{"product_id":"dream-death-and-the-self-9780691128597","title":"Dream Death and the Self","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eApproaches the question about dream and reality by seeking to identify its subject matter: what is it that would be the dream if \"this\" were a dream?\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"In this long, meditative, worrying book Valberg explores and defends these thoughts about himself and searches for their sources and their implications for all of us. It is an intense, personal book, aspiring to the kind of philosophical reflections that brings to light something we all know about ourselves already, but for various reasons are unwilling or unable to acknowledge.\"--Barry Stroud, Times Literary Supplement\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePreface xv     INTRODUCTION: Philosophical Discovery and Philosophical Puzzles 1  Int.1 Discovering What We Already Know 1  Int.2 The Socratic Conception of Philosophical Discovery 2  Int.3 Wittgenstein: Insidership and Philosophical Discovery 3  Int.4 Philosophical Discovery and Resistance 6  Int.5 The Presumptuousness of a Claim to Philosophical Discovery 7  Int.6 Conceptual Analysis and the Communal Horizon 9  Int.7 The Personal Horizon 11  Int.8 Philosophical Anticipations of the Personal Horizon 13  Int.9 Two Types of Philosophical Puzzle 18  Int.10 The Extraphilosophical Puzzles 20      PART ONE: Dream  THE MEANING OF THE DREAM HYPOTHESIS      Chapter 1: The Dream Hypothesis and the Argument from Internality 27  1.1 Our Purpose in Raising the Dream Hypothesis 27  1.2 That the Dream\/Reality Contrast Is Extrinsic to the Subject Matter of the Dream Hypothesis 28  1.3 The Argument from Internality 31  1.4 Dream and the Law of Excluded Middle 34  1.5 The Dream Hypothesis and Space 40  1.6 The Dream Hypothesis and Time 43  1.7 The Dream Hypothesis and the World 48      Chapter 2: The Dream Hypothesis: Identity and the First Person 53  2.1 A Puzzle about Identity 53  2.2 Representation and Identity 54  2.3 A Way out of the Puzzle 57  2.4 The Dream Hypothesis and the First-Person Singular 61  2.5 The Subject versus the Dreamer of a Dream; The Positional Conception of the Self 64  2.6 Emerging from a Dream and the First Person 68      Chapter 3: The Confusion of Standpoint 71  3.1 Dreams and the Infinity of Time 71  3.2 Time and the Confusion of Standpoint 74  3.3 Descartes and the Dream Hypothesis 76  3.4 Dream Skepticism versus Memory Skepticism 78  3.5 Real-Life Uncertainty about the Dream Hypothesis 80      Chapter 4: The Subject Matter of the Dream Hypothesis 84  4.1 Is the Argument from Internality Valid? 84  4.2 The Subject Matter of the Dream Hypothesis and Grammatical Illusion 86  4.3 Alternative Formulations of the Dream Hypothesis 88  4.4 Reality 91  4.5 What Is the Subject Matter of the Dream Hypothesis? 94  4.6 The Horizonal versus Phenomenal Conception of Mind 97      DREAM SKEPTICISM     Chapter 5: The Dream Hypothesis and the Skeptical Challenge 101  5.1 The Skeptical Argument 101  5.2 The Usual Argument for Dream Skepticism; Immanent versus Transcendent Dream Skepticism 105  5.3 The Uniqueness of Transcendent Dream Skepticism 108  5.4 Dream Skepticism and the External World 110  5.5 Nozick on the Tank Hypothesis 113      Chapter 6: Responding to Dream Skepticism 119  6.1 Is the Dream Hypothesis a Pseudo Hypothesis? 119  6.2 Whether It Would Matter if THIS Were a Dream 122  6.3 The General Form of My Response to the Dream Hypothesis 126  6.4 I Am with Others: Metaphysical Equality and the Claim to Preeminence 128  6.5 The Commitment to (O) 131  6.6 Raising the Dream Hypothesis in Conversation: Forcing a Withdrawal to the First Person 134  6.7 Withdrawing to the First Person and the Horizonal Use of the First Person 136  6.8 Why It Is Rationally Impossible to Believe the Dream Hypothesis 138  6.9 The Space of Horizons 141  6.10 Other Minds 144  6.11 Skepticism and Solipsism 146      PART TWO: Death  THE MEANING OF DEATH      Chapter 7: I Will Die 153  7.1 Dream and Death; Discovering the Meaning of Death 153  7.2 Being Disturbed by the Prospect of Death 154  7.3 That the Prospect of Death Holds Up Something Not Just Awful but Incomprehensible; Death and Self-Deception 157  7.4 Reacting to the Prospect of Death: A Text 160  7.5 Philosophical Reflection and Real-Life Disturbance 165      Chapter 8: The Subject Matter and \"Mineness\" of My Death 168  8.1 The Prospect of Death 168  8.2 I Will Cease to Be 171  8.3 Death and the Stream of Mental States 173  8.4 The World and the Subject Matter of Death 177  8.5 The \"Mineness\" of My Death and the Horizonal Use of the First Person 181      DEATH AND SOLIPSISM     Chapter 9: Solipsism 185  9.1 My Horizon and the Horizon 185  9.2 The Solipsism of Wittgenstein's Tractatus 188  9.3 Solipsism and Self-Consciousness 192  9.4 Kripke on the Solipsism of the Tractatus 195  9.5 Negativism 198      Chapter 10: Death and the Truth of Solipsism 201  10.1 Solipsism and My Life with Others 201  10.2 Relativized Solipsism 204  10.3 Solipsism and the Meaning of Death 206  10.4 Qualifying the NOTHINGNESS of Death 209      Chapter 11: The Awfulness and Incomprehensibility of Death 215  11.1 The Awfulness of Death 215  11.2 The Two Forms of the Impossibility of Death 219  11.3 The Temporal Impossibility of Death 220  11.4 Consciousness and Causation 222  11.5 The Solipsistic Impossibility of Death 227  11.6 The \"Aloneness\" of the Dying Subject 228  11.7 The Puzzles of Death and the Causation of Consciousness 232      PART THREE: The Self  POSSIBILITY AND THE SELF      Chapter 12: Imagination and the Cartesian Self 237  12.1 What Is \"the Self\"? 237  12.2 The Cartesian Argument 237  12.3 Imagination and Proof 240  12.4 Exhibiting Possibilities in Imagination 242  12.5 Imagination and Experiential Possibility 245  12.6 Experiential Possibilities and Possibilities of Essence 247  12.7 The Paralogism of Imagination 249  12.8 The Cartesian Reply 251      Chapter 13: Metaphysical Possibility and the Self 255  13.1 Metaphysical Possibility 255  13.2 Metaphysical Possibility and the Self 257  13.3 The Logic of the Self 259  13.4 Naturalizing the Self 261  THE POSITIONAL CONCEPTION OF THE SELF     Chapter 14: Preliminary Reflections on the Positional Conception of the Self 264  14.1 Nagel's Puzzle about \"Being Me\" 264  14.2 Individual Essence: Frege on Our \"Particular and Primitive\" Mode of Self-Presentation 265  14.3 My Body and Me (the Human Being That I Am) 269  14.4 The Multiplicity of the Phenomenology of the Subject Position 271  14.5 The Standing\/Operative Ambiguity 273  14.6 Causal Centrality 275  14.7 Causation and the Phenomenology of the Subject Position 279  14.8 Orientational Centrality 281  14.9 The Sense in Which the Positional and Horizonal Conceptions of the Self Are \"Always in Play\" 282      Chapter 15: The Phenomenology of the Subject Position 286  15.1 Perceptual Centrality: The Visual and Tactual Appearing of My Body 286  15.2 Perceptual Centrality: The Visual Appearing of Myself 290  15.3 Perceptual Centrality: Views of Myself 293  15.4 Centrality of Feeling: Figuring as the Space of Feeling 297  15.5 The Centrality of Feeling: The Sense in Which the Space of Feeling (My Body-Space) Is a \"Space\" 299  15.6 Centrality of Feeling: The Ontological Dependence of My Body-Space on My Body 304  15.7 Volitional Centrality: Acting\/Will and the Phenomenology of the Subject Position 307  15.8 Volitional Centrality: The Phenomenology of Will 309  15.9 Volitional Centrality: The \"Mineness\" of My Actions 315  15.10 Volitional Centrality: Phenomenology and Causality 319      THE FIRST PERSON     Chapter 16: The Uses of the First Person 321  16.1 Introduction 321  16.2 The Referential Use of the First Person 322  16.3 Reference and the Use of \"I\" as Subject\/Object 324  16.4 \"I Am Thinking ... \/I See ...\" 329  16.5 The Positional Use of the First Person 334  16.6 The Horizonal Use of the First Person 337      Chapter 17: What Makes First-Person Reference First Personal? 342  17.1 The Meaning of the Question We Are Asking 342  17.2 Following the Rule for the Use of \"I\" 343  17.3 Inner First-Person Reference 346  17.4 Attitudes de Se 351  17.5 First-Person Reference and the Positional Conception of the Self 354  17.6 The First Person and Emptiness at the Center 355      TIME AND THE SELF     Chapter 18: Temporalizing the Self 359  18.1 Introduction 359  18.2 Tense and the Phenomenology of the Subject Position 360  18.3 The Tense Asymmetry in the Phenomenology of the Subject Position 364  18.4 Tense and the Horizonal Self 366      Chapter 19: The Problem of Personal Identity 370  19.1 The Special Philosophical Problem of Personal Identity: The Problem of First-Person Identity 370  19.2 Imagining Myself Persisting through a Change of Human Beings (Bodies) 373  19.3 Locke's View of Personal Identity 376  19.4 Persistence and the Horizon 380  19.5 Remembering; The Past-Self Ambiguity 382  19.6 Possibility, Personal Identity, and Naturalizing the Self 387      Chapter 20: Time and the Horizon 394  20.1 The Oneness of the Horizon 394  20.2 Skepticism about the Oneness over Time of My Horizon 397  20.3 Kant's Third Paralogism: The Self \"in Time\" and the Self That \"Time Is In\" 400      Chapter 21: My Past 408  21.1 The Availability in Memory of Past Events 408  21.2 The Argument from Pastness 410  21.3 Being Open to the Availability of the Past 413  21.4 Memory Images 417  21.5 Letting the Past Be Past 420  21.6 Moving from Inside to Outside the Sphere of Phenomenological Reflection 422  21.7 The Puzzle of Memory and the Puzzle of Experience 426  21.8 The Puzzle of Memory and the Problems of First-Person Identity 429      Chapter 22: My Future 432  22.1 My Future versus the Future 432  22.2 My Future and My Brain: Jumping over Death 434  22.3 Parfit on My Future Self 439  22.4 Nozick's \"Closest Continuer\" Theory 444      Chapter 23: My Future: The Puzzle of Division 450  23.1 Personal Identity and Possibility (Review) 450  23.2 The Possibility of Division 451  23.3 Parfit on Division 454  23.4 Other Responses to the Puzzle of Division: Nozick and Lewis 458  23.5 The Puzzle of Division and the Identity-Framework 463  23.6 Horizonal Doubling versus Splits within the Horizon 465  23.7 The Impossibility of Horizonal Doubling 468  23.8 The Unity of Consciousness 470  23.9 The Puzzle of Division 472      Chapter 24: Conclusion: The Extraphilosophical Puzzles 474  24.1 The Extra- versus Purely Philosophical Puzzles 474  24.2 The Puzzle of Division as an Extraphilosophical Puzzle 476  24.3 The Puzzle of Division and the Puzzle of the Causation of Consciousness 478  24.4 Our Causal Entrapment in the World 480  24.5 The Extraphilosophical Puzzles and the Horizonal Subject Matter 482      Bibliography 487  Index 491","brand":"Princeton University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49403746582871,"sku":"9780691128597","price":42.5,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780691128597.jpg?v=1730484426","url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/products\/dream-death-and-the-self-9780691128597","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}