{"product_id":"making-it-explicit-9780674543300","title":"Making It Explicit","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eWhere accounts of the relation between language and mind often rest on the concept of representation, Brandom sets out an approach based on inference, and on a conception of certain kinds of implicit assessment that become explicit in language. It is the first attempt to work out a detailed theory rendering linguistic meaning in terms of use.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMaking It Explicit\u003c\/i\u003e has already developed a justified reputation as a major contribution to the philosophy of language. It takes the traditional ill-fitting story of the relationship between language and the world and turns it upside down. Instead of starting with the existence of the world and explaining what it is for language to represent the world, it starts with language and explains what it is for the world to be represented by language...With tremendous panache, he launches into accounts of normativity, inference, meaning, truth, reference and objectivity, trying to show that the later concepts in that list are made intelligible by the earlier. -- Rowland Stout * Times Literary Supplement *\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMaking It Explicit\u003c\/i\u003e is a landmark in theoretical philosophy comparable to that constituted in the early seventies by \u003ci\u003eA Theory of Justice\u003c\/i\u003e in practical philosophy...Drawing upon the resources furnished by his intricate theory of language, Brandom succeeds in offering a thoroughly convincing description of the practices within which beings capable of language and action express their rationality and autonomy. -- Jürgen Habermas * Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung *\u003cbr\u003eRobert Brandom's magnificent book is an attempt to rework the whole of the philosophy of language in terms of normative, socially articulated pragmatics.  His approach, inferentialism, which he traces through Kant and Frege to Wittgenstein and Sellars, is opposed to a more standard approach, representationalism...\u003ci\u003eMaking It Explicit\u003c\/i\u003e is written with an exhilarating argumentative relish and tremendous assurance and thoroughness. -- Rowland Stout * Mind *\u003cbr\u003eWilfrid Sellars described his project as an attempt to usher analytic philosophy out of its Humean and into its Kantian stage...Brandom's work can usefully be seen as an attempt to usher philosophy from its Kantian to its Hegelian stage...This sort of free and easy transition between philosophy of language and mind on the one hand, and world-historical vision on the other, is reminiscent not only of Mead and Dewey but also of Gadamer and Habermas. -- Richard Rorty, Introduction to Sellars' \u003ci\u003eEmpiricism and the Philosophy of Mind\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAn extraordinary philosophical book. Brandom has produced a work of great power, scope, and originality. He gives a plausible and powerful reading to the claim that \"meaning is normative,\" or that the concept of meaning is a normative concept, and elucidates it at length. It turns out, in his hands, to be a claim of great philosophical fertility and power. -- Allan Gibbard, University of Michigan\u003cbr\u003eRobert Brandom's \u003ci\u003eMaking it Explicit\u003c\/i\u003e is an unusual book on the Anglo-American scene...What Brandom achieves is a convincing elaboration of the view of intentionality as a linguistic, normative and social-pragmatic affair...Brandom's book is the first detailed elaboration of the position that it is normative attitudes which distinguishes us, insofar as we are thinking and acting beings, from the physical. It will hopefully contribute to giving that position the attention it deserves in contemporary philosophy of mind. -- Michael Epsfield * Erkenntnis *\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePreface    PART ONE    Toward a Normative Pragmatics   Introduction   From Intentional State to Normative Status   From Norms Explicit in Rules to Norms Implicit in Practices   From Normative Status to Normative Attitude   From Assessment to the Social Institution of Norms   From Intentional Interpretation to Original Intentionality   Appendix: Wittgenstein's Use of Regel    Toward an Inferential Semantics   Content and Representation   The Priority of the Propositional   Conceptual Classification and Inference   Material Inference, Conceptual Content, and Expression   Circumstances and Consequences of Application   Conclusion    Linguistic Practice and Discursive Commitment   Intentional States and Linguistic Practices   Deontic Status and Deontic Attitudes   Asserting and Inferring   Scorekeeping: Pragmatic Significance and Semantic Content    Perception and Action: The Conferral of Empirical and Practical Conceptual Content   Assertions as Knowledge Claims   Reliability   Observation Reports and Noninferential Authority   Rational Agency   Practical Reasoning: Inferences from Doxastic to Practical Commitments   Intentions    PART TWO    The Expressive Role of Traditional Semantic Vocabulary: 'True' and 'Refers'   From Inference to Truth, Reference, and Representation   Truth in Classical Pragmatism   From Pragmatism to Prosentences   Reference and Anaphorically Indirect Descriptions   The Function of Traditional Semantic Vocabulary Is Expressive, Not Explanatory    Substitution: What Are Singular Terms, and Why Are There Any?   Multivalued Logic and Material Inference   Substitution, Sentential Embedding, and Semantic Roles   Subsentential Expressions   What Are Singular Terms?   Why Are There Singular Terms?   Objections and Replies   Conclusion    Appendix: From Substitutional Derivation of Categories to Functional Derivation of Categories   Appendix: Sentence Use Conferring the Status of Singular Terms on Subsentential Expressions--An Application    Anaphora: The Structure of Token Repeatables   Frege's Grundlagen Account of Picking Out Objects   Definite Descriptions and Existential Commitments   Substitution, Token Recurrence, and Anaphora   Deixis and Anaphora   Interpersonal Anaphora and Communication   Appendix: Other Kinds of Anaphora--Paychecks, Donkeys, and Quantificational Antecedents    Ascribing Propositional Attitudes: The Social Route from Reasoning to Representing   Representation and De Re Ascription of Propositionally Contentful Commitments   Interpretation, Communication, and De Re Ascriptions   De Re Ascriptions and the Intentional Explanation of Action   From Implicit Attribution to Explicit Ascription   Epistemically Strong De Re Attitudes: Indexicals, Quasi-Indexicals, and Proper Names   The Social-Perspectival Character of Conceptual Contents and the Objectivity of Conceptual Norms   Appendix: The Construction and Recursive Interpretation of Iterated Ascriptions That Mix De Dicto and De Re   Content Specifications    Conclusion   Two Concepts of Concepts   Norms and Practices   We Have Met the Norms, and They Are Ours    Abbreviations   Notes   Index","brand":"Harvard University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49403596407127,"sku":"9780674543300","price":36.86,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780674543300.jpg?v=1730483933","url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/products\/making-it-explicit-9780674543300","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}