{"product_id":"expression-and-selfknowledge-9781118908471","title":"Expression and SelfKnowledge","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eProvides a timely and original contribution to the debate surrounding privileged self-knowledge\u003c\/b\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eContemporary epistemologists and philosophers of mind continue to find puzzling the nature and source of \u003ci\u003eprivileged self-knowledge\u003c\/i\u003e: the ordinary and effortless first-person' knowledge we have of our own sensations, moods, emotions, beliefs, desires, and hopes. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn \u003ci\u003eExpression and Self-Knowledge, \u003c\/i\u003eDorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright articulate their joint dissatisfaction with extant accounts of self-knowledge and engage in a sustained and substantial critical debate over the merits of an expressivist approach to the topic. The authors incorporate cutting-edge research while defending their own alternatives to existing approaches to so-called first-person privilege'. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBar-On defends her neo-expressivist account, addressing the objection that neo-expressivism fails to provide an adequate epistemology of ordinary self-knowledge, and addresses new objections levelled by W\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePreface and Acknowledgments ix\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1 Privileged Access 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§1.1 Privileged Access: What Is the Problem? 1\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§1.2 The Cartesian \"Solution\" 3\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§1.3 Language First or Thought First? 7\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2 Skepticism about the Problem 11\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eCrispin Wright\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§2.1 Rejecting the Entire Explanatory Project: Wittgenstein and the \"Default View\" 12\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§2.2 Disputing the \"Data\" 18\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§2.2.1 Snowdon 18\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§2.2.2 Schwitzgebel 25\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§2.2.3 Carruthers 31\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§2.2.4 Williamson 39\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3 A Critique of Some Recent Accounts of First-Person Privilege: Part I: Epistemic Approaches 43\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.1 Epistemic Approaches 44\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.2 Epistemic Access as \"Inward Gaze\": Non-Cartesian Conceptions of Inner Sense 45\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.2.1 Materialist Introspectionism 45\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.2.2 Against an Expertise Model of First-Person Privilege 48\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.3 Privileged Access as Outer Gaze: Transparency Views 51\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.3.1 Gareth Evans: Transparency as an Epistemic Procedure 51\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.3.2 Five Limitations of Transparency as an Epistemic Procedure 53\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.3.3 Alex Byrne: Transparent Inference Rules 58\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.4 Christopher Peacocke on Self-Knowledge of Belief 64\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4 A Critique of Some Recent Accounts of First-Person Privilege: Part II: \"High-Road\" Approaches to Self-Knowledge 73\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§4.1 Avowals as Expressive of Commitments: Moran and Bilgrami 74\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§4.2 Against Commissive Views 78\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§4.3 The Uniformity Constraint 82\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§4.4 Tyler Burge on Self-Knowledge and Critical Reasoning 86\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§4.5 Metaphysical Constitutivism: Resoluteness and Shoemaker 92\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§4.6 Conceptual Constitutivism: Wright and Judgment-Dependence 96\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§4.7 Privileged Access: Diagnosis and Desiderata 100\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5 Some Initial Thoughts about Expressivist Responses to the Problem 103\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eCrispin Wright\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§5.1 Psychological Expressivism: Simple and Radical 103\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§5.2 Radical Expressivism: Some Serious Misgivings 107\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6 Neo-Expressivism: Speaking One's Mind 110\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDorit Bar-On\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.1 Avowals' Distinctive Security and Basic Self-Knowledge: A Brief Overview 111\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.1.1 Basic Self-Knowledge: Some Theses, Some Questions 111\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.1.2 \"Language-first\" Vs. \"Thought-first\" 113\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.1.3 Avowals' Security: The Explanatory Task 115\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.2 Expressivism: Simple, Radical, and New 116\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.2.1 Simple Expressivism 117\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.2.2 \"Radical\" Expressivism 120\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.3 The Neo-Expressivist Account of Avowals' Distinctive Security 124\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.3.1 Avowals: Acts, Products, Vehicles 124\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.3.2 Neo-Expressivism: Explaining Avowals' Distinctive Security 128\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.3.3 Avowals' Security: Immunity to Error 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.3.4 Dual Immunity to Error and the Expressive Character of Avowals 137\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.3.5 False Avowals, Transparency, and Moore's Paradox 139\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e7 Neo-Expressivism: Knowing One's Mind 144\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDorit Bar-On\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.1 Neo-Expressivism and Self-Knowledge 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.2 Expression and No-\"How\" Basic Self-Knowledge 146\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.2.1 \"Baseless\" Self-Knowledge: Warrant, Entitlement, and Grounding 147\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.2.2 The Dual Immunity to Error of Avowals and Avowals' Default Entitlement 149\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.2.3 Avowals as Warranted: Baseless yet Grounded? 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.3 Basic Self-Knowledge Without Avowals? 154\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.3.1 The Objection from Unavowed Self-Knowledge 155\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.3.2 Implicit Self-Knowledge and the \"Episodic Constraint\" 156\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.3.3 Is Avowing Necessary for Possessing Actual Self-Knowledge? 163\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.4 Neo-Expressivism: \"Grammar,\" Epistemology, and Metaphysics 169\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.4.1 Neo-Expressivism Vs. Other Views 169\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.4.2 Expression, Self-Knowledge, and the Nature of Mind 173\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix: Epistemological Disjunctivism about Self-Knowledge 178\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e8 On Neo-Expressivism: Continuing Doubts 183\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eCrispin Wright\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.1 Introduction: Testimony, Expression, and the Program for the Chapter 183\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.2 Immunity to Error through Misidentification and Immunity to Error through Misascription 187\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.3 Immediacy and the Phenomenal 193\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.4 Is Self-Knowledge a Kind of Knowledge \"No-‘How'\"? 197\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.5 Bar-On's Marginalization of Salience 199\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.6 \"Speaking From\" and Authority 202\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.7 On Neo-Expressivism's Account of Self-Knowledge 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.8 Neo-Expressivism and Barn Façades 218\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.9 Resumé of Objections Raised 220\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e9 Speaking One's Mind: Authority, Testimony, and Expression 224\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDorit Bar-On\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.1 Introduction: Where Are We? 226\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.2 Avowals' Immunity to Error, Security, and Authority 228\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.3 Avowals: Testimony, and \"Evidential Force\" 234\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.4 Arguments for the Routine Testimonial Model Debunked 237\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.4.1 The Argument from Deliberate Expression 238\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.4.2 The Argument from Intentional Communication 240\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.4.3 The Argument from Linguistic Application 243\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.5 \"Evidential Force\" and \"Performance Equivalence\" 247\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.6 The Insufficiency of RTM 249\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.7 Wright's Knowledge \"How\" and the Immediacy of the Phenomenal 253\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.8 Avowals' Expressive Character and Speaking One's Mind 255\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.9 What about Salience? 258\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix: On Immunities to Error and Skeptical Scenarios 263\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§1 Expressive Character and Non-Recognitionality 263\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§2 Non-Recognitionality and IEM\/A 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3 Non-Recognitionality and Brute Error 265\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§4 Mental State Façade Country? 266\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e10 Divide and Conquer: A Prospectus for Progress? 270\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eCrispin Wright\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§10.1 Some Points about Belief and Judgment 271\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§10.2 Varieties of Awareness and of Judgment-Dependence 274\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§10.3 Avowals as Initiative? 279\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§10.4 Self-Interpreting 286\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§10.5 Self-Knowledge of Intentionally Directed Affective States 287\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§10.6 Common-sense Psychological Explanation and the Trifecta 292\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§10.7 Summary of the Prospectus 295\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e11 Expression, Mediating Beliefs, and the Judgment-Independence of Mental States 298\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDorit Bar-On\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.1 Expression, Action, and Belief 299\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.1.1 Wright's Argument from Intentional Action Debunked 301\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.1.2 Expressive Acts and Intentional Actions 303\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.2 \"Initiative\" Avowals 306\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.3 (Non-Phenomenal) Attitudinal Avowals 310\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.4 Avowals of \"Pure Phenomenal\" States and \"Directed Affective\" States: \"S-awareness\" and \"C-awareness\" 313\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.4.1 Pure Phenomenal States (\"PPSs\"): Hypothesis 1 314\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.4.2 Directed Affective States (\"DASs\"): Hypothesis 2 315\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.4.3 Difficulties with Hypotheses 1 and 2 317\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.5 Some Remaining Cases 322\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.5.1 \"Negative Avowals\" 323\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.5.2 Self-Ascriptions of Psychological Change 325\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.6 Uniformity and the Trifecta 328\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBibliography 334\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 344\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"John Wiley and Sons Ltd","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48738354954583,"sku":"9781118908471","price":20.85,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9781118908471.jpg?v=1723811967","url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/products\/expression-and-selfknowledge-9781118908471","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}