{"product_id":"kant-ought-implies-can-the-principle-of-alternate-possibilities-and-happiness-9781498519618","title":"Kant Ought Implies Can the Principle of Alternate","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThroughout his corpus, Kant repeatedly and resolutely denies that there is a duty to promote one's own happiness, and most present-day Kantians seem to agree with him. In Kant, Ought Implies Can, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, and Happiness, Samuel Kahn argues that this denial rests on two main ideas: (1) a conception of duty that makes the principle of ought implies can (OIC) and the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) analytic, and (2) the claim that humans necessarily promote their own happiness. This book defends OIC and PAP but nonetheless attacks the second idea, and it supplements this attack with two additional argumentsan interpersonal one and an intrapersonal onefor the claim that a modern day Kantian ethics should affirm a duty to promote one's own happiness.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eSamuel Kahn’s book is a wide-ranging and provocative discussion of important issues in normative ethics, metaethics and moral psychology. It contains thoughtful and cogent discussions not only of Kant and the Kant literature, but also of contemporary treatments of the moral ought, responsibility and the place of happiness among human ends. Kahn provides an engaging introduction to all these themes. -- Allen Wood, Indiana University Bloomington\u003cbr\u003eSamuel Kahn explores one of the most puzzling but under-theorized aspects of Kant’s ethics: the nature and moral importance of human happiness. Against most readings, Kahn contends that not only was Kant wrong to insist that a person could have no moral duty to promote her own happiness, but also that his own views entail that we do. Kahn brings Kant’s ethics into a sustained and illuminating conversation with the extensive contemporary literature on the relationship between obligation, blameworthiness, and the possibility of fulfilling (or failing to fulfill) the demands of morality. This encyclopedic work will be a valuable resource not just for those interested in Kant’s practical philosophy, but for anyone concerned with the moral significance of our physical and psychological limitations. -- David Sussman, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIntroduction Part One. Ought implies can in Kantian ethics Chapter 1. Terminology and Exegesis \tSection 1. Terminology  \tSection 2. Exegesis Chapter 2. Arguments in Favor of OIC \tSection 1. Kant’s argument for OIC \tSection 2. The argument from explanation \tSection 3. The fairness argument \tSection 4. The prescriptivist argument \tSection 5. The argument from deontic logic Chapter 3. Objections to OIC \tSection 1. The appeal to alternate traditions \tSection 2. The epistemic argument \tSection 3. The ordinary language objection \tSection 4. The appeal to culpable inability \tSection 5. The argument from past obligations \tSection 6. The argument from simplicity \tSection 7. The argument from excuses \tSection 8. The appeal to Hume’s principle \tSection 9. The argument from reasons \tSection 10. The moral satisfaction objection \tSection 11. The appeal to obligations from nowhere \tSection 12. The argument from interdependence \tSection 13. The argument from epistemic oughts \tSection 14. The argument from feeling oughts \tSection 15. The appeal to conflicts of duties \tSection 16. The argument from emphasis \tSection 17. The appeal to conversational implicature \tSection 18. The exphi objection Part Two. The principle of alternate possibilities Chapter 4. Setting the stage \tSection 1. Frankfurt’s seminal attack \tSection 2. Conceding PAP but mitigating the consequences Chapter 5. The connection between PAP and OIC \tSection 1. OIC entails PAP with respect to blame \tSection 2. Blame requires impermissibility \tSection 3. Able not to and able to do otherwise \tSection 4. Some concluding remarks Chapter 6. The second line of defense \tSection 1. The metaphysical premise \t\tSubsection 1. Flickers and alchemy \t\tSubsection 2. The dilemma defense \t\tSubsection 3. The deterministic horn \t\tSubsection 4. The new dispositionalists \t\tSubsection 5. Morally relevant alternatives \tSection 2. The moral premise \t\tSubsection 1. PAP and OIC \t\tSubsection 2. The W-defense \t\tSubsection 3. Counterfactual interveners and knowledge \t\tSubsection 4. The reliability of intuitions Part Three. The duty to promote one’s own happiness in Kantian ethics Chapter 7. “Happiness,” “general duties” and the standard account \tSection 1. “Happiness” \tSection 2. “General duties” \tSection 3. The standard account Chapter 8. The means to happiness, indirect duties and two arguments for a direct duty \tSection 1. Indirect duties \tSection 2. Two arguments for a direct duty Chapter 9. Objections \tSection 1. Internal incoherence \tSection 2. The universal desire for happiness \tSection 3. Happiness as a necessary end \tSection 4. A duty to promote one’s own happiness would be otiose \tSection 5. Happiness is impossible Notes Bibliography","brand":"Lexington Books","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":51040670122327,"sku":"9781498519618","price":81.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false}],"url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/products\/kant-ought-implies-can-the-principle-of-alternate-possibilities-and-happiness-9781498519618","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}