{"product_id":"this-is-ethics-9781118479858","title":"This Is Ethics","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThis is Ethics\u003c\/i\u003e presents an accessible and engaging introduction to a variety of issues relating to contemporary moral philosophy.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003eCovers a wide range of topics which are actively debated in contemporary moral philosophy\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eAddresses the nature of happiness, well-being, and the meaning of life, the role of moral principles in moral thinking, moral motivation, and moral responsibility\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eCovers timely ethical issues such as population growth and climate change\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eOffers additional resources at\u003ca href=\"https:\/\/thisisphilosoph.wordpress.com\/ethics\/\"\u003ehttps:\/\/thisisphilosoph.wordpress.com\/ethics\/\u003c\/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"https:\/\/www.wiley.com\/en-us\/thisisphilosophy\/thisisethicsanintroduction\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/a\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eFeatures extensive annotated bibliographies, summaries, and study questions for further investigation\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eWritten in an accessible, jargon-free manner using helpful illustrative examples\u003c\/li\u003e \u003c\/ul\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ePreface xv\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eAcknowledgments xix\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart One What’s in Our Interests? 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1 Pleasure 3\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThree Questions about Pleasure 4\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Is Pleasure? 6\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe sensation view 7\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe attitude view 7\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe desire view 8\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePhysiology of pleasure* 10\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eValue of Pleasure 11\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHedonism 12\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArgument in favor of hedonism 1: Discernible differences 13\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArgument in favor of hedonism 2: Motivation 13\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHigher pleasures 13\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePluralism about prudential value 15\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNozick’s experience machine argument 15\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTwo responses to Nozick 16\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePessimism about the value of pleasure* 17\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 19\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 20\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 22\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2 Happiness, Well-being, and the Meaning of Life 25\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHedonism, Again 27\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 1: Trivial pleasures 28\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 2: The role of happiness in deliberation 28\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSatisfaction Theories 29\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDesire satisfaction theories of well-being 29\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjections to desire satisfaction theories 30\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 1: Which desires count? 30\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 2: Expensive tastes 31\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLife satisfaction theories of happiness 32\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAn objection to life satisfaction theories 33\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjective List Theories 34\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjections to the objective list theories 35\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Capability Approach* 37\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHappiness and the Meaning of Life 39\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmotional state theory of happiness* 40\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe question of the meaning of life 41\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSusan Wolf ’s fitting fulfillment theory 42\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 43\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 44\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 47\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart Two Normative Ethics 51\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3 Egoism and Altruism 53\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDifferent Forms of Egoism and Altruism 55\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFeldman’s objection to ethical egoism 56\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTwo Arguments for Ethical Egoism 57\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe “ought implies can” argument 58\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe practical reasons argument 58\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTwo Objections to Psychological Egoism 59\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe everyday objection 59\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe evolutionary objection 60\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoore’s Argument against Ethical Egoism* 62\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems of Moore’s argument* 63\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGauthier’s Contractarianism 64\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe paradox of social cooperation 65\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eContractarianism as a solution 67\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe compliance problem 68\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReason one: Risk of exclusion 69\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReason two: Risk of revealing your true motives 69\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary 69\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems with Gauthier’s Theory 70\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 1: Scope of moral concern 70\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 2: Deception 70\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 3: Acting for right reasons 71\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 71\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 73\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 75\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4 Consequentialism and Kantian Ethics 79\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConsequentialism 80\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUtilitarianism 82\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDeliberation procedure vs. criterion of rightness 83\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDirect vs. indirect forms of consequentialism 83\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUtilitarianism vs. richer conceptions of value 84\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eActual vs. expected value 85\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMaximizing vs. satisficing 86\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMill’s Argument for Utilitarianism 86\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe problems with Mill’s argument 88\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSaving Mill’s argument 89\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKantian Ethics 90\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe good will 90\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe universalization test 92\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDuties, right and wrong 94\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy do the right thing? 95\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReason 1: Exceptions 95\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReason 2: Freedom 96\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCounterexamples and Convergence 97\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCounterexamples to utilitarianism 98\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCounterexamples to the Categorical Imperative 99\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUtilitarian and consequentialist responses to the counterexamples* 100\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKantian responses to the counterexamples* 102\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConvergence* 104\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 105\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 106\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 109\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5 Intuitionism, Particularism, and Virtue Ethics 113\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRoss’s Objection to Consequentialism and Kantian Ethics 113\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntuitionism in Normative Ethics 115\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrima facie duties 115\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow do you know? 117\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrima facie duties and actual duties 118\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eParticularism 120\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrima facie duties and holism 120\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHolism and particularism* 121\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKnowing what is right* 123\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVirtue Ethics 124\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFlourishing 125\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVirtue acquisition 127\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eActing virtuously 128\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRight and wrong acts 129\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTwo Objections to Virtue Ethics 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCircularity 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImproving yourself 131\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVirtue ethics and moral sensibility 131\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 133\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 134\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 136\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart Three Metaethics 139\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6 Subjectivism, Relativism, and Divine Commands 141\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubjectivism 143\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdvantages of subjectivism 144\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjections to subjectivism 144\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 1: Experience 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 2: Infallibility 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 3: Disagreement 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRelativism 146\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdvantages of relativism 148\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems of relativism 149\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblem 1: Disagreement 149\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblem 2: Moral fallibility 150\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblem 3: Tolerance 150\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblem 4: Multiculturalism 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDivine Command Theory 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDivine command theory and moral words 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDivine command theory and moral properties 153\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdvantages of divine command theory 154\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Euthyphro Dilemma* 155\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat is right explains what God commands* 156\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGod’s commands explain what is right* 156\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblem 1: God’s goodness 157\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblem 2: Anything could be wrong 157\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblem 3: The reasons for God’s commands 158\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 158\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 159\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 163\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e7 Naturalism and the Open Question Argument 167\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoral Realism 167\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNaturalism vs. non-naturalism 168\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePros and cons of non-naturalism 169\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Open Question Argument 171\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStage 1: Words and properties 172\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStage 2: Moral words and moral properties 173\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStage 3: The open question test 173\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStage 4: Moral words and open questions 174\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStage 5: Putting the argument together 175\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponses to the Open Question Argument 176\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponse 1: Begging the question 176\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponse 2: Making know-how explicit 177\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponse 3: The sense\/reference distinction 179\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntuitionism in Metaethics* 181\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe problem of knowledge* 181\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFoundationalism to the rescue* 183\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMisconceptions and objections* 184\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMisconception 1: The role of experience and emotions 184\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMisconception 2: What seems self-evident to you 184\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 1: People who understand but don’t agree 185\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 2: Dogmatism 186\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 186\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 187\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 190\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e8 Moral Motivation and Expressivism 195\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Argument from Motivation 196\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Humean Theory of Motivation 197\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDirections of fit 197\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe role of beliefs and desires 198\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoral Judgment Internalism 199\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVery Strong Internalism 200\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWeakness of will 201\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStrong Internalism 201\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCounterexamples to Strong Internalism 202\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAmoralists 202\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBad people 203\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA case of depression 204\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExpressivism 205\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe core claims of expressivism 206\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClaim 1: Moral judgments 207\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClaim 2: Moral language 208\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClaim 3: Moral properties 210\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponses to two common objections 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 1: Truths and facts 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 2: Mere attitudes 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Frege–Geach Problem 212\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmbedded claims 212\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eValid inferences* 213\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe negation problem* 214\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 215\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 217\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 220\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart Four Ethical Questions 223\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e9 Moral Responsibility 225\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Is Moral Responsibility? 225\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCausal responsibility and attributability 227\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe agency condition 227\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFreedom and real selves 229\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Freedom Principle: A Threat for Moral Responsibility 230\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe consequence argument 230\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe problem of luck 231\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGalen Strawson’s argument against moral responsibility 232\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Frankfurt Cases 234\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjections and responses* 235\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 1: Flicker of freedom 235\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 2: A dilemma 235\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponse 1: Mele and Robb 236\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponse 2: Dennett 236\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Deep Attributability Principle 237\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrankfurt’s higher-order desire theory 238\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Real Self 239\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWatson’s theory of the real self 240\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe time-slice problem 241\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponsiveness to reasons 242\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 243\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 244\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 247\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e10 Population Growth and Climate Change 249\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Non-Identity Effect 251\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Repugnant Conclusion 253\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe average utility principle 256\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCritical-level utilitarianism* 257\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVariable value view and intuitions* 259\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClimate Change and Personal Obligations 260\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCarbon off setting 261\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClimate Change and Governments 262\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe discount rate* 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe social action problem 266\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClimate Change and Uncertainty 267\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMaximizing expected value* 268\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 269\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 271\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 272\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGlossary of Terms 275\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 293\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"John Wiley and Sons Ltd","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49406877335895,"sku":"9781118479858","price":27.55,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9781118479858.jpg?v=1730497419","url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/products\/this-is-ethics-9781118479858","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}