{"product_id":"mergers-9780471419006","title":"Mergers","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eA powerful guide for seeking out the best acquisition and merger targets\u003cbr\u003e As increasingly more companies look to mergers and acquisitions (M\u0026amp;As) as a source of new growth and revenue, there is an even greater chance that these M\u0026amp;As will go bad. This insightful guide focuses on one of the most often debated and key issues in mergers and acquisitions-why some deals fail miserably and why others prosper. It provides a complete road map for what potential buyers should look for when picking a target and what characteristics of sellers they should steer clear of, as well as pitfalls to avoid during the M\u0026amp;A process. Real-world examples are provided of high-profile failures-Quaker Oats, United Airlines, Sears, and Mattel-and high-profile successes-General Electric and Cisco.\u003cbr\u003e Patrick A. Gaughan (New York, NY) is President of Economatrix Research Associates and a professor of Economics and Finance at the College of Business, Fairleigh Dickinson University. He is actively engaged in t\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePreface.  \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 1: Introduction to Mergers and Acquisitions.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBackground and Terminology.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMerger Process.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEconomic Classifications of Mergers and Acquisitions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegulatory Framework of Mergers and Acquisitions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAntitrust Laws.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eState Corporation Laws.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHostile Takeovers.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTakeover Defense.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLeveraged Transactions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRestructurings.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReasoning for Mergers and Acquisitions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrends in Mergers.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCase Study: Lessons from the Failures of the Fourth Merger Wave.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 2: Merger Strategy: Why Do Firms Merge?\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGrowth.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExamples of Growth as an Inappropriate Goal.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUsing M\u0026amp;As to Achieve Growth.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eM\u0026amp;As in a Slow-Growth Industry as a Way to Achieve Growth.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSynergy.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMerger Gains: Operating Synergy or Revenue Enhancements—Case of Banking Industry.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndustry Clustering.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDeregulation.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImproved Management Hypothesis.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHubris Hypothesis of Takeovers.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWinner’s Curse and the Hubris Hypothesis.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCross-Industry Deals and Hubris.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDiversification and CEO Compensation.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDiversification that Does Seem to Work Better: Related Diversification.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMerging to Achieve Greater Market Power.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDo Firms Really Merge to Achieve Market Power?\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMerging to Achieve the Benefits of Vertical Integration.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSpecial Cases of Mergers Motivated by Specific Needs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCase Study: Vivendi.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 3: Merger Success Research.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCriteria for Defining Merger Success Using Research Studies.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTakeover Premiums and Control.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInitial Comment on Merger Research Studies.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResearch Studies.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMergers of Equals: Acquirers versus Target Gains.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFirm Size and Acquisition Gains.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLong-Term Research Studies.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLong- versus Short-Term Performance and Method of Payment.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBidder Long-Term Effects: Methods of Payment.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBidder’s Performance Over the Fifth Merger Wave.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCase Study: Montana Power—Moving into Unfamiliar Areas.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 4: Valuation and Overpaying.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eValuation: Part Science and Part Art.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eValuation: Buyer versus Seller’s Perspective.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSynergy, Valuation, and the Discount Rate.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinancial Synergies and the Discount Rate.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eToe Holds and Bidding Contests.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBidding Contest Protections.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOverpaying and Fraudulent Seller Financials.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eValuation and Hidden Costs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePostmerger Integration Costs—Hard Costs to Measure.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCase Study: AOL Time Warner.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 5: Corporate Governance: Part of the Solution.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernance Failure.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegulatory Changes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorporate Governance.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eManagerial Compensation and Firm Size.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eManagerial Compensation, Mergers, and Takeovers.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDisciplinary Takeovers, Company Performance, and CEOs and Boards.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eManagerial and Director Voting Power and Takeovers.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShareholder Wealth Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions and Corporation Acquisition Decisions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePost-Acquisitions Performance and Executive Compensation.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLessons from the Hewlett-Packard–Compaq Merger: Shareholders Lose, CEOs Gain.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCEO Power and Compensation.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDo Boards Reward CEOs for Initiating Acquisitions and Mergers?\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorporate Governance and Mergers of Equals.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAntitakeover Measures and Corporate Governance.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCase Study: WorldCom.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 6: Reversing the Error: Sell-Offs and Other Restructurings.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDivestitures.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDecision: Retain or Sell Off.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSpin-Offs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInvoluntary Spin-Offs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDefensive Spin-Offs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTax Benefits of Spin-Offs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShareholder Wealth Effects of Sell-Offs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRationale for a Positive Stock Price Reaction to Sell-Offs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWealth Effects of Voluntary Defensive Sell-Offs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWealth Effects of Involuntary Sell-Offs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinancial Benefits for Buyers of Sold-Off Entities.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShareholder Wealth Effects of Spin-Offs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorporate Focus and Spin-Offs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEquity Carve-Outs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBenefits of Equity Carve-Outs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEquity Carve-Outs Are Different from Other Public Offerings.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShareholder Wealth Effects of Equity Carve-Outs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUnder Which Situations Should a Company Do a Spin-Off versus an Equity Carve-Out?\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShareholder Wealth Effects of Tracking Stock Issuances.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCase Study: DaimlerChrysler.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 7: Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances: Alternatives to Mergers and Acquisitions.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eContractual Agreements.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eComparing Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures with Mergers and Acquisitions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJoint Ventures.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMotives for Joint Ventures.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegulation and Joint Ventures.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShareholder Wealth Effects of Joint Ventures.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShareholder Wealth Effects by Type of Venture.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRestructuring and Joint Ventures.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePotential Problems with Joint Ventures.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStrategic Alliances.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernance of Strategic Alliances.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShareholder Wealth Effects of Strategic Alliances.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShareholder Wealth Effects by Type of Alliance.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Determines the Success of Strategic Alliances?\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePotential for Conflicts with Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCross Stock Holdings as Conflict Insurance.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCase Study: AT\u0026amp;T.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"John Wiley \u0026 Sons Inc","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49402590822743,"sku":"9780471419006","price":31.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780471419006.jpg?v=1730480877","url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/products\/mergers-9780471419006","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}