{"product_id":"project-recovery-9781118809198","title":"Project Recovery","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eBest practices for picking up the pieces when projects fail   There are plenty of books available offering best practices that help you keep your projects on track, but offer guidance on what to do when the worst has already happened.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e1 Understanding Success and Failure 1\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.0 Introduction 1\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.1 Success: Historical Perspective 2\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.2 Early Modifications to Triple Constraints 3\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.3 Primary and Secondary CONSTRAINTS 4\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.4 Prioritization of Constraints 6\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.5 From Triple Constraints to Competing Constraints 6\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.6 Future Definitions of Project Success 8\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.7 Different Definitions of Project Success 11\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.8 Understanding Project Failure 12\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.9 Degrees of Project Failure 13\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.10 Other Categories of Project Failure 16\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.11 Summary of Lessons Learned 17\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2 Causes of Project Failure 19\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.0 Introduction 19\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.1 Facts about Project Failure 19\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.2 Causes of Project Failure 20\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.3 Schedule Failure 22\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.4 Failures due to Unknown Technology 23\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.5 Project Size and Success\/Failure Risk 24\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.6 Failure due to Improper Critical Failure Factors 25\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.7 Failure to Establish Tracking Metrics 26\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.8 Failing to Recognize Early Warning Signs 26\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.9 Improper Selection of Critical Team Members 27\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.10 Uncertain Rewards 29\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.11 Estimating Failures 31\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.12 Staffing Failures 32\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.13 Planning Failures 34\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.14 Risk Management Failures 36\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.15 Management Mistakes 37\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.16 Lacking Sufficient Tools 38\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.17 Failure of Success 39\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.18 Motivation to Fail 41\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.19 Tradeoff Failures 42\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.20 Summary of Lessons Learned 43\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3 Business Case Failure 45\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.0 Introduction 45\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.1 Changing Stakeholders 45\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.2 Revalidation of Assumptions 46\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.3 Managing Innovation 47\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.4 Examples of Changing Business Cases 48\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.5 PROLOGUE TO THE Iridium Case Study 52\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.6 Rise, Fall and Resurrection of Iridium 52\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNaming the Project “Iridium” 55\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObtaining Executive Support 55\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLaunching the Venture 56\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIridium System 58\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTerrestial and Space-Based Network 58\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProject Initiation: Developing Business Case 59\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e“Hidden” Business Case 61\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRisk Management 61\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCollective Belief 63\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIridium’s Infancy Years 64\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDebt Financing 67\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eM-Star Project 68\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA New CEO 69\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProject Management at Motorola (Iridium) 69\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSatellite Launches 70\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInitial Public Offering (IPO) 71\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSigning Up Customers 71\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIridium’s Rapid Ascent 72\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIridium’s Rapid Descent 74\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIridium “Flu” 78\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDefinition of Failure (October 1999) 79\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.7 Summary of Lessons Learned 84\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4 Sponsorship\/Governance Failures 87\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.0 Introduction 87\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.1 Defining Project Governance 88\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.2 Project versus Corporate Governance 88\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3 Roles, Responsibilities and Decision-Making Authority 90\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.4 Governance Frameworks 91\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.5 Governance Failures 93\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.6 Why Projects Are Hard to Kill 94\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.7 Collective Belief 96\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.8 Exit Champion 97\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.9 When to Give Up 98\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.10 Prologue to the Denver International Airport Case Study 101\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.11 Denver International Airport 101\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBackground 101\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAirports and Airline Deregulation 102\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDoes Denver Need a New Airport? 103\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEnplaned Passenger Market 108\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLand Selection 109\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFront Range Airport 109\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAirport Design 110\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProject Management 112\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBaggage-Handling System 114\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEarly Risk Analysis 115\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMarch 1991 115\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eApril 1991 116\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMay 1991 116\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAugust 1991 117\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNovember 1991 117\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDecember 1991 118\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJanuary 1992 118\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJune 1992 118\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSeptember 1992 119\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOctober 1992 119\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMarch 1993 119\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAugust 1993 120\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSeptember 1993 120\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOctober 1993 121\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJanuary 1994 121\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFebruary 1994 121\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMarch 1994 121\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eApril 1994 122\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMay 1994 122\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJune 1994 123\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJuly 1994 124\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAugust 1994 124\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSeptember 1994 127\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOctober 1994 128\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNovember 1994 128\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDecember 1994 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAirline Costs per Enplaned Passenger 131\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFebruary 28, 1995 132\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix A 133\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction 133\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAgreement between United and the City 134\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix B Jokes about the Abbreviation DIA 138\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.12 Denver International Airport Baggage- Handling System: Illustration of Ineffective Decision Making 142\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSynopsis 142\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBackground 142\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSystem at a Glance 142\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChronology of Events 143\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBasic Mode of Failure 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKey Decisions That Led to Disaster 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOther Failure Points 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 152\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.13 Summary of Lessons Learned 153\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5 Project Politics and Failure 155\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.0 Introduction 155\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.1 Political Risks 156\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.2 R easons for Playing Politics 156\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.3 Situations Where Political Games Will Occur 157\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.4 Governance Committee 158\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.5 Friends and Foes 159\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.6 A ttack or Retreat 159\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.7 N eed for Effective Communications 161\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.8 Power and Influence 162\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.9 Managing Project Politics 163\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.10 Prologue to the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster Case Study 163\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.11 Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster 164\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBackground to Space Transportation System 166\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNASA Succumbs to Politics and Pressure 167\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSolid Rocket Boosters 169\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBlowholes 171\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eO-Ring Erosion 173\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJoint Rotation 173\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eO-Ring Resilience 174\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExternal Tank 175\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSpare Parts Problem 175\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRisk Identification Procedures 175\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTeleconferencing 176\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePaperwork Constraints 176\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePolitics and O-Rings 178\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIssuing Waivers 178\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLaunch Liftoff Sequence Profile: Possible Aborts 180\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eO-Ring Problem 184\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePressure, Paperwork and Waivers 189\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMission 51-L 191\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSecond Teleconference 194\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIce Problem 199\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Accident 202\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNASA and Media 205\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFindings of Commission 205\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChain-of-Command Communication Failure 209\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEpilogue 210\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePotential Cover-Up 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSenate Hearing 213\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.12 Summary of Lessons Learned 214\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6 Software Failures 217\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.0 Introduction 217\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.1 IT’s Biggest Failures 217\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIBM’s Stretch Project 217\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKnight-Ridder’s Viewtron Service 218\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDMV Projects—California and Washington 218\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eApple’s Copland Operating System 219\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSainsbury’s Warehouse Automation 220\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCanada’s Gun Registration System 220\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThree Current Projects in Danger 221\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.2 Software Bugs 222\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.3 Causes of Failure in Software Projects 224\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.4 Large-Scale IT Failure 225\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReader ROI 225\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOut with the Old 227\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSeeds of Failure 228\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEarly Warnings 230\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCall for Help 232\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.5 W orst Possible Failure: FoxMeyer Drugs 234\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCase Study: FoxMeyer Drugs’ Bankruptcy: Was It a Failure of ERP? 235\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.6 L ondon Heathrow Terminal 239\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHistory 240\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConstruction 240\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMain Terminal Building 241\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSatellite Terminal Buildings 241\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNew Heathrow Control Tower 242\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOpening Day 242\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.7 Summary of Lessons Learned 243\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7 Safety Considerations 245\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.0 Importance of Safety 245\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.1 Boeing 787 Dreamliner Battery Problems 245\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2 Airbus A380 Problems 250\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConfigurations 251\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBrief History 251\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.3 Summary of Lessons Learned 255\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8 Scope Creep 257\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.0 Understanding Scope Creep 257\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.1 Creeping Failure 258\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.2 Defining Scope 259\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.3 Scope Creep Dependencies 261\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.4 C auses of Scope Creep 261\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.5 N eed for Business Knowledge 263\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.6 W ays to Minimize Scope Creep 263\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.7 Sydney Opera House 265\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePerformance Venues and Facilities 266\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConstruction History 267\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.8 Summary of Lessons Learned 273\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9 Project Health Checks 275\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.0 Need for Project Health Checks 275\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.1 Understanding Project Health Checks 276\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.2 Who Performs Health Checks? 278\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.3 Health Check Life-Cycle Phases 278\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.4 Project Management Failure Warning Signs 279\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e“Instant Amnesia” and “Da Nial Ain’t In Egypt” 280\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProject Cost 280\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Lone Ranger Rides Again! 281\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNo Sale! 281\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArrogance Rules! 282\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2 + 2 = 17! 282\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMao Didn’t Have the Only “Long March” 283\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Risk? There’s No Risk Here! 283\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhere’s Your Project Plan? 284\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eI’ll Take a Booth without a Cell Phone! 284\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDon’t Bother Me with Details! 284\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Layoffs? 285\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Out-of-Towner Speaks: Distance Means Credibility 285\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDisclaimer 286\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.5 Summary of Lessons Learned 286\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10 Techniques for Recovering Failing Projects 289\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.0 Understanding Troubled Projects 289\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.1 Root Causes of Failure 290\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.2 Definition Phase 292\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.3 Early Warning Signs of Trouble 292\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.4 Selecting Recovery Project Manager (RPM) 294\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.5 Recovery Life-Cycle Phases 295\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.6 Understanding Phase 295\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.7 Audit Phase 296\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.8 Tradeoff Phase 298\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.9 Negotiation Phase 300\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.10 Restart Phase 300\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.11 E xecution Phase 301\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.12 Project Recovery versus Project Rescue 302\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.13 R ecovery Decision 302\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.14 Summary of Lessons Learned 304\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 309\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"John Wiley \u0026 Sons Inc","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49406927569239,"sku":"9781118809198","price":60.75,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9781118809198.jpg?v=1730497583","url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/products\/project-recovery-9781118809198","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}