{"product_id":"disputed-decisions-of-world-war-ii-9781476680040","title":"Disputed Decisions of World War II","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e   A former Harvard professor of decision science and game theory draws on those disciplines in this review of controversial strategic and tactical decisions of World War II.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e   Allied leaders--although outstanding in many ways--sometimes botched what now is termed meta-decision making or deciding how to decide. Operation Jubilee, a single-division raid on Dieppe, France, in August 1942, for example, illustrated the pitfalls of groupthink. In the Allied invasion of North Africa three months later, American and British leaders fell victim to the planning fallacy: having unrealistically rosy expectations of an easy victory. In Sicily in the summer of 1943, they violated the millennia-old principle of command unity--now re-endorsed and elaborated on by modern theorists. Had Allied strategists understood the game theory of bluffing, in January 1944 they might well not have landed two-plus divisions at Anzio in Italy.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cli\u003eAcknowledgments  vii\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eIntroduction  1\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e1. Dieppe  5\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe Strategic Decision: Should Dieppe in August 1942 Have Been Raided? 5\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe Outcome: Minor Success; Profitless Movement; Major Disaster 13\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eLater Decisions: Should Reserves Have Been Sent to Red and White Beaches—As Was Done? 15\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe Outcome: Wounding, Capture and Death 16\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eStill Later Decision: Should the Operation Have Been Called Off—As It Was? 16\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe Outcome: The Return of Twelve Hundred; Crowing in Berlin 17\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eHow Bad Was the Outcome? How Significant the Battle? 17\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eAn Alternative Approach to Judging Decisions and Outcomes, That of Decision Science 18\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eDid the Lessons of Dieppe Make Its Outcome, on Net, Good? 19\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eWhat Pluses, Other Than Its Lessons, Did Operation Jubilee Have? 21\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eJudging Decisions Apart from Outcomes 22\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eWas Undertaking Jubilee a Good or a Bad Decision? 23\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eHow Much Did Ill Luck, Flawed Execution, or Poor Intelligence Contribute to the Bad Outcome? 25\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eGiven the Retrospective Consensus That the Plans for Operations Rutter and Jubilee Were Disastrous, Why Had They Been Approved? 28\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eCould No One Have Prevented the Suicidal Folly? Did the Fault Lie in the ­Meta-Decisions—The Determinations of How the Decisions Would Be Made? 31\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e­Meta-Decisional Issues: How Should ­Go-No-Go Determinations Be Made? How Were They Made on Dieppe? 34\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eDid the British Authorize Rutter\/Jubilee Expecting Failure—Perhaps Also Hoping for It and Even Acting to Sabotage the Raid? 35\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe Expected Value of Information 37\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eWhat Should the Allies Have Done? 38\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eModels of Governmental ­Decision-Making 38\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eConclusions 39\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e2. North Africa 41\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe ­Grand-Strategic Decision: Should the Allies in November 1942 Have Landed in North Africa? 41\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe Four Steps of Decision Science 49\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eCompeting ­Grand-Strategic Priorities 49\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eStrategic Alternatives 51\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eTactical Choices 52\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eUncertainties 54\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eValues: ­Anglo-American Differences in Outlook and Priority 57\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eModes of Decision Influence 59\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eRoosevelt and Marshall 65\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe Outcome: Brief Opposition in Landing; Loss of the Race for Tunis; Capturing Thrice as Many Men as Had Been in the Afrika Korps 66\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe Sequence of Outcome Ratings for Torch: First Good; Then Bad; Ultimately, Better Than Good 72\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe Planning Fallacy 73\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eConsequences of the Allied Failure to Take Tunis Quickly 75\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eWas Undertaking Operation Gymnast\/Torch a Good or a Bad Decision? 75\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eWas the Decision of Adolf Hitler to Send More Troops to Africa Good or Bad? 78\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eGame Theory 80\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e­Other-Side Perception 81\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e­Move-Order Plusses and Minuses 83\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eConclusions 84\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e3. Messina 86\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe ­Non-Decision: Should the Allies in July and August of 1943 Have Acted, More Than They Negligibly Did, to Prevent the Escape of 53,000 Germans Across the Strait of Messina? 87\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe Outcome: Allied Conquest of Sicily; German Escape; Italian Forsaking of the Axis Alliance 88\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eHow Good or Bad Was the Outcome of Operation Husky? 89\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eJudgments on the ­Non-Decision of Failing to Interdict German Flight and Its Outcome 90\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eWhat Affected How Bad or How Good the Outcome of Operation Husky Was? 91\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eWhat Steps Might the Allies Have Taken to Have Captured or Killed Tens of Thousands More Germans in Sicily? 93\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eWhy Did the Allies in Sicily Not Take Any of Many Possible Decision Alternatives, Instead of Drifting into Their Actual, Inferior ­Non-Decision? 97\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eWho, If Anyone, Was at Fault? 99\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eWhat Should the Allies Not Have Done? 100\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003ePrincipals and Agents; Unity of Command 102\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eWhy Did the Germans in Sicily Do Better Than the Allies? 108\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe Perspective of Game Theory 108\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eRisk Aversion 109\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eOrganizational Behavior 109\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eHow Bad Were the Consequences of the ­Non-Decision at Messina? 110\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eConclusions 111\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e4. Anzio 113\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe Strategic Decision: Should the Allies in January 1944 Have Landed at Anzio? 113\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe Operational Decision: Should Major General John Lucas, in His First Two Days Ashore, Have Pushed Boldly Forward—Which He Did Not Do? 118\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe Outcome: Stalemate at the Beachhead 120\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eDid the Operational Decision of John Lucas Have a Good or a Bad Outcome? 122\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eWas the Operational Decision of John Lucas Good or Bad? 123\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eDid Operation Shingle Have a Good or a Bad Outcome? 125\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eDeciding on Shingle 127\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eUncertainties 128\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eValues 130\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eJudgments of the Decision to Undertake Shingle 131\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eShingle as a Bluff 132\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e­Game-Theoretic Perspectives on Anzio 134\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eGovernmental Politics 134\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eConclusions 137\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eEpilogue: The Science of Deciding, the Theory of Games and War 139\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe Planning Fallacy 139\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eWays of Influencing and Resolving Decisions 139\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003ePublic Opinion 143\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eWeariness 145\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eAge 148\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eDecision Fatigue, Food and Sex 152\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eGroupthink 153\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eExpertise 157\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eNumbers 159\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003ePrincipals, Agents, Asymmetric Information, Command Unity and Coalitions 162\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe Potential Value of Decision Science and Game Theory Between Dieppe and Anzio 165\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eBetter Decisions in Conflicts to Come 167\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eChapter Notes 171\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eBibliography 191\u003c\/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eIndex 197\u003c\/li\u003e","brand":"McFarland \u0026 Co Inc","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":51040469877079,"sku":"9781476680040","price":48.59,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9781476680040.jpg?v=1750946854","url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/products\/disputed-decisions-of-world-war-ii-9781476680040","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}