{"product_id":"knowledge-belief-and-strategic-interaction-9780521061261","title":"Knowledge Belief and Strategic Interaction","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eA group of pre-eminent figures offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic and episemology in the formal models of knowledge, belief, deliberation and learning.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"...a first class collection of essays that should both advance the foundations of modern game theory and give philosophers an excellent and up-to-date view as to what is going on in this recently and increasingly important area of philosophy.\"   Ellery Eells, University of Wisconsin\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePreface; 1. Feasibility Isaac Levi; 2. Elicitation for games Joseph B. Kadane, Isaac Levi and Teddy Seidenfeld; 3. Equilibrium, common knowledge, and optimal sequential decisions Joseph B. Kadane and Teddy Seidenfeld; 4. Rational choice in the context of ideal games Edward F. McClennen; 5. Hyperrational games: concept and resolutions Jordan Howard Sobel; 6. Equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation Brian Skyrms; 7. Tortuous labyrinth: noncooperative normal-form games between hyperrational players Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz; 8. On consistency properties of some strongly implementable social choice rules with endogenous agenda formation Stefano Vannucci; 9. Algorithmic knowledge and game theory Ken Binmore and Hyun Song Shin; 10. Possible worlds, counterfactuals, and epistemic operators Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara; 11. Semantical aspects of quantified modal logic Giovanna Corsi and Silvio Ghilardi; 12. Epistemic logic and game theory Bernard Walliser; 13. Abstract notions of simultaneous equilibrium and their uses Vittorioemanuele Ferrante; 14. Representing facts Krister Segerberg; 15. Introduction to metamoral Roberto Magari; 16. The logic of Ulam's games with lies Daniele Mundici; 17. The acquisition of common knowledge Michael Bacharach; 18. The electronic mail game: strategic behavior under 'almost common knowledge' Ariel Rubinstein; 19. Knowledge-depentent games: backward induction Cristina Bicchieri; 20. Common knowledge and games with perfect information Philip J. Reny; 21. Game solutions and the normal form John C. Harsanyi; 22. The dynamics of belief systems: foundations versus coherence theories Peter Gärdenfors; 23. Counterfactuals and a theory of equilibrium in games Hyun Song Shin.","brand":"Cambridge University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":51767585374551,"sku":"9780521061261","price":37.04,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780521061261.jpg?v=1758713877","url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/products\/knowledge-belief-and-strategic-interaction-9780521061261","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}