{"product_id":"economics-of-information-lying-and-cheating-in-markets-and-organizations-9780631206668","title":"Economics of Information Lying and Cheating in","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eInformation is a key issue in decision making in economics and business. Being 'in the know' confers strategic advantages to people, allowing them to lie and\/or cheat on their uninformed opponents. This text is designed to take students through key issues to give an understanding of the impact of imperfect and information in an economic context.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eList of Figures. \u003cp\u003eList of Tables.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePreface.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1. Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart I: Adverse Selection: The Market for Lemons.\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3. Adverse Selection: The Wilson Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4. Lemons Problems: Experimental Evidence.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart II: Signalling.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5. Job Market Signalling.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6. Screening: A Self-Selection Mechanism.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7. Further Literature on Signalling Theory.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8. Signalling\/Screening Behaviour: Experimental Evidence.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart III: Moral Hazard.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9. Moral Hazard: Shareholder\/Management Relations.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10. Moral Hazard: A Principal-Agent Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11. Further Literature on Moral Hazard and Agency Theory.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12. Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart IV: Mechanism Design: Applications to Bargaining and Auctions.\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13. Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle: A Bargaining Example.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14. Auction Design: Theory.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15. Auction Design: Experimental Evidence.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16. Concluding Comments.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix: Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Baye's Rule, Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"John Wiley and Sons Ltd","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49403415789911,"sku":"9780631206668","price":40.84,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780631206668.jpg?v=1730483402","url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/products\/economics-of-information-lying-and-cheating-in-markets-and-organizations-9780631206668","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}