{"product_id":"philosophy-of-law-9780415827461","title":"Philosophy of Law","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePhilosophy of Law: An Introduction\u003c\/em\u003e provides an ideal starting point for students of philosophy and law. Setting it clearly against the historical background, Mark Tebbit quickly leads readers into the heart of the philosophical questions that dominate philosophy of law today. He provides an exceptionally wide-ranging overview of the contending theories that have sought to resolve these problems. He does so without assuming prior knowledge either of philosophy or law on the part of the reader.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe book is structured in three parts around the key issues and themes in philosophy of law:\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cul\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cli\u003eWhat is the law? â the major legal theories addressing the question of what we mean by law, including natural law, legal positivism and legal realism.\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cli\u003eThe reach of the law â the various legal theories on the nature and extent of the lawâs authority, with regard to obligation and civil disobedience, rights, liberty and privacy.\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cli\u003eCrimi\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"With its uniquely detailed focus on the Common Law, this is the best textbook available for philosophy students not already familiar with law as it is practiced in the UK, US, and related systems. It will likewise be particularly valuable to law students interested in philosophising about the actual concrete legal systems which surround our lives, rather than \"the law\" as some abstract and contextless ideal object.\" \u003cstrong\u003eShane Glackin\u003c\/strong\u003e, \u003cem\u003eUniversity of Exeter, UK\u003c\/em\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003ePreface to 3rd Edition\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAcknowledgements\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePart I: What is the law?\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e1. Morality, justice and natural law\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMorality and law at variance\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhat is justice?\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNatural law theory and legal positivism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTraditional natural law theory\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConclusion\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStudy questions and further reading\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e2. From common law to modern positivism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCommon law today\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEarly positivism: an age of philosophical transition\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAustin’s legal positivism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAustin’s command theory\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConclusion\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStudy questions and further reading\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e3. Hart’s legal positivism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHart’s challenge to Austin\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLegal and moral obligation\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eInternalisation\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConventions and obligations\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMinimal natural law\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePrimary and secondary rules\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe rule of recognition\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePositivist doubts about Hart’s system of rules\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConclusion\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStudy questions and further reading\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e4. Legal theory and the Nazi legality problem\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHans Kelsen’s pure theory of law\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRadbruch against Kelsen\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFuller’s secular version of natural law\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe problem of Nazi legality\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConclusion\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStudy questions and further reading\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e5. Legal realism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePragmatism and legal realism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWho were the realists?\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLegal theory and judicial practice\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe pragmatist attack on certainty\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe realist revolt against formalism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAbductive inference to the best explanation\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRealism and rule-scepticism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe pragmatics of justice\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHart’s criticism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConclusion\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStudy questions and further reading\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e6. Competing images of law in contemporary jurisprudence\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHard cases and legal positivism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDworkin’s theory of law as integrity\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDworkin’s hard cases\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCriticisms of Dworkin\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConclusion\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStudy questions and further reading\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e7. Radical challenges to mainstream theories\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe roots of modernity and the Enlightenment\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCritics of the Enlightenment: Marx and Nietzsche\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe postmodernist attack on modernity: Foucault and Derrida\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCritical Legal Studies\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe contradictions in liberalism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eJustice modern and postmodern\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConclusion: Perspectivism and truth\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStudy questions and further reading\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePart II: The reach of the law\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e8. Obedience and disobedience\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNatural law and positivist responses\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eH.D.Thoreau: Conscience as the sole basis for obligation\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSocrates’ arguments in Plato’s Crito\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConsequentialist arguments for conditional obedience\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eClassical contract theory: Hobbes and Locke\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRawls: the original position and the conditional duty to obey\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eInjustice and civil disobedience\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConclusion\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStudy questions and further reading\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e9. Legal and moral rights\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRights and rights-scepticism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBentham’s attack on rights\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eResponses to rights-scepticism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAbsolute rights\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRights versus utility – Bentham and Mill\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDworkin’s theory of rights\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Human Rights Act (1998) and the case of the conjoined twins\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConclusion\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStudy questions and further reading\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e10. Law and private morals\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLiberalisation and the Wolfenden Report\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eJ.S. Mill and liberty\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDevlin’s critique of the Wolfenden Report\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHart’s reply to Devlin\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDworkin’s critique of Devlin\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConclusion\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStudy questions and further reading\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e11 Radical critiques of liberal theories of law\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe liberal concept of the individual\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe contextualisation of universal rights\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMarx and Marxism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFeminist jurisprudence and the rights of women\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRights in relation to class, sex and race\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConclusion\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStudy questions and further reading\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePart III\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCriminal responsibility and punishment\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e12 Guilty minds: recklessness, manslaughter and murder\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCriminal responsibility and the mens rea doctrine in English common law \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNegligence and recklessness\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIntentional killing and murder\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDirect and oblique intention\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe subjective-objective controversy\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConclusion\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStudy questions and further reading\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e13 Unlawful killing: the defences of necessity and duress\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe defence of duress\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMurder and the Hale authority\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe defence of necessity\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe classic cases\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eArguments for and against necessity as a defence to murder\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eShould the Hale authority allow any exceptions?\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA veil of ignorance test\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIntention\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStudy questions and further reading\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e14 Insanity and diminished responsibility\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTraditional problems with insanity\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe case of Daniel M’Naghten\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe M’Naghten Rules and their critics\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDiminished responsibility and the 1957 Homicide Act\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConclusion\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStudy questions and further reading\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e15 Theories of punishment\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe problem of justification\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePunishment justified by its effects\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eJustifying punishment retrospectively\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCriticisms of the traditional theories\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWeaknesses of retributivism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eModifications and compromises\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePunishment as communication: Nozick and Hampton\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDesert and deterrence in sentencing\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConclusion\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStudy questions and further reading\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e16 Radical perspectives on crime and punishment\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEnlightenment liberalism and its critics \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe range of radical criticisms\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe individual and society\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIntention and determinism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFree agency, criminal intention and mens rea\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConclusion: Enlightenment values and the rule of law\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStudy questions and further reading\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBibliography\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIndex\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e","brand":"Taylor \u0026 Francis","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":51018199695703,"sku":"9780415827461","price":45.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780415827461.jpg?v=1750776001","url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/products\/philosophy-of-law-9780415827461","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}