{"product_id":"analyzing-strategic-behavior-in-business-and-economics-9781498525626","title":"Analyzing Strategic Behavior in Business and","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis textbook is an introduction to game theory, which is the systematic analysis of decision-making in interactive settings. Game theory can be of great value to business managers. The ability to correctly anticipate countermove by rival firms in competitive and cooperative settings enables managers to make more effective marketing, advertising, pricing, and other business decisions to optimally achieve the firm's objectives. Game theory does not always accurately predict how rivals will act in strategic situations, but does identify a decision maker's best response to situations involving move and countermove. As Nobel Prize winner Thomas Shelling noted: We may wish to understand how participants actually do conduct themselves in conflict situations; an understanding of the correct' play may give us a bench mark for the study of actual behavior. The concise and axiomatic approach to the material presented in this textbook is easily accessible to students with a background in the prin\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eBusiness decisions are rarely made in a competitive vacuum. A manager’s ability to maximize a firm’s value on behalf of shareholders may be hamstrung by an inability to raise finance capital, disruption in the flow of critical raw materials, shortages of skilled labor, capacity constraints, labor unrest, insufficient warehouse space, more. Managers who are able to put themselves in to the shoes of rivals are more likely to successfully achieve the firm’s objectives than those who do not. This volume is an introduction to game theory, the systematic analysis of decision making in interactive settings. Game theory identifies a decision maker’s best response to situations involving move and counter move. Thomas J. Webster is professor of economics in the Department of Finance and Economics of Pace University’s Lubin School of Business in NYC. * Wonderpedia *\u003cbr\u003eWrong incentive compatibility frameworks are at the root of the current global economic recession. Game theory is at the core of modern economic analysis, and Thomas J. Webster’s textbook is the first step to understand it.  It is simple in exercises, yet deep in concepts. -- Augusto Schianchi, Universita Degli Studi di Parma\u003cbr\u003eWebster does a great job of relating different strands of game theory to business applications.  The book helps managers understand how to anticipate and optimally react to their rivals’ actions. -- David J. Gabel, Queens College\u003cbr\u003eThis is an excellent text, clearly written with practical end of chapter questions. It is perfect for teaching students who may not have a sophisticated mathematical background. It makes a major contribution in making game theory accessible to a broad audience, and is a pleasure to read. -- Joan Nix, Queens College\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePREFACE 1\tINTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY Introduction Strategic behavior Short history of game theory Lexicon of game theory Rational versus actual behavior Practice Exercises PART I:  STATIC GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION 2\tCOALITION GAMES Introduction Prisoner’s dilemma \tThe extensive form \tThe normal form Nash equilibrium \tShortcut for finding-pure strategy Nash equilibria \tDeterminants of business collusion \tNumber of firms with similar interests \tFirm size relative to the industry \tVisibility Practice Exercises 3\tSTRATEGIC MOVES AND DETERRING DEFECTION \tIntroduction \tStrategic moves Deterring defection \tContracts \tReputation \tCutting off communications \tPreventing retreat \tBrinksmanship \tIncrementalism \tTeamwork \tAgents Practice exercises 4\tCOMPETITION GAMES Introduction Strictly-dominant strategies Weakly-dominant strategies Iterated elimination of dominated strategies Three-player games Non-dominant strategies Maximin (secure) strategy Practice exercises 5\tCOORDINATION GAMES Introduction Battle-of-the-sexes game Focal-point equilibrium Developing a theory of focal-point equilibria \tFraming Practice Exercises 6\tINFINITELY-REPEATED GAMES Introduction Coalitions Repeated static games Trigger strategies\t Evaluating payoffs in infinitely-repeated games Practice Exercises 7\tFINITELY-REPEATED GAMES Introduction Finitely-repeated games with a certain end \tEnd-of-game problem Finitely-repeated games with an uncertain end \tA word of caution Concluding remarks Practice Exercises 8\tEVOLUTION GAMES Introduction Evolutionary game theory Reproductive success Evolutionary equilibrium Networks \tPositive feedback effects \tNetwork game \tImplications \tPractice Exercises 9\tTIT-FOR-TAT Introduction Tit-for-tat End-of-game problem Practice Exercises 10\tMIXING PURE STRATEGIES Introduction Zero-sum games \tMatching pennies Minimax theorem Mixed strategies Optimal mixing rules Calculating optimal mixing rules When to use optimal mixing rules How to use optimal mixing rules Bluffing Practice Exercises 11.\tCONTINUOUS STRATEGIES Introduction \tContinuous strategies \tBest-response (reaction) functions \tTragedy of the commons \tShifting best-response functions \tPractice Exercises 12.\tSTATIC OLIGOPOLY GAMES Introduction Cournot model \tAdvertising in a Cournot setting Bertrand model \tBertrand paradox Practice Exercises 13.\tSTRATEGIC TRADE POLICY Introduction \tDiscrete pure strategies \tContinuous pure strategies \tNational welfare \tIntraindustry trade \tImperfect competition \tIntraindustry coalitions \tExport subsidies \tReciprocity \tPractice Exercises 14.\tPRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION Introduction Horizontal differentiation Vertical differentiation \tLocation \tProduct differences Practice exercises 15.\tSTRATEGIC COMPLEMENTS Introduction Double marginalization Practice exercises PART II: DYNAMIC GAMES WITH COMPLETE AND PERFECT INFORMATION 16.\tGAME TREES Introduction Game trees Subgame perfection Backward induction Credible threats First-mover advantage \tEntry deterrence Practice Exercises 17.\tA DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY GAME Introduction Stackelberg model Practice Exercises 18.\tBARGAINING Introduction The bargaining problem Ultimatum bargaining \tUltimatum paradox Nash bargaining Rubenstein bargaining Last-mover’s advantage Symmetric impatience Asymmetric impatience Practice Exercises PART III: GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 19.\tDECISION MAKING AND UNCERTAINTY Introduction Risk and uncertainty Static games with uncertain payoffs Static games in extensive form Dynamic games with uncertain payoffs Attitudes towards risk Risk aversion Understanding risk-averse behavior Practice Exercises 20.\tADVERSE SELECTION Introduction The market for lemons Practice Exercises 21.\tINCENTIVE CONTRACTS Introduction Principal-agent problem Incentive contracts \tPrincipal-agent problem with moral hazard Practice Exercises PART IV: GAMES WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION  22.\tINFORMATION SETS Introduction Information sets Bayesian updating Practice Exercises 23.\tAUCTIONS \tIntroduction Types of auctions Information structures Complete-information auctions \tSealed-bid, first-price auction \tSealed-bid, second-price auction \tEnglish auction \tDutch auction \tExpected revenues from complete-information auctions Incomplete-information auctions with independent private values \tSealed-bid, first-price auction \tSealed-bid, second-price auction \tEnglish auction \tDutch auction \tExpected revenues from incomplete-information auctions with independent private values Incomplete-information auctions with correlated value estimates \tCommon-value auctions and the winner’s curse Incomplete-information auctions and risk aversion Practice exercises 24.\tSIGNALING Introduction Spence education game \tPooling strategy \tSeparating strategy Corporate investment game Multiple subgame-perfect Bayesian equilibria Practice Exercises 25.\tSCREENING Introduction Self-selection Spence education game in reverse Practice Exercises APPENDICES REFERENCES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING INDEX","brand":"Lexington Books","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":51040686244183,"sku":"9781498525626","price":37.8,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9781498525626.jpg?v=1750947514","url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/products\/analyzing-strategic-behavior-in-business-and-economics-9781498525626","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}