{"product_id":"game-theory-9780674341166","title":"Game Theory","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eEminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson’s introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn a clear, Myersonian writing style, this book systematically describes our state-of-the-art knowledge of game theory. Written as an introductory text, it looks at the subject from the viewpoint of a newcomer to the field, beginning with utility theory and arriving at the most sophisticated ideas discussed today. Myerson not only gives complete mathematical statements and proofs, but also supplies the intuitive arguments that motivate them...Because of its comprehensiveness, researchers and users of game theory can find descriptions of almost all special game theoretic topics and issues presented in \"user friendly\" style...It is very likely that Myerson's \u003ci\u003eGame Theory\u003c\/i\u003e will remain the main introductory text for many years to come. -- Ehud Kalai * Games and Economic Behavior *\u003cbr\u003eExposing an applied mathematics field on a basic level poses a challenge to an author, namely, to find the proper mix of displaying the models, providing the motivation and presenting the mathematical results and derivations. This is even more true in a field like game theory, where the models are not universally acceptable as adequately depicting real applications. The author, in the text under review, is doing remarkably well. The models are displayed with enough details and explanations to generate motivation even in newcomers to the field...All in all, it is a very good elaborate introduction to game theory. -- Zvi Artstein * Mathematical Reviews *\u003cbr\u003eMyerson provides a good introduction to game theory, focusing on the 'generality and unity of game theory' rather than on its extensive applications. After a brief overview of Bayesian decision theory, noncooperative and cooperative models of games are explored in the context of their solutions, results, and guiding methodological principles. The relative merits of the extensive form and the strategic form of a game are illustrated, which lead naturally into an analysis of equilibria for each representation. Special extensions are discussed, including games with communication, repeated games, and noncooperative games that introduce the elements of bargaining and coalitions...The book has interesting and challenging problem sets for each chapter as well as a bibliography for students who want to study in more depth specific topics in game theory. * Choice *\u003cbr\u003eA very well-written introduction to game theory. * American Mathematical Monthly *\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePreface    1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations   1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence   1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory    1.3 Axioms    1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem    1.5 Equivalent Representations   1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems   1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model   1.8 Domination   1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems   Exercises    2. Basic Models   2.1 Games in Extensive Form    2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation   2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games   2.4 Reduced Normal Representations   2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies   2.6 Multiagent Representations   2.7 Common Knowledge   2.8 Bayesian Games   2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information   Exercises    3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games   3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability   3.2 Nash Equilibrium   3.3\tComputing Nash Equilibria   3.4\tSignificance of Nash Equilibria   3.5\tThe Focal-Point Effect   3.6\tThe Decision-Analytic Approach to Games   3.7\tEvolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance   3.8\tTwo-Person Zero-Sum Games   3.9\tBayesian Equilibria   3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria   3.11 Auctions   3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium   3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets   Exercises    4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games   4.1\tMixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies   4.2\tEquilibria in Behavioral Strategies   4.3\tSequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability   4.4\tConsistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States   4.5\tComputing Sequential Equilibria   4.6\tSubgame-Perfect Equilibria   4.7 Games with Perfect Information   4.8\tAdding Chance Events with Small Probability   4.9\tForward Induction   4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas   4.11 Technical Proofs   Exercises     5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form   5.1\tIntroduction   5.2\tPerfect Equilibria   5.3\tExistence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria   5.4\tProper Equilibria   5.5\tPersistent Equilibria   5.6\tStable Sets 01 Equilibria   5.7\tGeneric Properties   5.8\tConclusions   Exercises    6. Games with Communication   6.1\tContracts and Correlated Strategies   6.2 Correlated Equilibria   6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication   6.4\tBayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems    6.5\tTrading Problems with Linear Utility   6.6\tGeneral Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts   6.7\tSender-Receiver Games   6.8\tAcceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria   6.9\tCommunication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games   Exercises   Bibliographic Note    7. Repeated Games   7.1\tThe Repeated Prisoners Dilemma   7.2\tA General Model of Repeated Garnet   7.3\tStationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting   7.4\tRepeated Games with Standard Information: Examples   7.5\tGeneral Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games   7.6\tFinitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt   7.7\tImperfect Observability of Moves   7.8\tRepeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups   7.9\tRepeated Games with Incomplete Information   7.10 Continuous Time   7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games   Exercises     8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games   8.1\tNoncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory   8.2\tTwo-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution   8.3\tInterpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility   8.4\tTransferable Utility   8.5\tRational Threats   8.6\tOther Bargaining Solutions   8.7\tAn Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game   8.8\tAn Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information   8.9\tA Discrete Alternating-Offer Game   8.10 Renegotiation   Exercises    9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games   9.1\tIntroduction to Coalitional Analysis   9.2\tCharacteristic Functions with Transferable Utility   9.3\tThe Core   9.4\tThe Shapkey Value   9.5\tValues with Cooperation Structures   9.6\tOther Solution Concepts   9.7\tColational Games with Nontransferable Utility   9.8\tCores without Transferable Utility   9.9\tValues without Transferable Utility   Exercises   Bibliographic Note    10. Cooperation under Uncertainty   10.1 Introduction   10.2 Concepts of Efficiency   10.3 An Example   10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers   10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms   10.6 Inscrutability and Durability   10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal   10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions   10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information   Exercises    Bibliography   Index","brand":"Harvard University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49403585233239,"sku":"9780674341166","price":999.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780674341166.jpg?v=1730483905","url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/products\/game-theory-9780674341166","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}