{"product_id":"political-power-and-corporate-control-9780691133812","title":"Political Power and Corporate Control","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eExplaining how politics shapes corporate governance, this book combines a theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and narratives of country cases.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"This is an exceptionally important book, meticulously researched and persuasively argued. It puts today's most pressing questions of corporate credibility and accountability in context, both historical and global. It is filled with information and insights of vital importance to anyone in the corporate world.\"--Nell Minow, The Corporate Library \"Gourevitch and Shinn conduct comparative analysis at its best, introducing cross-country quantitative analysis where that is possible and appropriate, but also offering analytical narratives on corporate governance, its likely origins, and the political and legal structures that support it in thirteen countries (mostly in Asia and Europe, but also including Chile and the United States). They combine superb conceptual clarity with informative detail.\"--Richard N. Cooper, Foreign Affairs \"A comprehensive examination of corporate governance.\"--Choice\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS vii  PREFACE xiii      CHAPTER ONE: Introduction and Summary Argument 1  Why Fight about Corporate Governance? 3  Great Variance and the \"Great Reversals\" 4  Putting the Pieces Together: In Search of a Political Explanation 10  Policy Consequences 12  Plan of Attack 14      CHAPTER TWO: Governance Patterns: What Causes What? 15  Outcomes: Dependent Variables and Patterns of Control 16  Capitalist Economic Policies, Minority Shareholder Protections, and Degrees of Coordination 20  Politics: Preferences and Institutions 22  Conclusion 26      CHAPTER THREE: Framing Incentives: The Economics and Law Tradition 27  Origins of the Debate 28  Incomplete Contracts and Private Order 30  Law and Regulation: Minority Shareholder Protections--Information, Oversight, Control, and Incentives 39  Varieties of Capitalism: Degrees of Coordination in Market Economies 51  Conclusion 55      CHAPTER FOUR: Politics: Preferences and Institutions 57  Mapping Financial Interests on Political Processes: A Causal Model 57  Preferences and Coalitions among Owners, Managers, and Workers 59  Political Institutions: Majoritarian and Consensus Mechanisms 67  Alternative Arguments: Legal Family and Economic Sociology 83  Conclusion 93      CHAPTER FIVE: Preference Cleavages 1: Class Conflict 95  Section 1: Owners and Managers Dominate Workers 96  The Investor Model 96  Analytic Narrative 123  Korea: Changing Institutions, Shifting Preferences 123  Section 2: Workers Dominate Owners and Managers 132  The Labor Power Model 132  Analytic Narrative 140  Sweden: The Exemplar of the Labor Power Model? 140  Conclusion 147      CHAPTER SIX: Preference Cleavages 2: Sectoral Conflict 149  Section 1: Cross-Class Coalitions 149  The Corporatist Model: Workers and Managers Dominate Owners 150  Analytic Narrative 159  Germany: From Corporatist Bargain to a Transparency Coalition 160  Japan: Concentration without Owners 167  The Netherlands: The Evolution of \"Poldermodel\" Corporatism 177  Section 2: Building Coalitions in Authoritarian Systems 187  The Oligarchy Model: Owners Dominate Workers and Managers 187  Analytic Narratives 189  Russia: Oligarchs and Politics 190  China: \"Selectorate-Electorate\" Coalition 192  Singapore: Shareholder Protections with \"Guided\" Democracy 199  Conclusion 203      CHAPTER SEVEN: Preference Cleavages 3: Transparency, Voice, and Pensions 205  Section 1: Workers and Owners Dominate Managers 205  From Class Conflict to Corporatist Compromise 206  Analytic Narratives 228  Chile: Authoritarian Roots of the Transparency Coalition 228  Malaysia: Ethnicity and Democracy in Governance Politics 232  Section 2: Managers Dominate Owners and Workers 237  \"Managerism\" 237  Analytic Narratives 241  The United States: A Contested Path from Oligarchy to MSP 241  United Kingdom: The Power of Majoritarian Political Institutions? 259  France: Without the State, Who Is in Control? 262  Conclusion 273      CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusion: Going Forward 277  Questions and Answers: What Explains Variance? 277  Shortcomings and Guideposts for Future Research 285  Conclusion: Fighting over the Governance Debate 287      DATA APPENDIX 297  BIBLIOGRAPHY 313  INDEX 333","brand":"Princeton University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":51359108268375,"sku":"9780691133812","price":999.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false}],"url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/products\/political-power-and-corporate-control-9780691133812","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}