{"product_id":"philosophy-for-as-and-a-level-9781138690394","title":"Philosophy for AS and A Level","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003ci\u003e\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cp\u003ePhilosophy for AS \u003ci\u003eand A Level \u003c\/i\u003eis an accessible textbook for the new 2017 AQA Philosophy syllabus. Structured closely around the AQA specification this textbook covers the two units shared by the AS and A Level, Epistemology and Moral Philosophy, in an engaging and student-friendly way. With chapters on ''How to do philosophy'', exam preparation providing students with the philosophical skills they need to succeed, and an extensive glossary to support understanding, this book is ideal for students studying philosophy.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eEach chapter includes:\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eargument maps that help to develop student's analytical and critical skills\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ecomprehension questions to test understanding\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ediscussion questions to generate evaluative argument\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eexplanation and commentary on the AQA set texts\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThinking harder' sections \u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ecross-references to help students make connections\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u0026lt;\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e'Michael Lacewing writes in an engaging way and really brings the A-Level philosophy syllabus to life; he focuses not only on the content but on the philosophical method itself. An essential read for any A-Level philosophy student'.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCressida Tweed,\u003c\/strong\u003e teacher of philosophy at Woodhouse College and Lead philosophy tutor at the National Extension college, UK. \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003eContents\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePermissions \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIntroduction \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHow to use this book \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHow to do philosophy \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFollowing the syllabus \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAdditional features \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUsing the anthology \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eGlossary \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCompanion website and further resources \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAcknowledgements \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e1 How to do philosophy \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePhilosophical argument \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDeductive argument \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eInductive argument \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHypothetical reasoning \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUnderstanding arguments and argument maps \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEvaluating arguments \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEvaluating claims \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn aside: why reason? \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFallacies \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eReading philosophy \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eApproaching the text \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEngaging with the text \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBeyond the text \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWriting philosophy \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhat you need to know \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePlanning an essay \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWriting an essay \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA standard essay structure \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eGeneral advice \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e2 Epistemology \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eI. What is knowledge? \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA. Knowledge and its definition\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTypes of knowledge\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePropositional knowledge\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe definition of knowledge\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe purpose and nature of definition\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCan propositional knowledge be defined?\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: knowledge and its definition \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eB. The tripartite view \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe tripartite definition of knowledge \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhy justified true belief?\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: A note on certainty\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAre the conditions individually necessary? \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eJustification is not a necessary condition of knowledge \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTruth is not a necessary condition of knowledge \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBelief is not a necessary condition of knowledge \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eGettier’s objection: are the conditions jointly sufficient? \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: the tripartite view \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eC. Responses \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAdd a ‘no false lemmas’ condition (J+T+B+N) \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eInfallibilism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: rejecting the argument for infallibilism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eReliabilism (R+T+B) \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTruth and the third condition\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eVirtue epistemology (V+T+B) \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eZagzebski’s analysis of knowledge\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: Responses \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSummary: What is knowledge? \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eII. Perception as a source of knowledge \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA. Direct realism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe argument from perceptual variation \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eResponses \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe argument from illusion \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: the argument from hallucination\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe disjunctive theory of perception \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe time-lag argument \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: direct realism and openness \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: direct realism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eB. Indirect realism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhat are sense-data? \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhy indirect realism?\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLocke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eScepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe existence of the external world is the best hypothesis \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTwo supporting arguments \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: the existence of mind-independent objects is not a hypothesis \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRepresentation, resemblance and the nature of physical objects \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBerkeley’s argument that mind-dependent ideas cannot be like mind-independent objects \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: indirect realism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eC. Berkeley’s idealism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBerkeley on primary and secondary qualities\u003ci\u003e \u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBerkeley on secondary qualities\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBerkeley’s attack on the primary\/secondary quality distinction\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThree arguments against mind-independent objects\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBerkeley’s ‘master’ argument \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIdealism and God\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: idealism and the cause of our perceptions \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIssues with Berkeley’s idealism\u003ci\u003e \u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eProblems with the role played by God in Berkeley’s idealism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eArguments from illusion and hallucination\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIdealism leads to solipsism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: Berkeley’s idealism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSummary: perception as a source of knowledge \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIII. Reason as a source of knowledge \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRationalism, empiricism and innatism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA priori\/a posteriori knowledge\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAnalytic\/synthetic propositions\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNecessary\/contingent truth\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDefining rationalism, empiricism and innatism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: rationalism, empiricism and innatism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA. Innatism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTwo arguments for innate knowledge\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePlato’s slave boy argument\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz on knowledge of necessary truths\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLocke’s arguments against innate knowledge\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz’s response to Locke \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: experience triggers innate knowledge \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAlternative empiricist accounts \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLocke’s argument against innate concepts\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRejecting Locke’s definition of ‘innate concept’\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz’s defence of innate concepts \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe mind as a ‘tabula rasa’ \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLocke’s two sources of concepts \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHume on impressions and ideas \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSimple and complex concepts \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIssues with the empiricist theory of concepts\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: challenging the copy principle \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz on ‘intellectual ideas’ \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: the concept of substance \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDiscussion\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: innatism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eB. The intuition and deduction thesis \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRationalism and empiricism revisited\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe meaning of ‘intuition’ and ‘deduction’ \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEmpiricist alternatives\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHume’s fork\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDescartes’ theory of rational intuition\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe cogito\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eClear and distinct ideas\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEmpiricist responses to the cogito\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eClear and distinct ideas and God\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDescartes’ Trademark argument\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: degrees of reality\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEmpiricist responses to the Trademark argument\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDescartes’ cosmological argument\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEmpiricist responses to Descartes’ cosmological argument\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDescartes’ ontological argument\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEmpiricist responses to Descartes’ ontological argument\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDescartes’ proof of the external world\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe concept of a physical object\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: The existence of physical objects\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEmpiricist responses to Descartes’ proof of the external world\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: the intuition and deduction thesis \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSummary: reason as a source of knowledge \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIV. The limits of knowledge \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA. Philosophical scepticism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe particular nature of philosophical scepticism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAm I a brain in a vat?\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe distinction between philosophical scepticism and normal incredulity \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLocal and global scepticism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDescartes’ sceptical arguments\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: philosophical scepticism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eB. Responses to scepticism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDescartes’ own response\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEmpiricist responses\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: Direct realism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: Reliabilism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: responses to scepticism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSummary: the limits of knowledge\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e3 Moral Philosophy \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eI. Normative ethical theories \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA. Utilitarianism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBentham’s quantitative hedonistic utilitarianism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e‘The Principle of Utility’ \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e‘Measuring Pleasure and Pain’ \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMill on utilitarianism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMill’s qualitative hedonistic utilitarianism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIs pleasure the only good? \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSmart on hedonistic and non-hedonistic utilitarianism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNozick’s experience machine\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePreference utilitarianism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMill’s ‘proof’ of utilitarianism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStage 1: Happiness is good\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStage 2: Only happiness is good\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIssues for (act) utilitarianism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eProblems with calculation \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFairness, individual liberty and rights \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePartiality \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMoral integrity and the individual’s intentions \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRule utilitarianism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSmart on rule utilitarianism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRule utilitarianism developed\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eObjections \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: utilitarianism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eB. Kantian deontological ethics \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDeontology\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKant’s account of the good will and duty \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe good will\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe distinction between acting in accordance with duty and acting out of duty\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: The good will again\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe categorical imperative\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHypothetical and categorical imperatives\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: Contradiction in conception and contradiction in will\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe second formulation of the Categorical Imperative \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIssues for Kantian deontological ethics \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUniversalisability and morality \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConflicts between duties\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe view that consequences of actions determine their moral value \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMorality is a system of hypothetical imperatives \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe value of certain motives \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: Kantian deontological ethics \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eC. Aristotelian virtue ethics \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe good for human beings\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEudaimonia \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFinal ends \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe function argument \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTesting the analysis \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: the rational ‘soul’\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAristotle’s account of virtues\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eVirtues as character traits \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eVirtues, the doctrine of the mean and the importance of feelings \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe role of education in the development of a moral character \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePractical wisdom \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe role of practical wisdom \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe relation between practical wisdom, virtue and action \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: Aristotelian virtue ethics (I) \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEudaimonia, pleasure and philosophy\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEudaimonia and pleasure\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEudaimonia and philosophy\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eVoluntary action, choice and moral responsibility\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eVoluntary and involuntary actions \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eChoice and deliberation \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: moral responsibility\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eJustice\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIssues for Aristotelian virtue ethics \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eGuidance on how to act \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConflicts between virtues \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe possibility of circularity involved in defining virtuous acts and\u003cbr\u003evirtuous people in terms of each other \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: Virtue and eudaimonia\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: Aristotelian virtue ethics (II) \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSummary: normative ethical theories\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eII. Applied ethics\u003ci\u003e \u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStealing\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUtilitarianism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKantian deontology \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAristotelian virtue ethics \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEating animals \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUtilitarianism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKantian deontology \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAristotle, Diamond and virtue ethics \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSimulated killing \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePlaying the killer \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn audience’s perspective \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTelling lies \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUtilitarianism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKantian deontology \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAristotelian virtue ethics \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: applied ethics \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSummary: applied ethics \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIII. Metaethics \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhat is metaethics?\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe origins of moral principles: reason, emotion\/attitudes, or society\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: The distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA. Moral realism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFrom cognitivism to moral realism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMoral naturalism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUtilitarianism as naturalism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: naturalism in virtue ethics \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMoral non-naturalism: Moore’s intuitionism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe naturalistic fallacy \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe open question argument\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: is the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ a real fallacy? \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIntuitionism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eObjections\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIssues for moral realism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA J Ayer’s verification principle\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe argument from Hume’s fork\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHume’s argument from motivation\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHume’s is-ought gap\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMackie’s argument from relativity\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMackie’s arguments from queerness\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: moral realism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eB. Moral anti-realism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eError theory\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNon-cognitivism and moral anti-realism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEmotivism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEmotivism and subjectivism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAyer’s defence\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEmotivism after Ayer \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePrescriptivism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePrescriptive meaning\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eGood\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMoral language \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIssues for moral anti-realism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCan moral anti-realism account for how we use moral language?\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThinking harder: disagreement and moral argument \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhether moral anti-realism becomes moral nihilism\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMoral progress \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKey points: moral anti-realism \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMetaethics and applied ethics\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSummary: metaethics \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e4 Preparing for the exam \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe examination \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe structure of the exam \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAssessment objectives \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUnderstanding the question: giving the examiners what they are looking for \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eShort-answer questions \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNine-mark questions \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFifteen-mark questions \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRevision: it’s more than memory \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eExam technique: getting the best result you can \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRevision tips \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eExam tips \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eGlossary (with Joanne Lovesey) \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIndex by syllabus content \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSubject index \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e","brand":"Taylor \u0026 Francis Ltd","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":51019518312791,"sku":"9781138690394","price":36.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9781138690394.jpg?v=1750780508","url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/products\/philosophy-for-as-and-a-level-9781138690394","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}