{"product_id":"epistemology-9781444333695","title":"Epistemology","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eEPISTEMOLOGY\u003c\/b\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis is a superb companion to \u003ci\u003eEpistemology: An Anthology\u003c\/i\u003e. It consists of sixty commentaries, one for each of the sixty entries in that anthology. Turri is an extremely lucid writer, with a wonderful knack for finding and laying out argumentative structure, and for explaining crucial concepts. His commentary will greatly aid student comprehension and enhance class discussion.\u003cbr\u003e \u003ci\u003eErnest Sosa, Rutgers University\u003c\/i\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTurri's discussions are engaging and lucid. They are written for beginning students and will serve that purpose beautifully, but they are so well done that even veteran epistemologists will find them helpful.\u003cbr\u003e \u003ci\u003eJohn Greco, Saint Louis University\u003c\/i\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eEpistemology: A Guide \u003c\/i\u003eis a straightforward and accessible introduction to contemporary epistemology for those studying the topic for the first time. It introduces and explains the main arguments of the most influential publications in the field from the last 50 years. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBalancing\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e“The author fosters an excellent bridge to the primary sources and presents the material in a way that scarcely could be made more palatable.  Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates and above.”  (\u003ci\u003eChoice\u003c\/i\u003e, 1 December 2014)\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePreface xi  \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgments xiii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1 The best case for skepticism about the external world?\u003cbr\u003e (Stroud, “The Problem of the External World”) 1\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2 Proving the external world exists\u003cbr\u003e (Or: Let’s all give Moore a hand!)  (Moore, “Proof of an External World”) 6\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3 Some ways of resisting skepticism\u003cbr\u003e (Moore, “Four Forms of Scepticism”) 10\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4 Plausibility and possibilities\u003cbr\u003e (Moore, “Certainty”) 15\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5 Skeptic on skeptic\u003cbr\u003e (Klein, “How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism”) 19\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6 Realism in epistemology\u003cbr\u003e (Williams, “Epistemological Realism”) 24\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7 Socratic questions and the foundation of empirical knowledge\u003cbr\u003e (Chisholm, “The Myth of the Given”) 31\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8–9 The foundation of empirical knowledge?\u003cbr\u003e (Sellars, “Does Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?” and “Epistemic Principles”) 36\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10 It’s not a given that empirical knowledge has a foundation\u003cbr\u003e (BonJour, “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?”) 44\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11 Interpretation, meaning and skepticism\u003cbr\u003e (Davidson, “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”) 49\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12 Blending foundationalism and coherentism\u003cbr\u003e (Haack, “A Foundherentist Theory of Epistemic Justification”) 54\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13 Foundationalism, coherentism and supervenience\u003cbr\u003e (Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid”) 60\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14 Infinitism\u003cbr\u003e (Klein, “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons”) 67\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15 The Gettier problem\u003cbr\u003e (Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”) 73\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16 Some principles concerning knowledge and inference\u003cbr\u003e (Harman, Thought, Selections) 77\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17 The essence of the Gettier problem\u003cbr\u003e (Zagzebski, “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems”) 83\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18 Knowledge is an unanalyzable mental state\u003cbr\u003e (Williamson, “A State of Mind”) 85\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19 Closure, contrast and semi-skepticism\u003cbr\u003e (Dretske, “Epistemic Operators”) 92\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20 Closure, contrast and anti-skepticism\u003cbr\u003e (Stine, “Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure”) 99\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e21 Keeping close track of knowledge\u003cbr\u003e (Nozick, “Knowledge and Skepticism”) 103\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e22 Moore wins\u003cbr\u003e (Sosa, “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore”) 111\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e23 The closure principle: dangers and defense\u003cbr\u003e (Vogel, “Are There Counter examples to the Closure Principle?”) 116\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e24 Evidentialist epistemology\u003cbr\u003e (Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism”) 123\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e25 Non-defensive epistemology\u003cbr\u003e (Foley, “Skepticism and Rationality”) 129\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e26 Reliabilism about justification\u003cbr\u003e (Goldman, “What Is Justified Belief?”) 135\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e27 Reliabilism: a level assessment\u003cbr\u003e (Vogel, “Reliabilism Leveled”) 141\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e28 Against externalism\u003cbr\u003e (BonJour, “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge”) 146\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e29 Against internalism\u003cbr\u003e (Goldman, “Internalism Exposed”) 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e30 A skeptical take on externalism\u003cbr\u003e (Fumerton, “Externalism and Skepticism”) 156\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e31 A friendly take on internalism\u003cbr\u003e (Feldman and Conee, “Internalism Defended”) 159\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e32 Warrant\u003cbr\u003e (Plantinga, “Warrant: A First Approximation”) 164\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e33 Intellectual virtues\u003cbr\u003e (Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind) 169\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e34 Virtue epistemology\u003cbr\u003e (Greco, “Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology”) 172\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e35 Knowledge, luck and virtue\u003cbr\u003e (Pritchard, “Cognitive Responsibility and the Epistemic Virtues”) 176\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e36 Epistemic value and cognitive achievement\u003cbr\u003e (Sosa, “The Place of Truth in Epistemology”) 181\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e37 Giving up on knowledge\u003cbr\u003e (Kvanvig, “Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?”) 187\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e38 Giving up on (exact) truth\u003cbr\u003e (Elgin, “True Enough”) 192\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e39 Naturalized epistemology advertised\u003cbr\u003e (Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized”) 196\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e40 Naturalized epistemology criticized\u003cbr\u003e (Kim, “What is ‘Naturalized Epistemology’?”) 203\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e41 Naturalized epistemology radicalized\u003cbr\u003e (Antony, “Quine as Feminist”) 207\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e42 A apriori justification and unrevisability\u003cbr\u003e (Putnam, “There is at Least One A Priori Truth”) 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e43 A priori justification and revisability\u003cbr\u003e (Casullo, “Revisability, Reliabilism, and A Priori Knowledge”) 215\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e44 Philosophical method and empirical science\u003cbr\u003e (Bealer, “A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy”) 219\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e45 Experimental epistemology\u003cbr\u003e (Weinberg, Nichols and Stich, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions”) 226\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e46 Natural kinds, intuitions and method in epistemology\u003cbr\u003e (Kornblith, “Investigating Knowledge Itself”) 230\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e47 Contextualism and skeptical puzzles\u003cbr\u003e (DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem”) 235\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e48 Contextualism and infallibilist intuitions\u003cbr\u003e (Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge”) 240\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e49 Contextualism and intuitional instability\u003cbr\u003e (Cohen, “Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems”) 244\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e50 Knowledge and action\u003cbr\u003e (Stanley, “Knowledge and Practical Interests, Selections”) 247\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e51 Rationality and action\u003cbr\u003e (Fantl and McGrath, “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification”) 252\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e52 One invariantist’s scorecard\u003cbr\u003e (Hawthorne, “Sensitive Moderate Invariantism”) 258\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e53 A relativist theory of knowledge attributions\u003cbr\u003e (MacFarlane, “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions”) 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e54 Rationality and trust\u003cbr\u003e (Baker, “Trust and Rationality”) 270\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e55 Testimony and gullibility\u003cbr\u003e (Fricker, “Against Gullibility”) 273\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e56 Some reflections on how epistemic sources work\u003cbr\u003e (Burge, “Content Preservation”) 277\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e57 Testimony and knowledge\u003cbr\u003e (Lackey, “Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission”) 282\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e58 Memory and knowledge\u003cbr\u003e (Huemer, “The Problem of Memory Knowledge”) 286\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e59 Perception and knowledge\u003cbr\u003e (McDowell, “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge”) 291\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e60 Skills and knowledge\u003cbr\u003e (Reynolds, “Knowing How to Believe with Justification”) 295\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 299\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"John Wiley and Sons Ltd","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49530085736791,"sku":"9781444333695","price":66.95,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9781444333695.jpg?v=1731878013","url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/products\/epistemology-9781444333695","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}