendly epistemology offers a better descriptive and normative account of human epistemic practices. This interpretation challenges the traditional assumption that increasing knowledge is the definitive epistemic goal. The book makes a major contribution to revisionary epistemology and to the expanding fields of social epistemology and feminist epistemology. All social scientists stand to benefit from Townley''s analysis, most of all those interested in knowledge and in feminist scholarship.
Trade ReviewThis book makes a valuable contribution to feminist, anti-racist, and 'mainstream' debates in epistemology. It is especially pertinent to discussions set in motion by ground-breaking work on epistemologies of ignorance, and by feminist work in virtue epistemology which centres on issues of responsible epistemic conduct, both individual and collective. -- Lorraine Code, York University, Toronto
Cynthia Townley's crisply argued book offers an indispensable guide to the indispensable place of ignorance in the complex mix of goals and achievements of epistemic agents. A most welcome and inviting addition to the changing landscape in epistemology. -- Elizabeth Spelman, Smith College
Table of ContentsChapter 1 Preface Chapter 2 Introduction: Ignorance Matters Chapter 3 Chapter 1. Epistemic Dependence: Beyond Facts Chapter 4 Chapter 2. Trust and Ignorance Chapter 5 Chapter 3. Institutional Epistemic Dependence Chapter 6 Chapter 4. Ignorance, Arrogance and Pluralism
