{"product_id":"political-competition-theory-and-applications-9780674021051","title":"Political Competition  Theory and Applications","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eJohn Roemer presents a unified and rigorous theory of political competition between parties and he models the theory under many specifications, including whether parties are policy oriented or oriented toward winning, whether they are certain or uncertain about voter preferences, and whether the policy space is uni- or multidimensional.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eRoemer characterizes—correctly—the traditional Downsian model of political competition as one modeling competition between ‘opportunistic politicians’ who themselves have no policy preferences and who choose instead to adopt positions that appeal to the preferences of the optimum number of voters. This, he says, is a misguided model, easy to use but empirically and theoretically inaccurate and producing meaningless results. He offers instead a more complex model…based on ‘parties in conflict,’ which have real policy preferences. Well written… [A] fine contribution to the literature on spatial modeling. -- M. Berheide * Choice *\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePreface   Introduction    1. Political Competition over a Single Issue: The Case of Certainty   1.1 Citizens, Voters, and Parties   1.2 The Downs Model   1.3 The Wittman Model   1.4 Conclusion    2. Modeling Party Uncertainty   2.1 Introduction   2.2 The State-Space Approach to Uncertainty   2.3 An Error-Distribution Model of Uncertainty   2.4 A Finite-Type Model   2.5 Conclusion    3. Unidimensional Policy Spaces with Uncertainty   3.1 Introduction   3.2 The Downs Model   3.3 The Wittman Model: An Example   3.4 Existence of Wittman Equilibrium   3.5 Properties of Wittman Equilibrium   3.6 Summary    4. Applications of the Wittman Model   4.1 Simple Models of Redistribution: The Politics of Extremism   4.2 Politico-Economic Equilibrium with Labor-Supply Elasticity   4.3 Partisan Dogmatism and Political Extremism   4.4 A Dynamic Model of Political Cycles   4.5 Conclusion    5. Endogenous Parties: The Unidimensional Case   5.1 Introduction   5.2 Average-Member Nash Equilibrium   5.3 Condorcet-Nash Equilibrium   5.4 Conclusion    6. Political Competition over Several Issues: The Case of Certainty   6.1 Introduction   6.2 The Downs Model   6.3 The Wittman Model   6.4 Conclusion    7. Multidimensional Issue Spaces and Uncertainty: The Downs Model   7.1 Introduction   7.2 The State-Space and Error-Distribution Models of Uncertainty   7.3 The Coughlin Model   7.4 The Lindbeck-Weibull Model   7.5 Adapting the Coughlin Model to the Case of Aggregate Uncertainty   7.6 Conclusion    8. Party Factions and Nash Equilibrium   8.1 Introduction   8.2 Party Factions   8.3 PUNE as a Bargaining Equilibrium   8.4 A Differential Characterization of PUNE   8.5 Regular Wittman Equilibrium   8.6 PUNEs in the Unidimensional Model   8.7 PUNEs in a Multidimensional Euclidean Model   8.8 Conclusion    9. The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Taxation   9.1 Introduction   9.2 The Model   9.3 The Equilibrium Concepts   9.4 Analysis of Party Competition   9.5 Calibration   9.6 Conclusion    10. Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich in Democracies   10.1 The Historical Issue and a Model Preview   10.2 The Politico-Economic Environment   10.3 Analysis of PUNEs   10.4 Empirical Tests   10.5 Proofs of Theorems   10.6 Concluding Remark    11. Distributive Class Politics and the Political Geography of Interwar Europe   11.1 Introduction   11.2 The Luebbert Model   11.3 Testing Luebbert's Theory   11.4 Introducing the Communists: A Three-Party Model   11.5 Conclusion   11.6 Methodological Coda   Appendix 11A    12. A Three-Class Model of American Politics   12.1 Introduction   12.2 The Model   12.3 Characterization of PUNEs   12.4 Results   12.5 Conclusion    13. Endogenous Parties with Multidimensional Competition   13.1 Introduction   13.2 Endogenous Parties   13.3 Taxation and Race   13.4 Fitting the Model to U.S. Data   13.5 Quadratic Taxation   13.6 Private Financing of Parties   13.7 A Technical Remark on the Existence of PUNEs   13.8 Conclusion   13.9 Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich: Reprise    14. Toward a Model of Coalition Government   14.1 Introduction   14.2 The Payoff Function of a Wittman Party   14.3 An Example of Coalition Government: Unidimensional Wittman Equilibrium   14.4 Multidimensional Three-Party Politics   14.5 Coalition Government with a Multidimensional Issue Space: An Example   14.6 Conclusion    Mathematical Appendix   A.1 Basics of Probability Theory   A.2 Some Concepts from Analysis    References   Index","brand":"Harvard University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49917764305239,"sku":"9780674021051","price":26.96,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780674021051.jpg?v=1738449107","url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/products\/political-competition-theory-and-applications-9780674021051","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}