{"title":"Game theory Books","description":"","products":[{"product_id":"the-extended-selfish-gene-9780198788782","title":"The Extended Selfish Gene","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAs relevant and influential today as when it was first published, this classic exposition of evolutionary thought, widely hailed for its stylistic brilliance and deep scientific insights, stimulated whole new areas of research. This extended edition includes a new epilogue from the author and two key chapters from The Extended Phenotype.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFrom the moment of its publication 40 years ago, it has been a sparkling best-seller and a scientific game-changer. * Matt Ridley, Nature *\u003cbr\u003eReview from previous edition The sort of popular science writing that makes the reader feel like a genius. * New York Times *\u003cbr\u003eThis book should be read, can be read, by almost everyone. It describes with great skill a new face of the theory of evolution. W.D. Hamilton, Science\u003cbr\u003eLearned, witty and very well written...Exhilaratingly good. Peter Medawar in The Spectator\u003cbr\u003eThe exciting theories and their wide implications are explaned with clarity, wit and enthusiasm.  Peter Parker, Sunday Times\u003cbr\u003eDawkins demonstrates that complex, theoretical or mathematical ideas can be expressed rigorously, in plain English. The book remains an excellent way for those who have not been trained in evolution to understand modern arguments.  Trends in Ecology and Evolution\u003cbr\u003eA splendid example of how difficult scientific ideas can be explained by someone who understands them and is willing to take the trouble. The New Yorker\u003cbr\u003ethe reader will come away with a clear understanding of kin selection, evolutionary stable strategies, and similar staples of the literature on evolutionary theories of animal behaviour. This is a considerable achievement.'  Times Higher Education Supplement\u003cbr\u003eBuy this book, read it and recommend it to your students...There is still nothing else quite like it. Not only are the new chapters and endnotes worthy additions to the original, but the 1976 text comes up as fresh as a primrose and, in its way, nearly as perfect. * Animal Behaviour *\u003cbr\u003eWhat is so refreshing about Dawkins is that he has confidence in the scientific method, in the testing of beliefs to destruction, no matter how cherished they may be. * Benjamin Woolley, The Listener *\u003cbr\u003e'Scientists give every appearance of being addicts, and science is their vice. That is one reason why progress in science is so rapid. I for one have benefited a great deal from Dawkins's addiction.'  David L. Hull, Nature\u003cbr\u003e'It's a classic that's still relevant today.' * Daily Express *\u003cbr\u003eDawkins's first book, The Selfish Gene, was a smash hit... Best of all, Dawkins laid out this biology - some of it truly subtle - in stunningly lucid prose. (It is, in my view, the best work of popular science ever written.) * H. Allen Orr, New York Review of Books *\u003cbr\u003eThe Selfish Gene is a classic. * Robin McKie, The Observer *\u003cbr\u003eA genuine cultural landmark of our time. * The Independent *\u003cbr\u003eReview from previous edition The sort of popular science writing that makes the reader feel like a genius. * New York Times *\u003cbr\u003eA splendid edition with a new introduction as well as (importantly) the introductions to the previous editions. * Jonathan Cowie, Concatenation *\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eINTRODUCTION TO 30TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION; PREFACE TO 1989 2ND EDITION; FOREWORD TO 1976 1ST EDITION; PREFACE TO 1976 1ST EDITION; EPILOGUE TO 40TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION;  ENDNOTES; REVIEWS FROM EARLIER EDITIONS; UPDATED BIBLIOGRAPHY; INDEX AND KEY TO BIBLIOGRAPHY; EXTRACTS FROM REVIEWS; THE EXTENDED PHENOTYPE OPENER; REFERENCES","brand":"Oxford University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48732784329047,"sku":"9780198788782","price":20.69,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780198788782.jpg?v=1719998385"},{"product_id":"game-theory-9780199218462","title":"Game Theory","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eGames are played everywhere: from economics and online auctions to social interactions, and game theory is about how to play such games in a rational way, and how to maximize their outcomes. This VSI reveals, without mathematical equations, the insights the theory can bring to everything from how to play poker optimally to the sex ratio among bees.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePreface ; 1. The Name of the Game ; 2. Chance ; 3. Time ; 4. Convention ; 5. Reciprocity ; 6. Information ; 7. Auctions ; 8. Biology ; 9. Bargaining and Coalitions ; 10. Puzzles and Paradoxes","brand":"Oxford University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48732835938647,"sku":"9780199218462","price":9.49,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780199218462.jpg?v=1719998604"},{"product_id":"game-theory-and-behavior-9780262047296","title":"Game Theory and Behavior","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eAn introduction to game theory that offers not only theoretical tools but also the intuition and behavioral insights to apply these tools to real-world situations.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis introductory text on game theory provides students with both the theoretical tools to analyze situations through the logic of game theory and the intuition and behavioral insights to apply these tools to real-world situations. It is unique among game theory texts in offering a clear, formal introduction to standard game theory while incorporating evidence from experimental data and introducing recent behavioral models. Students will not only learn about incentives, how to represent situations as games, and what agents “should” do in these situations, but they will also be presented with evidence that either confirms the theoretical assumptions or suggests a way in which the theory might be updated.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cu\u003e\u003cb\u003eFeatures:\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/u\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cul\u003e\u003cli\u003eEach chapter begins with a motivating example that can\u003c\/li\u003e\u003c\/ul\u003e","brand":"MIT Press Ltd","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48733459808599,"sku":"9780262047296","price":107.1,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780262047296.jpg?v=1720000161"},{"product_id":"nonzero-9780349113340","title":"Nonzero","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e*A controversial but optimistic book about humanity's increasing co-operation and our technological future\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eWright has constructed an interesting thesis... bold and thought-provoking. * SUNDAY TIMES *\u003cbr\u003eNot only a fascinating read but an important one. * INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY *\u003cbr\u003eOne of the main layman's objections to the supposedly random process of evolution is that for all its inherent pointlessness, evolution seems to have a goal, a narrative, a conscious direction. And that direction is towards complexity. Germs become animals. Apes become humans. Blood-caked Aztec savages become liberal-minded East Coast essayists. Now Robert Wright, author of the much-praised The Moral Animal, has come along with a contentious new book to tell us that the layman has been on to something all along. Evolution does have a goal. * The title of Wright's book comes from games theory, which divides human interactions into \"zero sum games\", where for every winner there's a loser, and \"non-zero sum games\", where everyone gains. Wright's aim is to knit together this theory with anthropol *\u003cbr\u003eThe author's learning is lightly worn. Sometimes too lightly. After a while his chatty, hey-let's-have-a-beer style starts to grate: \"When was the last time you invented a boomerang?\"; \"Ah, Tahiti!\". There are also some minor errors, like his claiming tha * Sean Thomas, AMAZON.CO.UK REVIEW *","brand":"Little, Brown Book Group","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48733646782807,"sku":"9780349113340","price":12.34,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780349113340.jpg?v=1720001006"},{"product_id":"mathematics-and-politics-strategy-voting-power-and-proof-9780387776439","title":"Mathematics and Politics Strategy Voting Power","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003eAs a text for an undergraduate mathematics course for nonmajors, Mathematics and Politics requires no prerequisites in either area while the underlying philosophy involves minimizing algebraic computations and focusing instead on some conceptual aspects of mathematics in the context of important real-world questions in political science.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003eFrom the reviews of the second edition:\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Mathematics and Politics is the fruit of undergraduate mathematics courses taught by the authors. The primary audience is political and social science majors. … The writing style is appropriate for the intended audience with the understanding that the students\/readers have some familiarity with political science economics or sociology. … Overall the book serves as a useful quantitative introduction to several of the covered topics. … Faculty in the social sciences should strongly consider Mathematics and Politics as a resource\/reference.” (J. Douglas Barrett, Technometrics, Vol. 53 (1), February, 2011)\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e“It is intended to serve as a text for social science and humanities students that will highlight the power and utility of mathematics. … if you are considering a course as described above, this textbook deserves to be the one that will entice you into taking the plunge. And if you simply want to educate yourself in areas of social science mathematics that have only recently started to get the attention they deserve, Mathematics and Politics deserves your strong consideration.” (Edward W. Packel, SIAM Review, Vol. 52 (4), 2010)\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eSocial Choice.- Yes–No Voting.- Political Power.- Conflict.- Fairness.- Escalation.- More Social Choice.- More Yes–No Voting.- More Political Power.- More Conflict.- More Fairness.- More Escalation.","brand":"Springer-Verlag New York Inc.","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48733726343511,"sku":"9780387776439","price":61.74,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780387776439.jpg?v=1720001398"},{"product_id":"strategy-3e-international-student-edition-9780393920826","title":"Strategy 3e International Student Edition","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe perfect balance of readability and formalism.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e1) \u003ci\u003eIntroduction\u003c\/i\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart I: Representations and Basic Assumptions\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e 2) The Extensive Form\u003cbr\u003e 3) Strategies and the Normal Form\u003cbr\u003e 4) Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Payoffs\u003cbr\u003e 5) General Assumptions and Methodology\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart II: Analyzing Behavior in Static Settings\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e 6) Dominance and Best Response\u003cbr\u003e 7) Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance\u003cbr\u003e 8) Location, Partnership, and Social Unrest\u003cbr\u003e 9) Nash Equilibrium\u003cbr\u003e 10) Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting\u003cbr\u003e 11) Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium\u003cbr\u003e 12) Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies\u003cbr\u003e 13) Contract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart III: Analyzing Behavior in Dynamic Settings\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e 14) Details of the Extensive Form\u003cbr\u003e 15) Sequential Rationality and Solution Concepts\u003cbr\u003e 16) Topics in Industrial Organization\u003cbr\u003e 17) Parlor Games\u003cbr\u003e 18) Bargaining Problems\u003cbr\u003e 19) Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games\u003cbr\u003e 20) Games with Joint Decisions; Negotiation Equilibrium\u003cbr\u003e 21) Unverifiable Investment, Hold Up, Options, And Ownership\u003cbr\u003e 22) Repeated Games and Reputation\u003cbr\u003e 23) Collusion, Trade Agreements, and Goodwill\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart IV: Information\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e 24) Random Events and Incomplete Information\u003cbr\u003e 25) Risk and Incentives in Contracting\u003cbr\u003e 26) Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability\u003cbr\u003e 27) Lemons, Auctions, and Information Aggregation\u003cbr\u003e 28) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium\u003cbr\u003e 29) Job-Market Signaling and Reputation\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eAppendices\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e A) Review of Mathematics\u003cbr\u003e B) The Mathematics of Rationalizability and Existence of Nash Equilibirum\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"WW Norton \u0026 Co","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48733732602199,"sku":"9780393920826","price":52.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780393920826.jpg?v=1720001430"},{"product_id":"williams-j-compleat-strategyst-9780486251011","title":"Williams J Compleat Strategyst","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis entertaining text is essential for anyone interested in game theory. Only a basic understanding of arithmetic is needed to grasp the necessary aspects of strategy games for two, three, four, and more players that feature two or more sets of inimical interests and a limitless array of zero-sum payoffs.","brand":"Dover Publications Inc.","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48733790339415,"sku":"9780486251011","price":13.49,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780486251011.jpg?v=1720001700"},{"product_id":"video-game-level-design-9781350015722","title":"Video Game Level Design","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eLevel design connects the player to the game through challenges, experiences, and emotions. This book is an invaluable introduction to the evolving practices of Level Designers across the games industry. The increasingly complex role of the Level Designer requires technical and creative skill as it brings together architecture, art, player psychology, interaction design, usability, and experience design. This book explores in detail the principles designers employ when planning levels and building engaging spaces for the player. As well as practical approaches to level design, the book delves into the theoretical underpinnings of the processes and charts a path towards thinking like a Level Designer. Throughout the book you will be guided through the fundamentals of level design: each chapter builds on the types of research, ideation, best practices, and methodologies Level Designers employ when creating prototypes and shipped games. A series of interviews with designers and case studi\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eA pragmatic approach to level design that captures the critical elements needed to conceptualize and create meaningful player experiences. Michael Salmond uses practical and straightforward examples to clearly define and explore the key considerations of game and level designers alike. The content is diverse covering many topics, yet succinct and to the point. This book fills a critical void for video game education. * Johnny Luce, co-owner, software designer, and engineer at augzoo *\u003cbr\u003eThis is an excellent book on level design, with a wealth of up-to-date and varied examples. It is highly visual and extremely readable, giving a comprehensive view of the area in a way that is colorful and engaging, whilst maintaining a good level of technicality. It is ideal for students studying game design, in order to develop their understanding of the theories and practices involved in level design as a specialism * J. Weinel, University of Greenwich, UK *\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e1. What Is Level Design? 2. Creating Immersive, Believable Worlds 3. Design for Narrative 4. Environment Design vs Level Design 5. Building Worlds 6. Design for Single \u0026amp; Multiplayer 7. Level Design is Agile Design 8. The Language of Level Design 9. Prototyping Level Design 10. The Game Is the Level, the Level Is the Game 11. Communication and Final Touches 12. Where to Next?","brand":"Bloomsbury Publishing PLC","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48738579415383,"sku":"9781350015722","price":31.34,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}]},{"product_id":"todd-howard-9781501350962","title":"Todd Howard","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe newest addition to our Influential Video Game Designers series explores the work of Todd Howard, executive producer at Bethesda Studios, known for how he consistently pushes the boundaries of open-world gaming and player agency. Howard's games create worlds in which players can design their own characters and tell their own stories. While many games tell the story of the game's main character, Todd Howard's worldbuilding approach to game design focuses more on telling the story of the game's world, whether it be the high fantasy environments of the \u003ci\u003eElder Scrolls\u003c\/i\u003e series or the post-apocalyptic wasteland of the \u003ci\u003eFallout \u003c\/i\u003eseries. This focus on sculpting the world allows for remarkable amounts of player freedom and choice in an expansive game environment by creating a landscape rich with open opportunity. Drawing on both academic discussions of narrative, world design, and game design, as well as on officially released interviews, speeches, and presentations given by Howard\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn \u003ci\u003eTodd Howard: Worldbuilding in Tamriel and Beyond\u003c\/i\u003e, Wendi Sierra illuminates this beloved game developer's mind, his struggles and passions, the history of his career from humble beginnings to towering success, and his visions for the future of games. Choosing to highlight his excellence in worldbuilding, she examines how rich, expansive game worlds like Tamriel keep players coming back again and again, logging hundreds or even thousands of in-game hours trudging up and down snowy mountains, collecting herbs, ore, and flowers, and questing for colorful NPCs—and for the sake of a compelling story in which they are the protagonist. This book is an essential guide to one of the greatest worldbuilders in the history of fantasy, and it belongs on the shelves of game scholars and game lovers alike. * Lauren Woolbright, Assistant Professor of Communication and New Media Studies, Alma College, USA *\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e1: An Unlikely Beginning 2: Little Catastrophes 3: Set Pieces for Player Experience 4: Expanding the Game World 5: Todd Howard: In His Own Words 6: The Future of Open World Gaming Appendix - Chronology of Works Bibliography Index","brand":"Bloomsbury Publishing Plc","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48739785998679,"sku":"9781501350962","price":999.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9781501350962.jpg?v=1720053139"},{"product_id":"the-traitors-the-interactive-game-book-9781529917635","title":"The Traitors: The Interactive Game Book","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTest your wits with the ultimate game of cunning, logic and intuition\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e'This book is brilliant' Zoe Ball, BBC Radio 2\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e*It's time to start your adventure. Get them before they get you*\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePut your sleuthing skills to the test in a world of deception, betrayal, and strategy. Placed in a castle in the Scottish Highlands, you must figure out if your fellow players are Faithful or a Traitor. Can you trust Jorge, the dentist with an encyclopaedic memory and tendency to smile at everyone? Or Nina, the retiree who acts like the group's matriarch but has a knowing glint in her eyes..? Beware, for in this treacherous game, trust is a luxury you cannot afford.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn the official book of the BAFTA-winning phenomenon, \u003ci\u003eThe Traitors: The Interactive Game Book\u003c\/i\u003e, the decisions you make will decide what happens next. Take this thrilling journey on your own or with others, pooling your wisdom to make the right choices. With over 20 standalone games to play in a group - all with cunning Traitors twists - this is the perfect gift, guaranteed to unleash hours of mischief and fun.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e*Praise for The Traitors TV show* \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e'Addictively fiendish, this treachery was the best thing on TV in 20 years' \u003ci\u003eDaily Mail\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e'By far and away the most compelling and engrossing reality show of 2022, if not all time' \u003ci\u003eRolling Stone\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e'One of the hottest realities right now, \u003ci\u003eThe Traitors\u003c\/i\u003e is an absolute phenomenon you can enjoy also in a book format. Now, this is not a normal book' \u003ci\u003eDigital Spy\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eEver since the show aired, \u003ci\u003eTraitors\u003c\/i\u003e fans have been asking how they can be part of the wonderful world of the show . . . The book is full of all the mystery, suspense and fun of the show. * Amanda Lovett (Season 1 contestant, BBC The Traitors UK) *\u003cbr\u003eThis book is brilliant * Zoe Ball, BBC Radio 2 *\u003cbr\u003eOne of the hottest realities right now, \u003ci\u003eThe Traitors\u003c\/i\u003e is an absolute phenomenon you can enjoy also in a book * Digital Spy *","brand":"Cornerstone","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48740338958679,"sku":"9781529917635","price":17.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9781529917635.jpg?v=1720054451"},{"product_id":"gladiators-pirates-and-games-of-trust-how-game-theory-strategy-and-probability-rule-our-lives-9781786780102","title":"Gladiators, Pirates and Games of Trust: How Game","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eGame Theory isn't just for poker players or economists. You don't have to be a microeconomics or political science expert to understand it _ discover the theory of decision making and optimize your strategic thinking with the help of Gladiators, Pirates and Games of Trust.Have you ever struggled to make a decision? Tried to figure out the winning bidding strategy at an auction? Wondered how best to split the bill in a restaurant? Divide an inheritance? Wished you were better at negotiating? Thought about how to discourage a spouse from cheating?Then Haim Shapira's fascinating exploration of Game Theory and how it affects our everyday life will delight and captivate you. Topics include how to respond to ultimatums, playing chicken, the diner's dilemma, the blackmailer's paradox and matchmaking strategies.Make buying this book your first winning decision.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"One of the best Decision Making and Game Theory books of all time.\" —Reid Hoffman (LinkedIn founder) and Nassim Nicholas Taleb (author of \u003ci\u003eBlack Swan\u003c\/i\u003e), BookAuthority","brand":"Watkins Media Limited","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48741466734935,"sku":"9781786780102","price":9.49,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9781786780102.jpg?v=1720057671"},{"product_id":"body-of-knowledge-for-modeling-and-simulation-a-handbook-by-the-society-for-modeling-and-simulation-international-9783031110849","title":"Body of Knowledge for Modeling and Simulation: A","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003eCommissioned by the Society for Modeling and Simulation International (SCS), this needed, useful new ‘Body of Knowledge’ (BoK) collects and organizes the common understanding of a wide collection of professionals and professional associations.\u003ci\u003e\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eModeling and simulation (M\u0026amp;S) is a ubiquitous discipline that lays the computational foundation for real and virtual experimentation, clearly stating boundaries—and interactions—of systems, data, and representations. The field is well known, too, for its training support via simulations and simulators. Indeed, with computers increasingly influencing the activities of today’s world, M\u0026amp;S is the third pillar of scientific understanding, taking its place along with theory building and empirical observation.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis valuable new handbook provides intellectual support for all disciplines in analysis, design and optimization. It contributes increasingly to the growing number of computational disciplines, addressing the broad variety of contributing as well as supported disciplines and application domains. Further, each of its sections provide numerous references for further information. Highly comprehensive, the BoK represents many viewpoints and facets, captured under such topics as:\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMathematical and Systems Theory Foundations\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSimulation Formalisms and Paradigms\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSynergies with Systems Engineering and Artificial Intelligence\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMultidisciplinary Challenges\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEthics and Philosophy\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eHistorical Perspectives\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e\u003cp\u003eExamining theoretical as well as practical challenges, this unique volume addresses the many facets of M\u0026amp;S for scholars, students, and practitioners. As such, it affords readers from all science, engineering, and arts disciplines a comprehensive and concise representation of concepts, terms, and activities needed to explain the M\u0026amp;S discipline.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTuncer Ören\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor Emeritus at the University of Ottawa. \u003cb\u003eBernard Zeigler\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor Emeritus at the University of Arizona. \u003cb\u003eAndreas Tolk\u003c\/b\u003e is Chief Scientist at The MITRE Corporation. All three editors are long-time members and Fellows of the Society for Modeling and Simulation International. Under the leadership of three SCS Fellows, Dr. Ören, University of Ottawa, Dr. Zeigler, The University of Arizona, and Dr. Tolk, The MITRE Corporation, more than 50 international scholars from 15 countries provided insights and experience to compile this initial M\u0026amp;S Body of Knowledge.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e1.  Preliminary.- 2. M\u0026amp;S BOK Core Areas and the Big Picture.- 3. Simulation as Experimentation.- 4. Simulation as Experience to Enhance Three Types of Skills.- 5. Simulation Games (Simulation as Experience for Entertainment).- 6. Infrastructure.- 7.  Reliability and Quality Assurance of M\u0026amp;S.- 8. Ethics.- 9. Enterprise (Economics of M\u0026amp;S).- 10. Maturity.- 11.  Supporting Domains: Computers and Computation.- 12. Supporting Science Areas.- 13. Supporting Engineering Areas.-14. Supporting Social Science and Management Areas.- 15. Philosophy and Modelling and Simulation.- 16. History.- 17. Core Research Areas.- 18. Trends, Desirable Features, and Challenges. ","brand":"Springer International Publishing AG","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48743069057367,"sku":"9783031110849","price":94.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9783031110849.jpg?v=1723812628"},{"product_id":"critical-phenomena-in-natural-sciences-chaos-fractals-selforganization-and-disorder-concepts-and-tools-9783540308829","title":"Critical Phenomena in Natural Sciences: Chaos,","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003eConcepts, methods and techniques of statistical physics in the study of correlated, as well as uncorrelated, phenomena are being applied ever increasingly in the natural sciences, biology and economics in an attempt to understand and model the large variability and risks of phenomena. This is the first textbook written by a well-known expert that provides a modern up-to-date introduction for workers outside statistical physics. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eUseful Notions of Probability Theory.- Sums of Random Variables, Random Walks and the Central Limit Theorem.- Large Deviations.- Power Law Distributions.- Fractals and Multifractals.- Rank-Ordering Statistics and Heavy Tails.- Statistical Mechanics: Probabilistic Point of View and the Concept of “Temperature”.- Long-Range Correlations.- Phase Transitions: Critical Phenomena and First-Order Transitions.- Transitions, Bifurcations and Precursors.- The Renormalization Group.- The Percolation Model.- Rupture Models.- Mechanisms for Power Laws.- Self-Organized Criticality.- to the Physics of Random Systems.- Randomness and Long-Range Laplacian Interactions.","brand":"Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH \u0026 Co. KG","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48743130136919,"sku":"9783540308829","price":64.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}]},{"product_id":"mathematical-game-theory-9789811246692","title":"Mathematical Game Theory","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eWhat is a game? Classically, a game is perceived as something played by human beings. Its mathematical analysis is human-centered, explores the structures of particular games, economic or social environments and tries to model supposedly 'rational' human behavior in search of appropriate 'winning strategies'. This point of view places game theory into a very special scientific corner where mathematics, economics and psychology overlap and mingle.This book takes a novel approach to the subject.  Its focus is on mathematical models that apply  to game theory in particular but exhibit a universal character and thus extend the scope of game theory considerably.This textbook addresses anyone interested in a general game-theoretic view of the world. The reader should have mathematical knowledge at the level of a first course in real analysis and linear algebra. However, possibly more specialized aspects are further elaborated and pointers to relevant supplementary literature are given. Moreover, many examples  invite the reader to participate 'actively' when going through the material. The scope of the book can be covered in one course on Mathematical Game Theory at advanced undergraduate or graduate level.","brand":"World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48743282311511,"sku":"9789811246692","price":63.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9789811246692.jpg?v=1720064912"},{"product_id":"microeconomic-theory-9789811300400","title":"Microeconomic Theory","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis book covers microeconomic theory at the Master’s and Ph.D levels for students in business schools and economics departments. It concisely covers major mainstream microeconomic theories today, including neoclassical microeconomics, game theory, information economics, and contract theory.  The revamped, 3rd edition of \"Microeconomic Theory\" offers faculty, graduate and upper undergraduate students with a comprehensive curriculum solution. \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eChapter 1. Producer Theory.- Chapter 2. Consumer Theory.- Chapter 3. Risk Theory.- Chapter 4. Equilibrium Theory.- Chapter 5. Micro-Foundation for Financial Markets.- Chapter 6. Micro-Foundation for Industrial Markets.- Chapter 7. Imperfect Information Games.- Chapter 8. Incomplete Information Games.- Chapter 9. Cooperative Games.- Chapter 10. Signalling.- Chapter 11. Mechanism Design.- Chapter 12. Incentive Contracts.\u003cbr\u003e","brand":"Springer Verlag, Singapore","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48743286341975,"sku":"9789811300400","price":82.49,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9789811300400.jpg?v=1720064929"},{"product_id":"around-the-world-in-80-games-9780008525910","title":"Around the World in 80 Games","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e''BRILLIANTLY CLEAR AND CAPTIVATING PROSE'' STEPHEN FRYA WATERSTONES BOOK OF YEAR 2023An award-winning mathematician explores the maths behind the games we love and why we love to play them.Where should you move first in Connect 4?What is the best property in Monopoly?And how can pi help you win rock paper scissors?Spanning millennia, oceans and continents, countries and cultures, Around the World in 80 Games gleefully explores how mathematics and games have always been deeply intertwined. Marcus du Sautoy investigates how games provided the first opportunities for deep mathematical insight into the world, how understanding maths can help us play games better, and how both maths and games are integral to human psychology and culture.For as long as there have been people, there have been games, and for nearly as long, we have been exploring and discovering mathematics. A grand adventure, Around the World in 80 Games teaches us not just how games are won, but how they, and the maths behi\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e‘Marcus du Sautoy’s brilliantly clear and captivating prose manages to bring to life the drama of so many different games. With the lightest of touches du Sautoy manages persuasively to show how games are both narratives that speak about us and structures whose ideas underlie everything in our known universe. And on top of it, the book serves as an absolutely indispensable compendium. Rainy weekends in Cornwall will now be welcomed’ \u003cstrong\u003eStephen Fry\u003c\/strong\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e           \u003cp\u003e'A delightful and addictive celebration of games. You’ll keeping wanting one more go' \u003cstrong\u003eDara Ó Briain\u003c\/strong\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e           \u003cp\u003e‘Whether your game is Go, Dungeons and Dragons, or Chocolate Chilli Roulette, you'll find this book adorable. It's lively, creative and humane – exactly as one would expect from Marcus du Sautoy’ \u003cstrong\u003eTim Harford, author of \u003cem\u003eHow To Make The World Add Up\u003c\/em\u003e\u003c\/strong\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e           \u003cp\u003e‘The book encapsulates the very essence of human ingenuity and our intrinsic love for play and exploration. You do not need to be a seasoned player nor a skilled mathematician to relish this enchanting read. However, this book may just encourage you to become the one or the other’ \u003cstrong\u003eReiner Knizia, award-winning game designer\u003c\/strong\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"HarperCollins Publishers","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48864008700247,"sku":"9780008525910","price":999.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false}]},{"product_id":"around-the-world-in-80-games-9780008525927","title":"Around the World in 80 Games","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e''BRILLIANTLY CLEAR AND CAPTIVATING PROSE'' STEPHEN FRYA WATERSTONES BOOK OF YEAR 2023An award-winning mathematician explores the maths behind the games we love and why we love to play them.Where should you move first in Connect 4?Which property is best in Monopoly?How can pi help you win Rock Paper Scissors?Crossing oceans, continents and millennia, award-winning mathematician Marcus du Sautoy explores how maths and games have always been deeply intertwined. As well as being integral to human psychology and culture throughout the ages, games provided the first opportunities for deep mathematical insight into the world. This grand adventure teaches us how to strategise, play better and win more often.The subject matter is fun (I mean, isn't it quite literally the definition of fun?) and du Sautoy's enthusiasm is infectious' THE SUNDAY TIMES''A delightful and addictive celebration of games. You'll keep wanting one more go'' DARA Ó BRIAIN, author of Is There Anybody Out There?Lively, creative and humane  exactly as one would expect from Marcus du Sautoy' TIM HARFORD, author of How To Make The World Add UpYou do not need to be a seasoned player nor a skilled mathematician to relish this enchanting read. However, this book may just encourage you to become the one or the other' REINER KNIZIA, award-winning game designer\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e‘With the lightest of touches du Sautoy manages persuasively to show how games are both narratives that speak about us and structures whose ideas underlie everything in our known universe. And on top of it, the book serves as an absolutely indispensable compendium. Rainy weekends in Cornwall will now be welcomed’ Stephen Fry\u003c\/p\u003e           \u003cp\u003e'A delightful and addictive celebration of games. You’ll keeping wanting one more go' Dara Ó Briain\u003c\/p\u003e           \u003cp\u003e‘Whether your game is Go, Dungeons and Dragons, or Chocolate Chilli Roulette, you'll find this book adorable. It's lively, creative and humane – exactly as one would expect from Marcus du Sautoy’ Tim Harford, author of \u003cem\u003eHow To Make The World Add Up\u003c\/em\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e           \u003cp\u003e‘The book encapsulates the very essence of human ingenuity and our intrinsic love for play and exploration. You do not need to be a seasoned player nor a skilled mathematician to relish this enchanting read. However, this book may just encourage you to become the one or the other’ Reiner Knizia, award-winning game designer\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"HarperCollins Publishers","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48864008831319,"sku":"9780008525927","price":999.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false}]},{"product_id":"gamechanger-9780393349894","title":"GameChanger","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eEmpowers readers with the wisdom to win in every strategic situation.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"...a well-written account of wide-ranging real-world situations that show the nuts and bolts of game theory...\" -- Engineering \u0026amp; Technology","brand":"WW Norton \u0026 Co","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48864546750807,"sku":"9780393349894","price":18.05,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780393349894.jpg?v=1722272412"},{"product_id":"games-and-decisions-9780486659435","title":"Games and Decisions","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e","brand":"Dover Publications Inc.","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48864740147543,"sku":"9780486659435","price":21.24,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780486659435.jpg?v=1722273024"},{"product_id":"a-beautiful-mind-9780571212927","title":"A Beautiful Mind","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eA Beautiful Mind\u003c\/i\u003e is Sylvia Nasar''s award-winning biography about the mystery of the human mind, the triumph over incredible adversity, and the healing power of love.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAt the age of thirty-one, John Nash, mathematical genius, suffered a devastating breakdown and was diagnosed with schizophrenia. Yet after decades of leading a ghost-like existence, he was to re-emerge to win a Nobel Prize and world acclaim. A Beautiful Mind has inspired the Oscar-winning film directed by Ron Howard and featuring Russell Crowe in the lead role of John Nash.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Faber \u0026 Faber","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48865103053143,"sku":"9780571212927","price":13.49,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780571212927.jpg?v=1722273542"},{"product_id":"the-essential-john-nash-9780691096100","title":"The Essential John Nash","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eWhen John Nash won the Nobel prize in economics in 1994, many people were surprised to learn that he was alive. This book presents Nash's contributions not only to game theory, for which he received the Nobel, but to mathematics - from Riemannian geometry and partial differential equations - in which he commands greater acclaim among academics.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"If you want to see a sugary Hollywood depiction of John Nash's life, go to the cinema. Afterwards, if you are curious about his insights, pick up a new book that explains his work and reprints his most famous papers. It is just as amazing as his personal story.\"--Chris Giles, Financial Times \"One of the most beautifully designed economics books I have ever seen and at a low price... Why are we so intrigued by the story of John Nash? We are curious to understand a person who proves theorems we are unable to fathom. We imagine the voices from another world he has heard. We ask where he was for 30 years during which he walked among us but wasn't here. We are frightened and we are attracted by this combination of 'crazy' and 'genius', an invitation for visiting the edge of our own minds.\"--Ariel Rubinstein, The Times Higher Education Supplement \"Any mathematician who read A Beautiful Mind ... had to be looking for the appendices--the ones explaining what Nash actually did to earn his formidable reputation within the mathematical community. Well, here they are, in a beautifully produced volume... Kuhn, Nasar, and the other contributors have performed a most welcome service by collaborating to bring together the pieces missing from A Beautiful Mind... The mathematical community is eternally in their debt.\"--SIAM News \"The book is written in a pleasant and informal style, addressed to a large audience.\"--P.T. Moranu, Mathematica\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePREFACE by Harold W. Kuhn vii  INTRODUCTION by Sylvia Nasar xi  Chapter 1: Press Release--The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 1  Chapter 2: Autobiography 5  Photo Essay 13  Editor's introduction to Chapter 3 29  Chapter 3: The Game of Hex by John Milnor 31  Editor's Introduction to Chapter 4 35  Chapter 4: The bargaining problem 37  Editor's Introduction to Chapters 5, 6, and 7 47  Chapter 5: Equilibrium Points in n-Person games 49  Chapter 6: Non-Cooperative Games Facsimile of Ph.D. Thesis 51  Chapter 7: Non-Cooperative Games 85  Chapter 8: Two-Person Coooperative Games 99  Editor's Introduction to Chapter 9 115  Chapter 9: Parallel Control 117  Chapter 10: real Algebraic Manifolds 127  Chapter 11: The Imbedding problem for Riemannian Manifolds 151  Chapter 12: Continuity of Solutions of Parabolic and Elliptic Equations 211  AFTERWORD 241  SOURCES 243","brand":"Princeton University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48865517764951,"sku":"9780691096100","price":31.5,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780691096100.jpg?v=1722274352"},{"product_id":"game-theory-9780691129082","title":"Game Theory","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eSuitable for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students, this title introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory. It covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information and features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"The book is enjoyable to read and truly an enrichment in game theory. It is widely well-structured and well-written and mathematically correct. The purpose is given perfectly. I recommend the book for researchers and graduate students who wants to get some insight in the area of game theory.\"--Sirma Zeynep, Zentralblatt MATH \"The book aims to be precise and rigorous, yet accessible and reader-friendly, and, to a great extent, it does hit these apparently conflicting targets... The depth of the book is intermediate, with a conventional, yet clear, style of writing. It will please mainstream economists... It can help advanced undergraduates and also students at honors or master's levels. It can also be used by PhD students seeking a fast, not so mathematized introduction to the field.\"--Jose Rodriques-Neto, Economic Record\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePreface xi   PART I Rational Decision Making   Chapter 1 The Single-Person Decision Problem 3  *1.1 Actions, Outcomes, and Preferences 4 * 1.1.1 Preference Relations 5 * 1.1.2 Payoff Functions 7 *1.2 The Rational Choice Paradigm 9 *1.3 Summary 11 *1.4 Exercises 11   Chapter 2 Introducing Uncertainty and Time 14  *2.1 Risk, Nature, and Random Outcomes 14 2.1.1 Finite Outcomes and Simple Lotteries 15 2.1.2 Simple versus Compound Lotteries 16 2.1.3 Lotteries over Continuous Outcomes 17 *2.2 Evaluating Random Outcomes 18 2.2.1 Expected Payoff: The Finite Case 19 2.2.2 Expected Payoff: The Continuous Case 20 2.2.3 Caveat: It's Not Just the Order Anymore 21 2.2.4 Risk Attitudes 22 2.2.5 The St. Petersburg Paradox 23 *2.3 Rational Decision Making with Uncertainty 24 2.3.1 Rationality Revisited 24 2.3.2 Maximizing Expected Payoffs 24 *2.4 Decisions over Time 26 2.4.1 Backward Induction 26 2.4.2 Discounting Future Payoffs 28 *2.5 Applications 29 2.5.1 The Value of Information 29 2.5.2 Discounted Future Consumption 31 *2.6 Theory versus Practice 32 *2.7 Summary 33 *2.8 Exercises 33    PART II Static Games of Complete Information   Chapter 3 Preliminaries 43  *3.1 Normal-Form Games with Pure Strategies 46 3.1.1 Example: The Prisoner's Dilemma 48 3.1.2 Example: Cournot Duopoly 49 3.1.3 Example: Voting on a New Agenda 49 *3.2 Matrix Representation: Two-Player Finite Game 50 3.2.1 Example: The Prisoner's Dilemma 51 3.2.2 Example: Rock-Paper-Scissors 52 *3.3 Solution Concepts 52 3.3.1 Assumptions and Setup 54 3.3.2 Evaluating Solution Concepts 55 3.3.3 Evaluating Outcomes 56 *3.4 Summary 57 *3.5 Exercises 58 Chapter 4 Rationality and Common Knowledge 59  *4.1 Dominance in Pure Strategies 59 4.1.1 Dominated Strategies 59 4.1.2 Dominant Strategy Equilibrium 61 4.1.3 Evaluating Dominant Strategy Equilibrium 62 *4.2 Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Pure Strategies 63 4.2.1 Iterated Elimination and Common Knowledge of Rationality 63 4.2.2 Example: Cournot Duopoly 65 4.2.3 Evaluating IESDS 67 *4.3 Beliefs, Best Response, and Rationalizability 69 4.3.1 The Best Response 69 4.3.2 Beliefs and Best-Response Correspondences 71 4.3.3 Rationalizability 73 4.3.4 The Cournot Duopoly Revisited 73 4.3.5 The \"p-Beauty Contest\" 74 4.3.6 Evaluating Rationalizability 76 *4.4 Summary 76 *4.5 Exercises 76   Chapter 5 Pinning Down Beliefs: Nash Equilibrium 79  *5.1 Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies 80 5.1.1 Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Matrix 81 5.1.2 Evaluating the Nash Equilibria Solution 83 *5.2 Nash Equilibrium: Some Classic Applications 83 5.2.1 Two Kinds of Societies 83 5.2.2 The Tragedy of the Commons 84 5.2.3 Cournot Duopoly 87 5.2.4 Bertrand Duopoly 88 5.2.5 Political Ideology and Electoral Competition 93 *5.3 Summary 95 *5.4 Exercises 95   Chapter 6 Mixed Strategies 101  *6.1 Strategies, Beliefs, and Expected Payoffs 102 6.1.1 Finite Strategy Sets 102 6.1.2 Continuous Strategy Sets 104 6.1.3 Beliefs and Mixed Strategies 105 6.1.4 Expected Payoffs 105 *6.2 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 107 6.2.1 Example: Matching Pennies 108 6.2.2 Example: Rock-Paper-Scissors 111 6.2.3 Multiple Equilibria: Pure and Mixed 113 *6.3 IESDS and Rationalizability Revisited 114 *6.4 Nash's Existence Theorem 117 *6.5 Summary 123 *6.6 Exercises 123 PART III Dynamic Games of Complete Information    Chapter 7 Preliminaries 129  *7.1 The Extensive-Form Game 130 7.1.1 Game Trees 132 7.1.2 Imperfect versus Perfect Information 136 *7.2 Strategies and Nash Equilibrium 137 7.2.1 Pure Strategies 137 7.2.2 Mixed versus Behavioral Strategies 139 7.2.3 Normal-Form Representation of Extensive-Form Games 143 *7.3 Nash Equilibrium and Paths of Play 145 *7.4 Summary 147 *7.5 Exercises 147 Chapter 8 Credibility and Sequential Rationality 151  *8.1 Sequential Rationality and Backward Induction 152 *8.2 Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium: Concept 153 *8.3 Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium: Examples 159 8.3.1 The Centipede Game 159 8.3.2 Stackelberg Competition 160 8.3.3 Mutually Assured Destruction 163 8.3.4 Time-Inconsistent Preferences 166 *8.4 Summary 169 *8.5 Exercises 170 Chapter 9 Multistage Games 175  *9.1 Preliminaries 176 *9.2 Payoffs 177 *9.3 Strategies and Conditional Play 178 *9.4 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 180 *9.5 The One-Stage Deviation Principle 184 *9.6 Summary 186 *9.7 Exercises 186 Chapter 10 Repeated Games 190  *10.1 Finitely Repeated Games 190 *10.2 Infinitely Repeated Games 192 10.2.1 Payoffs 193 10.2.2 Strategies 195 *10.3 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 196 *10.4 Application: Tacit Collusion 201 *10.5 Sequential Interaction and Reputation 204 10.5.1 Cooperation as Reputation 204 10.5.2 Third-Party Institutions as Reputation Mechanisms 205 10.5.3 Reputation Transfers without Third Parties 207 *10.6 The Folk Theorem: Almost Anything Goes 209 *10.7 Summary 214 *10.8 Exercises 215 Chapter 11 Strategic Bargaining 220  *11.1 One Round of Bargaining: The Ultimatum Game 222 *11.2 Finitely Many Rounds of Bargaining 224 *11.3 The Infinite-Horizon Game 228 *11.4 Application: Legislative Bargaining 229 11.4.1 Closed-Rule Bargaining 230 11.4.2 Open-Rule Bargaining 232 *11.5 Summary 235 *11.6 Exercises 236 PART IV Static Games of Incomplete Information   Chapter 12 Bayesian Games 241  *12.1 Strategic Representation of Bayesian Games 246 12.1.1 Players, Actions, Information, and Preferences 246 12.1.2 Deriving Posteriors from a Common Prior: A Player's Beliefs 247 12.1.3 Strategies and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium 249 *12.2 Examples 252 12.2.1 Teenagers and the Game of Chicken 252 12.2.2 Study Groups 255 *12.3 Inefficient Trade and Adverse Selection 258 *12.4 Committee Voting 261 *12.5 Mixed Strategies Revisited: Harsanyi's Interpretation 264 *12.6 Summary 266 *12.7 Exercises 266 Chapter 13 Auctions and Competitive Bidding 270  *13.1 Independent Private Values 272 13.1.1 Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions 272 13.1.2 English Auctions 275 13.1.3 First-Price Sealed-Bid and Dutch Auctions 276 13.1.4 Revenue Equivalence 279 *13.2 Common Values and the Winner's Curse 282 *13.3 Summary 285 *13.4 Exercises 285 Chapter 14 Mechanism Design 288  *14.1 Setup: Mechanisms as Bayesian Games 288 14.1.1 The Players 288 14.1.2 The Mechanism Designer 289 14.1.3 The Mechanism Game 290 *14.2 The Revelation Principle 292 *14.3 Dominant Strategies and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms 295 14.3.1 Dominant Strategy Implementation 295 14.3.2 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms 295 *14.4 Summary 299 *14.5 Exercises 299 PART V Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information   Chapter 15 Sequential Rationality with Incomplete Information 303  *15.1 The Problem with Subgame Perfection 303 *15.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 307 *15.3 Sequential Equilibrium 312 *15.4 Summary 314 *15.5 Exercises 314 Chapter 16 Signaling Games 318  *16.1 Education Signaling: The MBA Game 319 *16.2 Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence 323 16.2.1 Separating Equilibria 324 16.2.2 Pooling Equilibria 330 *16.3 Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games 332 *16.4 Summary 335 *16.5 Exercises 335 Chapter 17 Building a Reputation 339  *17.1 Cooperation in a Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 339 *17.2 Driving a Tough Bargain 342 *17.3 A Reputation for Being \"Nice\" 349 *17.4 Summary 354 *17.5 Exercises 354 Chapter 18 Information Transmission and Cheap Talk 357  *18.1 Information Transmission: A Finite Example 358 *18.2 Information Transmission: The Continuous Case 361 *18.3 Application: Information and Legislative Organization 365 *18.4 Summary 367 *18.5 Exercises 367 Chapter 19 Mathematical Appendix 369  *19.1 Sets and Sequences 369 19.1.1 Basic Definitions 369 19.1.2 Basic Set Operations 370 *19.2 Functions 371 19.2.1 Basic Definitions 371 19.2.2 Continuity 372 *19.3 Calculus and Optimization 373 19.3.1 Basic Definitions 373 19.3.2 Differentiation and Optimization 374 19.3.3 Integration 377 *19.4 Probability and Random Variables 378  19.4.1 Basic Definitions 378 19.4.2 Cumulative Distribution and Density Functions 379 19.4.3 Independence, Conditional Probability, and Bayes' Rule 380 19.4.4 Expected Values 382   References 385 Index 389","brand":"Princeton University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48865519370583,"sku":"9780691129082","price":55.8,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780691129082.jpg?v=1722274360"},{"product_id":"a-cooperative-species-9780691158167","title":"A Cooperative Species","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhy do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded behavior is widespread and cannot be explained simply by far-sighted self-interest or a desire to help close genealogical kin. In A Cooperative Specie\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"The achievement of Bowles and Gintis is to have put together from the many disparate sources of evidence a story as plausible as any we're likely to get in the present state of behavioural sciences of how human beings came to be as co-operative as they are.\"--W.G. Runciman, London Review of Books \"In A Cooperative Species, economists Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis update their ideas on the evolutionary origins of altruism. Containing new data and analysis, their book is a sustained and detailed argument for how genes and culture have together shaped our ability to cooperate... By presenting clear models that are tied tightly to empirically derived parameters, Bowles and Gintis encourage much-needed debate on the origins of human cooperation.\"--Peter Richerson, Nature \"An outstanding book that presents an important contribution and quite simply raises the scientific standard associated with the difficult and contentious problem of how human altruism evolved.\"--Charles Efferson, Economic Journal \"A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution states a clearly articulated gene-culture coevolution explanation for why we are a cooperative species. It is a read that will stretch readers' minds a bit, and I think it is an eminently valuable read... I await with eagerness the next time Bowles and Gintis are out cooperating again.\"--Jonathan D. Springer, PsycCRITIQUES \"[T]he authors' systematic and mathematical approach will appeal to any reader seriously interested in learning about alternative theories of adaptive altruism, and their treatment of cultural inheritance using population-genetic models is first-rate. Although this book will by no means settle the debate surrounding the evolutionary origin of altruism, it is a worthy addition and is well worth reading.\"--P. William Hughes, Journal of Economic Issues \"Bowles and Gintis are clearly not short of ideas. The attention they draw to the role of conflict and coordinated punishment in the evolution of our cooperative and reciprocal species makes the book very much worth reading. Their focus on the evolution of human nature also paints a much richer picture of our behavior than traditional economics tends to do.\"--Journal of Economic Literature \"Bowles and Gintis are not the first to claim that competition, conflict, and war between human groups is the foundation of cooperation and of society. However, their integration of this insight into evolutionary game theory stands to increase the accessibility of this powerful idea to a large number of scholars working in a dominant theoretical perspective that spans the social and biological sciences. This is one reason why I recommend their new book A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution.\"--Noah Mark, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation \"This book makes a strong case for returning as a discipline to this vexed theme. I can only hope we do so with the analytical ingenuity and empirical humility that Bowles and Gintis display.\"--Jacob G. Foster, American Journal of Sociology \"Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution should be of interest to individuals across multiple disciplines. The book provides a compelling argument supported by multiple kinds of theoretical and empirical evidence. Although the book does use some technical language and examples in places, the explanation is sufficiently clear to make the main ideas and arguments of the book accessible to individuals who were not previously familiar with these technicalities.\"--Christopher M. Caldwell, Metapsychology Online \"[This book] makes important contributions to our understanding of the nature and function of emotions in politics, including the evolution of emotion and cognition and their linkages to democratic governance... [It] should become [an] important resource for students of politics who have the requisite background in the behavioral sciences and wish to develop an integrated, life science perspective in their own work.\"--Michael S. Latner, Politics and the Life Sciences\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePreface xi Chapter 1: A Cooperative Species 1   Chapter 2: The Evolution of Altruism in Humans 8 2.1 Preferences, Beliefs, and Constraints 9 2.2 Social Preferences and Social Dilemmas 10 2.3 Genes, Culture, Groups, and Institutions 13 2.4 Preview 18   Chapter 3: Social Preferences 19 3.1 Strong Reciprocity Is Common 20 3.2 Free-Riders Undermine Cooperation 22 3.3 Altruistic Punishment Sustains Cooperation 24 3.4 Effective Punishment Depends on Legitimacy 26 3.5 Purely Symbolic Punishment Is Effective 29 3.6 People Punish Those Who Hurt Others 31 3.7 Social Preferences Are Not Irrational 32 3.8 Culture and InstitutionsMatter 33 3.9 Behavior Is Conditioned on Group Membership 35 3.10 People Enjoy Cooperating and Punishing Free-Riders 38 3.11 Social Preferences in Laboratory and Natural Settings 39 3.12 Competing Explanations 42   Chapter 4: The Sociobiology of Human Cooperation 46 4.1 Inclusive Fitness and Human Cooperation 48 4.2 Modeling Multi-level Selection 52 4.3 EquilibriumSelection 57 4.4 Reciprocal Altruism 59 4.5 Reciprocal Altruism in Large Groups 63 4.6 Reputation: Indirect Reciprocity 68 4.7 Altruism as a Signal of Quality 71 4.8 Positive Assortment 72 4.9 Mechanisms and Motives 75   Chapter 5: Cooperative Homo economicus 79 5.1 Folk Theorems and Evolutionary Dynamics 80 5.2 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 83 5.3 The Folk Theorem with Private Information 86 5.4 Evolutionarily Irrelevant Equilibria 87 5.5 Social Norms and Correlated Equilibria 89 5.6 The Missing Choreographer 90   Chapter 6: Ancestral Human Society 93 6.1 Cosmopolitan Ancestors 95 6.2 Genetic Evidence 99 6.3 PrehistoricWarfare 102 6.4 The Foundations of Social Order 106 6.5 The Crucible of Cooperation 110   Chapter 7: The Coevolution of Institutions and Behaviors 111 7.1 Selective Extinction 115 7.2 Reproductive Leveling 117 7.3 Genetic Differentiation between Groups 120 7.4 Deme Extinction and the Evolution of Altruism 121 7.5 The Australian Laboratory 123 7.6 The Coevolution of Institutions and Altruism 124 7.7 Simulating Gene-Culture Coevolution 126 7.8 Levelers and Warriors 130   Chapter 8: Parochialism, Altruism, andWar 133 8.1 Parochial Altruism and War 135 8.2 The Emergence of Parochial Altruism and War 138 8.3 Simulated and Experimental Parochial Altruism 142 8.4 The Legacy of a Past \"Red in Tooth and Claw\" 146   Chapter 9: The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity 148 9.1 Coordinated Punishment 150 9.2 Altruistic Punishment in a Realistic Demography 156 9.3 The Emergence of Strong Reciprocity 159 9.4 Why Coordinated Punishment Succeeds 163 9.5 A Decentralized Social Order 164   Chapter 10: Socialization 167 10.1 Cultural Transmission 168 10.2 Socialization and the Survival of Fitness-Reducing Norms 171 10.3 Genes, Culture, and the Internalization of Norms 173 10.4 The Internalized Norm as Hitchhiker 176 10.5 The Gene-Culture Coevolution of a Fitness-Reducing Norm 179 10.6 How Can Internalized Norms Be Altruistic? 180 10.7 The Programmable Brain 183 11Social Emotions 186 11.1 Reciprocity, Shame, and Punishment 188 11.2 The Evolution of Social Emotions 191 11.3 The \"Great Captains of Our Lives\" 192 12Conclusion: Human Cooperation and Its Evolution 195 12.1 The Origins of Human Cooperation 196 12.2 The Future of Cooperation 199   Appendix 201 A1 Altruism Defined 201 A2 Agent-Based Models 202 A3 Game Theory 207 A4 Dynamical Systems 209 A5 The Replicator Dynamic 212 A6 Continuation Probability and Time Discount Factor 213 A7 Alternatives to the Standing Model 214  A8 The Prisoner's Dilemma with Public and Private Signals 215 A9 Student and Nonstudent Experimental Subjects 217 A10 The Price Equation 218 A11 Weak Multi-level Selection 222 A12 Cooperation and Punishment with Quorum Sensing 223   References 225 Subject Index 251 Author Index 255","brand":"Princeton University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48865528906071,"sku":"9780691158167","price":25.2,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780691158167.jpg?v=1722274406"},{"product_id":"the-bounds-of-reason-9780691160849","title":"The Bounds of Reason","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eGame theory is central to understanding human behavior and relevant to all of the behavioral sciences - from biology and economics, to anthropology and political science. This title demonstrates, game theory alone cannot fully explain human behavior and should instead complement other key concepts championed by the behavioral disciplines.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"The Bounds of Reason appears as two books in one. One part develops an epistemic theory of the rational actor as an alternative to what is provided by classical game theory, and the other part is a spirited plea to use behavioral game theory as a unifying tool in all behavioral sciences. Both objectives are highly valuable, but combing them both creates friction. Friction creates heat, and Gintis, who thrives gleefully on controversial issues, may be enjoying the prospect of heated discussions.\"--Karl Sigmund, American Scientist \"Gintis' work reflects an amazing breadth of knowledge of the behavioural sciences. He is ever ready to pose unusual questions and to defend unorthodox proposals. The Bounds of Reason is Gintis' most ambitious project to date, one that draws upon all of his extraordinary originality and learning.\"--Peter Vanderschraaf, Journal of Economics and Philosophy \"The book is a combination of an excellent textbook on game theory and an innovation treatise advocating the unification of the behavioural sciences and refounding of game theory on different epistemic foundations... It is clearly an important contribution to the current debate over the rational actor model that the rise of behaviourial economics has provoked.\"--Oxonomics\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePreface xi  1 Decision Theory and Human Behavior 1  1.1 Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints 4  1.2 The Rationality of Time Inconsistency 9  1.3 Bayesian Rationality and Subjective Priors 12  1.4 Preferences Are State-Dependent 16  1.5 The Behavioral Revolution 18  2 Game Theory: Basic Concepts 33  2.1 The Extensive Form 33  2.2 The Normal Form 36  2.3 Nash Equilibrium 38  2.4 Correlated Equilibrium 47  3 Game Theory and Human Behavior 48  3.1 Behavioral Game Theory 49  3.2 Character Virtues 76  3.3 The Situational Character of Preferences 78  3.4 The Dark Side of Altruistic Cooperation 79  3.5 Norms of Cooperation: Cross-Cultural Variation 81  4 Rationalizability and Common Knowledge of Rationality 86  4.1 Dominated and Iteratedly Dominated Strategies 87  4.2 Epistemic Games 94  4.3 Rationalizable Strategies 98  4.4 Common Knowledge of Rationality 100  5 Extensive Form Rationalizability 106  5.1 Backward Induction and Dominated Strategies 106  5.2 CKR Fails off the Backward Induction Path 113  5.3 How to Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 114  5.4 Backward Induction and Extensive Form CKR 116  5.5 On the Inadmissibility of CKR 120  6 The Logical Antinomies of Knowledge 123  6.1 The Pitfalls of Na..ive Epistemic Logic 123  6.2 The Common Knowledge of Logicality Paradox 124  6.3 The Surprise Examination 125  6.4 The Modal Logic of Knowledge 126  6.5 A Truth That Cannot Be Known 128  7 The Mixing Problem: Purification and Conjectures 131  7.1 The Incoherence of Mixed Strategies 131  7.2 Purifying Mixed Strategies 133  7.3 A Reputational Model of Honesty and Corruption 135  7.4 Epistemic Games: Mixed Strategies as Conjectures 138  8 Bayesian Rationality and Social Epistemology 142  8.1 The Sexes: From Battle to Ballet 143  8.2 The Choreographer Trumps Backward Induction 144  8.3 Convention as Correlated Equilibrium 146  8.4 The Social Epistemology of Common Priors 149  8.5 The Social Epistemology of Common Knowledge 151  8.6 Social Norms 153  8.7 Game Theory and the Evolution of Norms 153  9 Common Knowledge and Nash Equilibrium 156  9.1 Nash Equilibrium in Two-Player Games 156  9.2 The Modal Logic of Common Knowledge 159  9.3 The Commonality of Knowledge 162  9.4 The Demise of Methodological Individualism 171  10 The Analytics of Human Sociality 174  10.1 Explaining Cooperation: An Overview 174  10.2 The Folk Theorem 178  10.3 Cooperation with Private Signaling 186  10.4 One Cheer for the Folk Theorem 188  10.5 Altruistic Punishing in the Public Goods Game 190  10.6 The Failure of Models of Self-Regarding Cooperation 193  11 The Unification of the Behavioral Sciences 194  11.1 Gene-Culture Coevolution: The Biological Model 196  11.2 Biological and Cultural Dynamics 202  11.3 The Socio-Psychological Theory of Norms 204  11.4 Socialization and the Internalization of Norms 206  11.5 Varieties of Behavioral Modeling 207  11.6 Society as a Complex Adaptive System 215  11.7 The Behavioral Disciplines Can Be Unified 219  12 Summary 221  12.1 Game Theory 221  12.2 Commonality of Beliefs 221  12.3 The Limits of Rationality 222  12.4 Social Norms as Correlated Equilibria 222  12.5 Reason Is Bounded by Sociality, Not Irrationality 223  13 Table of Symbols 224  References 226  Subject Index 254  Author Index 258","brand":"Princeton University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48865529856343,"sku":"9780691160849","price":27.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780691160849.jpg?v=1722274410"},{"product_id":"beautiful-game-theory-how-soccer-can-help-economics-9780691169255","title":"Beautiful Game Theory  How Soccer Can Help","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"[E]njoyably accessible to nonspecialists, especially sports enthusiasts, who will learn a great deal about soccer, economics, and human behavior more generally.\"--Foreign Affairs \"Beautiful Game Theory shows what it is like to think deeply about a sport and to test your ideas with data... [I]t is a book I recommend unconditionally to those economists with even a passing sport.\"--John Considine, Sportseconomics.org\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIntroduction 1 FIRST HALF 1.Pele Meets John von Neumann in the Penalty Area 9 2.Vernon Smith Meets Messi in the Laboratory 31 3.Lessons for Experimental Design 45 4.Mapping Minimax in the Brain (with Antonio Olivero, Sven Bestmann, Jose Florensa Vila, and Jose Apesteguia) 58 5.Psychological Pressure on the Field and Elsewhere 68 HALFTIME 6.Scoring at Halftime 89 SECOND HALF 7.Favoritism under Social Pressure 107 8.Making the Beautiful Game a Bit Less Beautiful (with Luis Garicano) 124  9.Fear Pitch 151 10.From Argentina without Emotions 164 11.Discrimination: From the Makana Football Association to Europe 174 Acknowledgments 193 References 195 Index 205","brand":"Princeton University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48865534116183,"sku":"9780691169255","price":17.09,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780691169255.jpg?v=1722274434"},{"product_id":"noncooperative-game-theory-9780691175218","title":"Noncooperative Game Theory","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"\u003ci\u003eNoncooperative Game Theory \u003c\/i\u003eoffers students a fresh way of approaching engineering and computer science applications.\" * Mathematical Reviews *\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePreamble xi  I INTRODUCTION  1 Noncooperative Games  1.1 Elements of a Game 3  1.2 Cooperative vs. Noncooperative Games: Rope-Pulling 4  1.3 Robust Designs: Resistive Circuit 8  1.4 Mixed Policies: Network Routing 9  1.5 Nash Equilibrium 11  1.6 Practice Exercise 11  2 Policies  2.1 Actions vs. Policies: Advertising Campaign 13  2.2 Multi-Stage Games:War of Attrition 16  2.3 Open vs. Closed-Loop: Zebra in the Lake 18  2.4 Practice Exercises 19  II ZERO-SUM GAMES  3 Zero-Sum Matrix Games  3.1 Zero-Sum Matrix Games 25  3.2 Security Levels and Policies 26  3.3 Computing Security Levels and Policies with MATLAB(R) 27  3.4 Security vs. Regret: Alternate Play 28  3.5 Security vs. Regret: Simultaneous Plays 28  3.6 Saddle-Point Equilibrium 29  3.7 Saddle-Point Equilibrium vs. Security Levels 30  3.8 Order Interchangeability 32  3.9 Computational Complexity 32  3.10 Practice Exercise 34  3.11 Additional Exercise 34  4 Mixed Policies  4.1 Mixed Policies: Rock-Paper-Scissor 35  4.2 Mixed Action Spaces 37  4.3 Mixed Security Policies and Saddle-Point Equilibrium 38  4.4 Mixed Saddle-Point Equilibrium vs. Average Security Levels 41  4.5 General Zero-Sum Games 43  4.6 Practice Exercises 47  4.7 Additional Exercise 50  5 Minimax Theorem  5.1 Theorem Statement 52  5.2 Convex Hull 53  5.3 Separating Hyperplane Theorem 54  5.4 On theWay to Prove the Minimax Theorem 55  5.5 Proof of the Minimax Theorem 57  5.6 Consequences of the Minimax Theorem 58  5.7 Practice Exercise 58  6 Computation of Mixed Saddle-Point Equilibrium Policies  6.1 Graphical Method 60  6.2 Linear Program Solution 61  6.3 Linear Programs with MATLAB(R) 63  6.4 Strictly Dominating Policies 64  6.5 \"Weakly\" Dominating Policies 66  6.6 Practice Exercises 67  6.7 Additional Exercise 70  7 Games in Extensive Form  7.1 Motivation 71  7.2 Extensive Form Representation 72  7.3 Multi-Stage Games 72  7.4 Pure Policies and Saddle-Point Equilibria 74  7.5 Matrix Form for Games in Extensive Form 75  7.6 Recursive Computation of Equilibria for Single-Stage Games 77  7.7 Feedback Games 79  7.8 Feedback Saddle-Point for Multi-Stage Games 79  7.9 Recursive Computation of Equilibria for Multi-Stage Games 83  7.10 Practice Exercise 85  7.11 Additional Exercises 86  8 Stochastic Policies for Games in Extensive Form  8.1 Mixed Policies and Saddle-Point Equilibria 87  8.2 Behavioral Policies for Games in Extensive Form 90  8.3 Behavioral Saddle-Point Equilibria 91  8.4 Behavioral vs. Mixed Policies 92  8.5 Recursive Computation of Equilibria for Feedback Games 93  8.6 Mixed vs. Behavioral Order Interchangeability 95  8.7 Non-Feedback Games 95  8.8 Practice Exercises 96  8.9 Additional Exercises 102  III NON-ZERO-SUM GAMES  9 Two-Player Non-Zero-Sum Games  9.1 Security Policies and Nash Equilibria 105  9.2 Bimatrix Games 107  9.3 Admissible Nash Equilibria 108  9.4 Mixed Policies 110  9.5 Best-Response Equivalent Games and Order Interchangeability 111  9.6 Practice Exercises 114  9.7 Additional Exercises 116  10 Computation of Nash Equilibria for Bimatrix Games  10.1 Completely Mixed Nash Equilibria 118  10.2 Computation of Completely Mixed Nash Equilibria 120  10.3 Numerical Computation of Mixed Nash Equilibria 121  10.4 Practice Exercise 124  10.5 Additional Exercise 126  11 N-Player Games  11.1 N-Player Games 127  11.2 Pure N-Player Games in Normal Form 129  11.3 Mixed Policies for N-Player Games in Normal Form 130  11.4 Completely Mixed Policies 131  12 Potential Games  12.1 Identical Interests Games 133  12.2 Potential Games 135  12.3 Characterization of Potential Games 138  12.4 Potential Games with Interval Action Spaces 139  12.5 Practice Exercises 142  12.6 Additional Exercise 144  13 Classes of Potential Games  13.1 Identical Interests Plus Dummy Games 145  13.2 Decoupled Plus Dummy Games 146  13.3 Bilateral Symmetric Games 147  13.4 Congestion Games 148  13.5 Other Potential Games 149  13.6 Distributed Resource Allocation 150  13.7 Computation of Nash Equilibria for Potential Games 153  13.8 Fictitious Play 156  13.9 Practice Exercises 159  13.10 Additional Exercises 167  IV DYNAMIC GAMES  14 Dynamic Games  14.1 Game Dynamics 171  14.2 Information Structures 173  14.3 Continuous-Time Differential Games 175  14.4 Differential Games with Variable Termination Time 177  15 One-Player Dynamic Games  15.1 One-Player Discrete-Time Games 178  15.2 Discrete-Time Cost-To-Go 179  15.3 Discrete-Time Dynamic Programming 179  15.4 Computational Complexity 184  15.5 Solving Finite One-Player Games with MATLAB(R) 186  15.6 Linear Quadratic Dynamic Games 187  15.7 Practice Exercise 187  15.8 Additional Exercise 189  16 One-Player Differential Games  16.1 One-Player Continuous-Time Differential Games 190  16.2 Continuous-Time Cost-To-Go 191  16.3 Continuous-Time Dynamic Programming 191  16.4 Linear Quadratic Dynamic Games 195  16.5 Differential Games with Variable Termination Time 196  16.6 Practice Exercise 198  17 State-Feedback Zero-Sum Dynamic Games  17.1 Zero-Sum Dynamic Games in Discrete Time 201  17.2 Discrete-Time Dynamic Programming 203  17.3 Solving Finite Zero-Sum Games with MATLAB(R) 205  17.4 Linear Quadratic Dynamic Games 206  17.5 Practice Exercise 209  18 State-Feedback Zero-Sum Differential Games  18.1 Zero-Sum Dynamic Games in Continuous Time 214  18.2 Linear Quadratic Dynamic Games 216  18.3 Differential Games with Variable Termination Time 219  18.4 Pursuit-Evasion 220  18.5 Practice Exercise 222  References 223  Index 225","brand":"Princeton University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48865536737623,"sku":"9780691175218","price":57.8,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780691175218.jpg?v=1722274447"},{"product_id":"chicago-price-theory-9780691192970","title":"Chicago Price Theory","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrice theory is a powerful analytical toolkit for measuring, explaining, and predicting human behavior in the marketplace. This incisive textbook provides an essential introduction to the subject, offering a diverse array of practical methods that empower students to learn by doing.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"A tremendous resource. This comprehensive and innovative book brings together in one great package the Chicago way of thinking about price theory.\"\u003cb\u003e—Douglas A. Irwin, author of \u003ci\u003eFree Trade under Fire \u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e","brand":"Princeton University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48865543291223,"sku":"9780691192970","price":54.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780691192970.jpg?v=1722274477"},{"product_id":"games-strategies-and-decision-making-9781429239967","title":"Games Strategies and Decision Making","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis text offers a wealth of diverse, intriguing applications to show where game theory works, where it doesn''t, and why. Accessible to all university students, the book conveys the power, appeal, and beauty of game-theoretic logic, emphasizing problem solving over answers.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Macmillan Learning","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48867039510871,"sku":"9781429239967","price":75.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}]},{"product_id":"co-opetition-9781861975072","title":"Co-Opetition","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eCo-opetition offers a new way of thinking that combines competition and cooperation. It is the first book to adapt game theory to the needs of CEOs, managers and entrepreneurs.  Though often compared to games like chess or poker, business is different - people are free to change the rules, the players, the boundaries, even the game itself. The essence of business success lies in making sure you are in the right game. Actively shaping which game you play, and how you play it, is the core of the innovative business strategy laid out in Co-opetition. Barry Nalebuff and Adam Brandenburger, professors at Yale and Harvard, are pioneers in the practice of applying the science of game theory to the art of corporate strategy. They have devised a practice-oriented model to help you break out of the traditional win-lose or lose-lose situations. Dozens of companies - including Intel, Nintendo, American Express and Nutrasweet - have been using the strategies of co-opetition to change their game and enjoy the benefits of win-win opportunities.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eSeize on Co-opetition * The Economist *\u003cbr\u003eDo read Co-opetition. You will certainly learn a great deal, while having fun at the same time. -- Rudi Bogni * Times Higher Education Supplement *\u003cbr\u003eA terrific book! * Tom Peters *","brand":"Profile Books Ltd","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48868832903511,"sku":"9781861975072","price":10.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9781861975072.jpg?v=1722289933"},{"product_id":"dynamic-economic-analysis-9781107443792","title":"Dynamic Economic Analysis","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFor advanced students in economics, this textbook provides a clear and concise introduction to dynamic economic theory and analysis. Sorger guides students step-by-step through the most popular model structures and solution concepts, from the simplest dynamic economic models to complex problems of dynamic general equilibrium frameworks.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e'This book offers a comprehensive vision of economic dynamics suitable for graduate students and professionals alike. Gerhard Sorger is a leading researcher with a flair for presenting mathematically challenging theories carefully and rigorously. His text emphasizes the interplay between formal theory and applications with detailed developments of a catalogue of economic models and examples drawn from macroeconomics, growth theory and game theory. There is no other single book readily accessible in the economics literature covering the same wide range of deterministic dynamics and optimization theories with detailed illustrations of those theories in action. It is accessible to students engaged in a self-study program for students engaging with dynamical systems for the first time. Better yet, it offers the topics and treatments for a course in dynamics.' Robert A. Becker, Indiana University, Bloomington\u003cbr\u003e'This is a beautifully written book, providing a completely self-contained introduction to dynamic economic methods and models for graduate students in economics. The masterly exposition strikes a perfect balance between a user-friendly approach and a completely rigorous presentation of the subject matter. The style of writing is marked by exceptional clarity, very much in keeping with the high standards set by the author in his research contributions. The book is neatly divided into two parts, the first providing a comprehensive account of the theory of dynamical systems, and the second the theory and applications of dynamic optimization in settings with single and multiple decision makers. The chapters on Autonomous Difference Equations and Optimization Techniques are real gems, and should form the core material in any course on dynamic economic analysis.' Tapan Mitra, Goldwin Smith Professor of Economics, Cornell University\u003cbr\u003e'Up to now, there are very few books available at the graduate level that introduce the necessary mathematical techniques to study macroeconomics from the viewpoint of nonlinear dynamics. Gerhard Sorger is one of the few theorists who have made profound contributions to the subject. His book beautifully introduces the basic results and synthesizes the latest developments in the discrete time nonlinear growth models. This book is ideally suited as a textbook for graduate courses in macroeconomics and mathematical economics. Gerhard Sorger should be congratulated on his efforts to educate young researchers. I highly recommend this book.' Kazuo Nishimura, RIEB, Kobe University\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePreface; Part I. Difference Equations: 1. Basic concepts; 2. Linear difference equations; 3. Autonomous difference equations; 4. One-dimensional maps; Part II. Dynamic Optimization: 5. Optimization techniques; 6. Dynamic inconsistency and commitment; 7. Dynamic games; 8. Dynamic competitive equilibrium; References; Index.","brand":"Cambridge University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48885255504215,"sku":"9781107443792","price":33.24,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}]},{"product_id":"game-theory-applications-9781560722663","title":"Game Theory \u0026 Applications","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eGame Theory \u0026amp; Applications","brand":"Nova Science Publishers Inc","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48886318530903,"sku":"9781560722663","price":106.39,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9781560722663.jpg?v=1722539601"},{"product_id":"game-theory-applications-volume-4-9781560726296","title":"Game Theory \u0026 Applications: Volume 4","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eGame Theory \u0026amp; Applications Volume 4","brand":"Nova Science Publishers Inc","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48886327476567,"sku":"9781560726296","price":106.39,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9781560726296.jpg?v=1722539635"},{"product_id":"game-theory-strategies-equilibria-theorems-9781604568448","title":"Game Theory: Strategies, Equilibria, \u0026 Theorems","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eGame theory is the research field to analyse the whole system as a group of many components interacting with each other. Considering the terms in game theory, the idea could be mapped into human''s rationality in social science or the forces of nature affecting all of natural phenomenon in fundamental level, and the relationship could be described with many sub-theories of game theory like non-co-operative game or co-operative game. Most of events and situations could be projected by the eye of game theory on the aspect that there always exist conflicts and co-operation on the interactions in them. Game theory was originated form economics, one of social science, but it applies to not just social system but also the realm of nature. For example we could see the molecular world of materials with game theoretic viewpoint. Molecules in material are connected or interacted with each other by several different kinds of physical forces like metallic bond, ionic bond, van der Waals forces, etc. This book provides leading-edge research from around the world on this field.","brand":"Nova Science Publishers Inc","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48886652404055,"sku":"9781604568448","price":129.74,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9781604568448.jpg?v=1722541050"},{"product_id":"game-theory-applications-volume-15-9781614701873","title":"Game Theory \u0026 Applications: Volume 15","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e","brand":"Nova Science Publishers Inc","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48886849798487,"sku":"9781614701873","price":146.24,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9781614701873.jpg?v=1722541863"},{"product_id":"game-theory-applications-volume-16-9781626184442","title":"Game Theory \u0026 Applications: Volume 16","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis book brings together papers of well-known specialists in game theory and adjacent problems. It presents the basic results in dynamic games, stochastic games, applications of game theoretical methods in ecology and economics and methodological aspects of game theory. Special attention was given to problems in dynamic games under partial information and to the development of numerical methods for high-dimensional games (there is an increasing focus on this arena as recent theory is leading to solution methods for problems which were heretofore quite intractable). The interdisciplinary aspects touched upon were related to dynamical systems via replicator dynamics, with probability (measure-valued processes), with statistical mechanics (kinetic equation, non-equilibrium behaviour), with max-plus (or tropical, or idempotent) mathematics. In this volume, we publish the review of Martin Shubik (The Present and Future of Game Theory) and the contributions presenting extending versions of the talks given at the workshop \"Game Theory for Finance, Social and Biological Sciences\", held in Warwick 14-17 April 2010. The conference was exclusively marked by a rare natural event: the eruption of an Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull, which blocked the functioning of most of the airlines, turning the way back for many participants to an adventurous enterprise.","brand":"Nova Science Publishers Inc","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48887042244951,"sku":"9781626184442","price":159.74,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9781626184442.jpg?v=1722542728"},{"product_id":"game-theory-applications-volume-17-game-theoretic-models-in-mathematical-ecology-9781634834896","title":"Game Theory \u0026 Applications: Volume 17 --","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe idea of this book is to demonstrate the tendency of modern research in mathematical ecology using the optimal control theory and game-theoretic methods. The book introduces the modelling of environmental systems through conceptual game-theoretic models, showing the importance of the equilibrium behavior under resource extraction. Using discrete and continuous models of biological and physical processes, the behavior of ecological-economic systems is represented by models with analytic or numerical solutions. A range of mathematical methods including analytic and approximate methods for equilibrium definition, cooperative and collective behavior determination are used to explore such models. The main feature of the presented investigations is characterised by time consistent, stabilised, collective and cooperative concepts in ecological-economic systems. This book is recommended for researchers and post-graduate students of management, economic and in the applied mathematics departments.","brand":"Nova Science Publishers Inc","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":48887207264599,"sku":"9781634834896","price":127.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9781634834896.jpg?v=1722543512"},{"product_id":"design-thinking-for-strategy-innovating-towards-competitive-advantage-9783030258771","title":"Design Thinking for Strategy: Innovating Towards","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe business environment is changing more rapidly than ever before, and new business ideas are emerging. This book discusses applying insights from design thinking to craft novel strategies that satisfy customer needs, make use of the available capabilities, integrate requirements for financial success and provide competitive advantage.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIt guides readers through the jungle encountered when developing a strategy for sustained growth and profitability. It addresses strategy design in a holistic way by applying abductive reasoning, iteratively observing customers and focusing on empathy, as well as prototyping ideas and using customers to validate them.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e Uniquely applying insights from design thinking to strategy, this book is a must-read for graduates, MBAs and executives interested in innovation and strategy, as well as corporate strategists, innovation managers, business analysts and consultants.\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePart I: The Concepts and Theories Behind Innovative Strategy Design.- Part II: A Structured Approach to Strategy Development.- Part III: Laying the Foundation for a Successful Strategy.- Part IV: Iteratively Developing the Business Model Underlying the Strategy.- Part V: Exposing the Designed Strategy to the Competitive Environment.","brand":"Springer Nature Switzerland AG","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49084748693847,"sku":"9783030258771","price":44.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}]},{"product_id":"strategy-an-introduction-to-game-theory-9780393918380","title":"Strategy An Introduction to Game Theory","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe perfect balance of readability and formalism.","brand":"WW Norton \u0026 Co","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49371711930711,"sku":"9780393918380","price":96.9,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}]},{"product_id":"the-world-the-game-theorists-made-9780226097039","title":"The World the Game Theorists Made","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eDrawing on a diverse collection of institutional archives, personal correspondence and papers, and interviews, the author shows how game theory offered social scientists, biologists, military strategists, and others a common, flexible language that could facilitate wide-ranging thought and debate on some of the most critical issues of the day.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"Erickson has written a vital book. He shows how game theory has survived despite its repeated failure to fulfill the highest hopes of its exponents. This is an outstanding and sure-to-be influential study of twentieth-century science and social thought.\" (Joel Isaac, Christ's College, Cambridge)","brand":"The University of Chicago Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49399941071191,"sku":"9780226097039","price":91.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780226097039.jpg?v=1730469214"},{"product_id":"the-world-the-game-theorists-made-9780226097176","title":"The World the Game Theorists Made","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eDrawing on a diverse collection of institutional archives, personal correspondence and papers, and interviews, the author shows how game theory offered social scientists, biologists, military strategists, and others a common, flexible language that could facilitate wide-ranging thought and debate on some of the most critical issues of the day.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"Erickson has written a vital book. He shows how game theory has survived despite its repeated failure to fulfill the highest hopes of its exponents. This is an outstanding and sure-to-be influential study of twentieth-century science and social thought.\" (Joel Isaac, Christ's College, Cambridge)","brand":"The University of Chicago Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49399941235031,"sku":"9780226097176","price":31.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780226097176.jpg?v=1730469214"},{"product_id":"towards-reading-freud-selfcreation-in-milton-wordsworth-emerson-and-sigmund-freud-9780226112725","title":"Towards Reading Freud SelfCreation in Milton","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn this application of game theory to political phenomena, Cohen focuses on Chile and Brazil. He explores why democratic reforms failed in Latin America, arguing that political outcomes cannot be explained without treating beliefs and preferences as having a causal force in their own right.","brand":"The University of Chicago Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49399946707287,"sku":"9780226112725","price":28.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780226112725.jpg?v=1730469233"},{"product_id":"a-course-in-game-theory-9780262650403","title":"A Course in Game Theory","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e","brand":"MIT Press Ltd","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49400710857047,"sku":"9780262650403","price":999.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false}]},{"product_id":"applied-econometrics-with-r-9780387773162","title":"Applied Econometrics with R","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eR is a language and environment for data analysis and graphics. (2) R is free software that can be downloaded and installed at no cost from a family of mirror sites around the globe, the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN);\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003eResearchers in quantitative social sciences in general, and econometrics in particular, have often favored scripting languages such as GAUSS or Stat, or packages such as EViews. Introducing R to this particular audience could therefore be a well-appreciated title among the growing number of publications about R…. So, is this a good introduction of R for econometricians? Absolutely— with a well-rounded selection of available methodologies, both classic and current, and a good focus on introducing graphical methods, as well as gently covering more novel and therefore less familiar approaches, it fulfills its task with aplomb. The writing style is conversational without being shallow. (Dirk Eddelbuettel, Journal of Statistical Software, February 2009, Vol. 29, Book Review 14)\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIntroduction. - Basics. - Linear Regression. - Diagnostics and alternative methods of regression. - Models of microeconometrics. - Time series. - Programming your own analysis. - References. - Index.","brand":"Springer-Verlag New York Inc.","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49401972621655,"sku":"9780387773162","price":71.24,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}]},{"product_id":"an-introduction-to-linear-programming-and-game-theory-9780470232866","title":"An Introduction to Linear Programming and Game","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003ePraise for the Second Edition:\u003c\/b\u003e  \u003cp\u003eThis is quite a well-done book: very tightly organized, better-than-average exposition, and numerous examples, illustrations, and applications.\u003cbr\u003e \u003ci\u003eMathematical Reviews of the American Mathematical Society\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eAn Introduction to Linear Programming and Game Theory, Third Edition\u003c\/i\u003e presents a rigorous, yet accessible, introduction to the theoretical concepts and computational techniques of linear programming and game theory. Now with more extensive modeling exercises and detailed integer programming examples, this book uniquely illustrates how mathematics can be used in real-world applications in the social, life, and managerial sciences, providing readers with the opportunity to develop and apply their analytical abilities when solving realistic problems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis Third Edition addresses various new topics and improvements in the field of mathematical programming, and it also presents two software programs, LP Assistant and t\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePreface xi\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1 Mathematical Models 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.1 Applying Mathematics 1\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.2 The Diet Problem 2\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.3 The Prisoner's Dilemma 5\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.4 The Roles of Linear Programming and Game Theory 8\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2 The Linear Programming Model 9\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.1 History 9\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.2 The Blending Model 10\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.3 The Production Model 21\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.4 The Transportation Model 34\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.5 The Dynamic Planning Model 38\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.6 Summary 47\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3 The Simplex Method 57\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.1 The General Problem 57\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.2 Linear Equations and Basic Feasible Solutions 63\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.3 Introduction to the Simplex Method 72\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.4 Theory of the Simplex Method 77\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.5 The Simplex Tableau and Examples 85\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.6 Artificial Variables 93\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.7 Redundant Systems 101\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.8 A Convergence Proof 106\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.9 Linear Programming and Convexity 110\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.10 Spreadsheet Solution of a Linear Programming Problem 115\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4 Duality 121\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.1 Introduction to Duality 121\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.2 Definition of the Dual Problem 123\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3 Examples and Interpretations 132\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.4 The Duality Theorem 138\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.5 The Complementary Slackness Theorem 154\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5 Sensitivity Analysis 161\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.1 Examples in Sensitivity Analysis 161\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.2 Matrix Representation of the Simplex Algorithm 175\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.3 Changes in the Objective Function 183\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.4 Addition of a New Variable 189\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.5 Changes in the Constant-Term Column Vector 192\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.6 The Dual Simplex Algorithm 196\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.7 Addition of a Constraint 204\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6 Integer Programming 211\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.1 Introduction to Integer Programming 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.2 Models with Integer Programming Formulations 214\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.3 Gomory's Cutting Plane Algorithm 228\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.4 A Branch and Bound Algorithm 237\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.5 Spreadsheet Solution of an Integer Programming Problem 244\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e7 The Transportation Problem 251\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.1 A Distribution Problem 251\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2 The Transportation Problem 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.3 Applications 282\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e8 Other Topics in Linear Programming 299\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.1 An Example Involving Uncertainty 299\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.2 An Example with Multiple Goals 306\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.3 An Example Using Decomposition 314\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.4 An Example in Data Envelopment Analysis 325\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e9 Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games 337\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.1 Introduction to Game Theory 337\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.2 Some Principles of Decision Making in Game Theory 345\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.3 Saddle Points 350\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.4 Mixed Strategies 353\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.5 The Fundamental Theorem 360\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.6 Computational Techniques 370\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.7 Games People Play 382\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e10 Other Topics in Game Theory 391\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.1 Utility Theory 391\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.2 Two-Person, Non-Zero-Sum Games 393\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.3 Noncooperative Two-Person Games 397\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.4 Cooperative Two-Person Games 404\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.5 The Axioms of Nash 408\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.6 An Example 414\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Vectors and Matrices 417\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eB An Example of Cycling 421\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eC Efficiency of the Simplex Method 423\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eD LP Assistant 427\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eE Microsoft Excel and Solver 431\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBibliography 439\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSolutions to Selected Problems 443\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 457\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"John Wiley \u0026 Sons Inc","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49402306494807,"sku":"9780470232866","price":104.36,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780470232866.jpg?v=1730480012"},{"product_id":"gametheoretic-foundations-for-probability-and-finance-9780470903056","title":"GameTheoretic Foundations for Probability and","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGame-theoretic probability and finance come of age\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGlenn Shafer and Vladimir Vovk's \u003ci\u003eProbability and Finance\u003c\/i\u003e, published in 2001, showed that perfect-information games can be used to define mathematical probability. Based on fifteen years of further research, \u003ci\u003eGame-Theoretic Foundations for Probability and Finance\u003c\/i\u003e presents a mature view of the foundational role game theory can play. Its account of probability theory opens the way to new methods of prediction and testing and makes many statistical methods more transparent and widely usable. Its contributions to finance theory include purely game-theoretic accounts of Ito's stochastic calculus, the capital asset pricing model, the equity premium, and portfolio theory.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eGame-Theoretic Foundations for Probability and Finance\u003c\/i\u003e is a book of research. It is also a teaching resource. Each chapter is supplemented with carefully designed exercises and notes relating the new theory to its historical context\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePreface xi\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgments xv\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart I Examples in Discrete Time 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1 Borel’s Law of Large Numbers 5\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.1 A Protocol for Testing Forecasts 6\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.2 A Game-Theoretic Generalization of Borel’s Theorem 8\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.3 Binary Outcomes 16\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.4 Slackenings and Supermartingales 18\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.5 Calibration 19\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.6 The Computation of Strategies 21\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.7 Exercises 21\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.8 Context 24\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2 Bernoulli’s and De Moivre’s Theorems 31\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.1 Game-Theoretic Expected Value and Probability 33\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.2 Bernoulli’s Theorem for Bounded Forecasting 37\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.3 A Central Limit Theorem 39\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.4 Global Upper Expected Values for Bounded Forecasting 45\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.5 Exercises 46\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.6 Context 49\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3 Some Basic Supermartingales 55\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.1 Kolmogorov’s Martingale 56\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.2 Doléans’s Supermartingale 56\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.3 Hoeffding’s Supermartingale 58\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.4 Bernstein’s Supermartingale 63\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.5 Exercises 66\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.6 Context 67\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4 Kolmogorov’s Law of Large Numbers 69\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.1 Stating Kolmogorov’s Law 70\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.2 Supermartingale Convergence Theorem 73\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3 How Skeptic Forces Convergence 80\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.4 How Reality Forces Divergence 81\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.5 Forcing Games 82\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.6 Exercises 86\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.7 Context 89\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5 The Law of the Iterated Logarithm 93\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.1 Validity of the Iterated-Logarithm Bound 94\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.2 Sharpness of the Iterated-Logarithm Bound 99\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.3 Additional Recent Game-Theoretic Results 100\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.4 Connections with Large Deviation Inequalities 104\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.5 Exercises 104\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.6 Context 106\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart II Abstract Theory in Discrete Time 109\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6 Betting on a Single Outcome 111\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.1 Upper and Lower Expectations 113\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.2 Upper and Lower Probabilities 115\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.3 Upper Expectations with Smaller Domains 118\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.4 Offers 121\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.5 Dropping the Continuity Axiom 125\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.6 Exercises 127\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.7 Context 131\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e7 Abstract Testing Protocols 135\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.1 Terminology and Notation 136\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2 Supermartingales 136\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.3 Global Upper Expected Values 142\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.4 Lindeberg’s Central Limit Theorem for Martingales 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.5 General Abstract Testing Protocols 146\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.6 Making the Results of Part I Abstract 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.7 Exercises 153\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.8 Context 155\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e8 Zero-One Laws 157\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.1 Lévy’s Zero-One Law 158\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.2 Global Upper Expectation 160\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.3 Global Upper and Lower Probabilities 162\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.4 Global Expected Values and Probabilities 163\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.5 Other Zero-One Laws 165\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.6 Exercises 169\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.7 Context 170\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e9 Relation to Measure-Theoretic Probability 175\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.1 Ville’s Theorem 176\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.2 Measure-Theoretic Representation of Upper Expectations 180\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.3 Embedding Game-Theoretic Martingales in Probability Spaces 189\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.4 Exercises 191\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.5 Context 192\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart III Applications in Discrete Time 195\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e10 Using Testing Protocols in Science and Technology 197\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.1 Signals in Open Protocols 198\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.2 Cournot’s Principle 201\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.3 Daltonism 202\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.4 Least Squares 207\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.5 Parametric Statistics with Signals 212\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.6 Quantum Mechanics 215\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.7 Jeffreys’s Law 217\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.8 Exercises 225\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.9 Context 226\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e11 Calibrating Lookbacks and p-Values 229\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.1 Lookback Calibrators 230\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2 Lookback Protocols 235\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3 Lookback Compromises 241\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.4 Lookbacks in Financial Markets 242\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.5 Calibrating p-Values 245\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.6 Exercises 248\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.7 Context 250\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e12 Defensive Forecasting 253\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.1 Defeating Strategies for Skeptic 255\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.2 Calibrated Forecasts 259\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.3 Proving the Calibration Theorems 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.4 Using Calibrated Forecasts for Decision Making 270\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.5 Proving the Decision Theorems 274\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.6 From Theory to Algorithm 286\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.7 Discontinuous Strategies for Skeptic 291\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.8 Exercises 295\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.9 Context 299\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart IV Game-Theoretic Finance 305\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e13 Emergence of Randomness in Idealized Financial Markets 309\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.1 Capital Processes and Instant Enforcement 310\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.2 Emergence of Brownian Randomness 312\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.3 Emergence of Brownian Expectation 320\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.4 Applications of Dubins–Schwarz 325\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.5 Getting Rich Quick with the Axiom of Choice 331\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.6 Exercises 333\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.7 Context 334\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e14 A Game-Theoretic Itô Calculus 339\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.1 Martingale Spaces 340\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.2 Conservatism of Continuous Martingales 348\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.3 Itô Integration 350\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.4 Covariation and Quadratic Variation 355\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.5 Itô’s Formula 357\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.6 Doléans Exponential and Logarithm 358\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.7 Game-Theoretic Expectation and Probability 360\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.8 Game-Theoretic Dubins–Schwarz Theorem 361\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.9 Coherence 362\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.10 Exercises 363\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.11 Context 365\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e15 Numeraires in Market Spaces 371\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.1 Market Spaces 372\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.2 Martingale Theory in Market Spaces 375\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.3 Girsanov’s Theorem 376\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.4 Exercises 382\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.5 Context 382\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e16 Equity Premium and CAPM 385\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.1 Three Fundamental Continuous I-Martingales 387\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.2 Equity Premium 389\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.3 Capital Asset Pricing Model 391\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.4 Theoretical Performance Deficit 395\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.5 Sharpe Ratio 396\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.6 Exercises 397\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.7 Context 398\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e17 Game-Theoretic Portfolio Theory 403\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.1 Stroock–Varadhan Martingales 405\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.2 Boosting Stroock–Varadhan Martingales 407\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.3 Outperforming the Market with Dubins–Schwarz 413\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.4 Jeffreys’s Law in Finance 414\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.5 Exercises 415\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.6 Context 416\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTerminology and Notation 419\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eList of Symbols 425\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 429\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 455\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"John Wiley \u0026 Sons Inc","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49402454704471,"sku":"9780470903056","price":82.76,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780470903056.jpg?v=1730480449"},{"product_id":"gaming-the-market-9780471168133","title":"Gaming the Market","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe first practical trading guide to the revolutionary new science of decision-making\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAccording to the \u003ci\u003eWall Street Journal\u003c\/i\u003e, Game theory is hot. On Wall Street, many of today''s most successful high-rollers now use it to help them make crucial buying and selling decisions. In the first trader''s guide to game theory, economist Ron Shelton uses real-world case studies to demonstrate how game theory works in trading. He provides a model that can be used to predict the profitability of trades and shows traders how to use it to make market buy and sell decisions.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"...a worthwhile read...\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eInteractive Investor\u003c\/i\u003e, Tuesday 17 June 2008\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eWhat is Game Theory?\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003e Basic Ideas About Financial Markets.\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003e The Interaction Between Price Fluctuations and Risk AcceptanceLevels.\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003e Constructing a Game Theoretic Model.\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003e Understanding the Model.\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003e Treasury Bond Futures.\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003e Appendices.\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003e Index.","brand":"John Wiley \u0026 Sons Inc","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49402507166039,"sku":"9780471168133","price":43.12,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780471168133.jpg?v=1730480611"},{"product_id":"who-gets-what-and-why-9780544705289","title":"Who Gets What  and Why","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e","brand":"Harper Business","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49403009270103,"sku":"9780544705289","price":13.18,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780544705289.jpg?v=1730482120"},{"product_id":"playing-with-reality-9780593538180","title":"Playing with Reality","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e","brand":"Penguin Publishing Group","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49403264663895,"sku":"9780593538180","price":19.65,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780593538180.jpg?v=1730482942"},{"product_id":"general-equilibrium-and-game-theory-9780674728738","title":"General Equilibrium and Game Theory","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAndreu Mas-Colell revolutionized our understanding of competitive markets, price formation, and the behavior of market participants. This volume presents the papers that solidified his standing as one of the preeminent economic theorists of our time. It also is invaluable for anyone wishing to study the craft of a master of economic modeling.","brand":"Harvard University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49403605844311,"sku":"9780674728738","price":43.31,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780674728738.jpg?v=1730483968"},{"product_id":"quantal-response-equilibrium-a-stochastic-theory-of-games-9780691124230","title":"Quantal Response Equilibrium  A Stochastic Theory","description":"\u003cb\u003eBook Synopsis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eQuantal Response Equilibrium presents a stochastic theory of games that unites probabilistic choice models developed in psychology and statistics with the Nash equilibrium approach of classical game theory. Nash equilibrium assumes precise and perfect decision making in games, but human behavior is inherently stochastic and people realize that the\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrade Review\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"This book brings together two decades of scholarship on an important model of boundedly rational behavior in strategic decision-making settings. Including numerous important applications in economics, political science, and pure game theory, this unified treatment will be valuable to a wide range of scholars.\"\u003cb\u003e—Timothy Cason, Purdue University\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"Quantal response equilibrium is a standard tool for game theorists and has numerous connections to other tools and applications. This book collects and extends existing material on QRE and is a significant contribution to pure, and especially applied, game theory. No other books explicate QRE systematically beyond the introductory level and these authors are the right team for pulling the core material together.\"\u003cb\u003e—Daniel Friedman, University of California, Santa Cruz\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"Well-written and easy to follow, this book covers the topic of quantal response equilibrium. The notion of stochastic equilibrium has changed the way game theorists think about long-run and short-run equilibrium. Written by three leading experts, this book is of great importance to researchers in economic theory and political science, and to graduate students.\"\u003cb\u003e—David K. Levine, European University Institute\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e*Frontmatter, pg. i*Contents, pg. v*Preface, pg. ix*1. Introduction and Background, pg. 1*2. Quantal Response Equilibrium in Normal-Form Games, pg. 10*3. Quantal Response Equilibrium in Extensive-Form Games, pg. 63*4. Heterogeneity, pg. 88*5. Dynamics and Learning, pg. 112*6. QRE as a Structural Model for Estimation, pg. 141*7. Applications to Game Theory, pg. 161*8. Applications to Political Science, pg. 206*9. Applications to Economics, pg. 248*10. Epilogue: Some Thoughts about Future Research, pg. 281*References, pg. 291*Index, pg. 301","brand":"Princeton University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":49403740029271,"sku":"9780691124230","price":49.3,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0817\/1739\/5799\/files\/9780691124230.jpg?v=1730484409"}],"url":"https:\/\/bookcurl.com\/collections\/game-theory.oembed?page=4","provider":"Book Curl","version":"1.0","type":"link"}